FACTS ARE FACTS

The untold story of India's Partition

WALI KHAN

ABDUL WALI KHAN was born on 11th January, 1917 at Utmanzai in Peshawar District. His initial education was at the Azad High School, established by his father, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Later he studied at the Col. Brown's School, which was run by an Irish retired army officer. By the time he finished school, Wali Khan developed eye trouble and was unable to pursue higher studies.

Abdul Wali Khan began his political career as a Khudai Khidmatgar, and was arrested under the obnoxious Frontier Crimes Regulation during the Quit India Movement in 1942. Since Partition, he has been to prison several times, spending long years behind bars, or detained in his own house. He was elected to the National and Provincial Assemblies in Pakistan and was for years leader of the combined opposition. He has been President of the National Awami Party, the National Democratic Party, the Awami National Party that emerged after the merger of four progressive and anti-imperialist parties, and associated with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement.

Wali Khan is one of the leading lights of the opposition in Pakistan, who has spurned several offers to head governments under various dictatorial regimes. He was firm in his rejection of such a non-elected office, as he wanted to gain power through the democratic process alone. But this has been continuously denied to the people of Pakistan. Even when his Party won the Provincial Election in 1970, he preferred to stay away and allowed his deputy to become the Chief Minister of the North West Frontier Province.

Abdul Wali Khan has travelled widely during the past forty years. He came to Delhi to attend Shrimati Indira Gandhi's funeral in November 1984, and then in December 1985 to participate in the Congress Centenary Celebrations in Bombay along with his party's delegation. In June 1987 he visited India once again to look after his ailing father, who was under treatment in Bombay.

Many people have written about the partition of India, its causes and consequences. A great deal more has yet to see the light of the day. This book highlights an untold version by one who was actively involved in the historical forces at play yet holding on steadfastly to the secular ideals.

Wali Khan, the son of the legendary freedom fighter Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly known as Badshah Khan and Fakhr-i-Afghan, has based his book entirely on classified documents of the British Government that were recently released to the Archives. The picture that emerges from these is highly sensitive and demolishes many old theories about the plan that was executed to divide India into two sovereign dominions and later republics. In doing so, Wali Khan has complimented the British heirarchy for recording those actions which to them must have been inspired by patriotism, but which have raised doubts about their bonafides in this part of the world. The book throws new light on the Muslim League leadership and its British patrons in what was India then. It exposes many stalwarts as mere pawns in an Imperial Game of Divide & Rule. In this case Divide & Quit.

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WALI KHAN

Translation by
Dr Syeda Saiyidain Hameed



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Preface

This book was written under peculiar circumstances. Imprisoned twice during the terms of Field Marshall Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, I had the time but lacked the access to reference materials which were necessary for this purpose. Due to my solitary confinement under the Bhutto regime, I could not even lay my hands on pen and paper to jot down my thoughts. With the help of a few books that came my way, however, I tried to put the record straight by presenting the other side of the picture which had, until this time, always been turned to the wall. It is a pity when the Government of the day presents only one point of view before the people and deliberately suppresses every other . The Government of Pakistan was determined to tamper with historical records and give the public a one-dimensional view, so that it could find religious justification for its political decisions. The purpose was to keep the public in a constant state of ignorance. Suffice to say that history was being fabricated rather than recorded. I felt sometimes that this was a court of law where only the public prosecuter was allowed to present evidence against the accused, while the latter was prohibited from speaking a single word in his defence. I felt as if his hands and feet were manacled and shackled, his lips sealed and his pen confiscated. Could this be called a House of Justice?

These circumstances compelled me to record historical facts, documenting each detail, so that, if not this generation, at least future generations would not be denied access to the truth. I was trying to reveal the true spirit of our political ideology. In my capacity as a member of his political caravan, I felt the inner compulsion to present to my people the truth behind Badshah Khan's Khudai Khidmatgar movement and its struggle for freedom. I used several books and memoirs as documentary evidence

for my statements and contentions. And by force of intellect plus the strength of my political upbringing I hope I have proved the truth behind the Pashtu proverb that whatsoever is yellow, round, and sour, is unmistakably a grapefruit!

After having served one prison term under Bhutto, I arrived in London. First there were medical problems which required attention. I then found time to browse through some of the London libraries.... I soon discovered that certain top-secret and highly confidential documents had been placed in the India Office Library, London. According to British law, after the lapse of a 30-year period, every document becomes public property. Therefore, there is no restriction upon reading or making xerox copies of these highly confidential papers.

For some time I had been in search of concrete evidence to support the main contention of this book. It pleased me no end to find what I was looking for, and I have no doubt that, based on that evidence, those who read this book will agree that Badshah Khan's politics, and the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement was a thorn in the British flesh. The British wanted to preserve their Empire, no matter what the cost. For this it was essential that the internal freedom movements be nipped in the bud.

It was evident to the British that the Indian National Congress was spearheading the internal freedom movements. The Congress represented all the religious groups in the country; Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians or Parsis, anyone could obtain its membership. The British policy was to support other movements in the country with a view to loosening the Congress grip. On the other hand, there was the matter of India's strategic natural location. Surrounded on three sides by vast oceans, its north was protected by the ramparts of the Himalayan range; a few natural passes were the only means of entering the country by land. The fact that those passes linked the country with the USSR posed the only real danger and threat. It was evident that the Khudai Khidmatgars were being clobbered because they refused to succumb to any of the British strategies. First, it was important to understand the genesis of the Anglo-Russian relationship. Therefore, I began my research by examining the archival manuscripts

of the Department of External Affairs.

During the Russian revolution of 1917 when the world witnessed its first ideological state, the British Government devised various strategies to curb its growth. As a matter of routine, the British Viceroy in India used to send his weekly report to the Secretary of State for India in Britain. In return, the Secretary despatched the government policy, pertaining to India, through a weekly courier service. I had a hunch that my problem might be resolved if I could lay my hands on the correspondence that was exchanged between India and Britain, during the months following the death of Lenin. I felt that these despatches would contain the key to the change in British policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

What I discovered in those documents was far beyond my expectations! For, along with their foreign policy documents, I found detailed analyses of the internal affairs of India. I had never really believed the allegations of my elders, who often accused the British of using the most underhand tactics to promote their policies. Having witnessed the lifelong suffering of Badshah Khan which was always attributed to the treatment he and his loyal followers received, I began to suspect that Badshah Khan's hatred for the British was a biased emotion. To blame them for their excesses against him and his men,was understandable, but to hold them responsible for everything that ever went wrong was absurd.... The Congress blamed Britain for creating communal hatred in the country in order to perpetuate their imperialist policies and strengthen their vice-like hold. I often heard them referred to as the bastards who bit the very hand that had fed them for well over one hundred years. The spark they created became a forest fire of communalism. No one, not even the authors of the crime, could find a means of quenching the flame. Having listened to these diatribes of my elders, I always attributed them to a common human fallacy whereby one's own shortcomings are laid at the doorstep of whoever is perceived as the "common enemy".

I did, however, believe that there was an underlying element of truth in the views of the Congress and Badshah Khan. But never could I imagine that their allegations were only a pale reflection of the truth; the truth was uglier. Their mischief exceeded our wildest

imagination. Badshah Khan's and Congress' allegations were far short of the truth. If there was the slightest doubt earlier, it was now totally removed because the documents preserved in the archives bore the official British seal. Housed in the world's most prestigious library, they were signed by no one less than the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India. What more proof could one ask for?

While reading certain portions of these documents, I found myself staggering with disbelief. I could not believe the facts that were staring me in the face. Often I was compelled to close the files and go out for a cup of coffee, before taking courage to look at that bitter truth. To give the devil its due, one cannot help admiring British loyalty which stopped at nothing to ensure maximum benefit for their country. Although it was difficult to accept the unscrupulousness with which these rational and educated people protected the Empire, yet one could not help admire them for their straightforward rendering of the truth. There was neither bias towards their own kind, nor malice towards others. One by one they stripped every one, friends, companions, and fellow-conspirators, to reveal the truth. They did not mince words in describing all the underhand tasks they assigned to their native lackeys. They appeared unconcerned about what would happen if these documents became known to the Indian people and the masks of their so-called leaders were ripped off. The Indian public would be aghast if they realized that these pious leaders and patriots were trafficking in the integrity of their own country, and were the country's enemy number one, besides being traitors and agents of the British Government. The British sense of fair-play did not take any of these factors into consideration

My study of twenty years of correspondence [from 1922-1942] between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India revealed that the earlier study I had made of books and diaries pertaining to the subject was futile. Every detail of the policy was clearly stated in these secret documents which I was now reading. The anti-USSR policy of the British was staring me in the face; all doubts and misgivings were thus removed.

What caused me tremendous embarrassment was the account of

incidents which revealed the character of the leaders of the country. The worst offenders by far were Muslim Leaguers. The allegations levelled against them by the Congress and or Badshah Khan were a fraction of what I found on record in these British documents.

After considerable reflection I made my final decision. The purpose of my book is to give an honest account of the struggle of Badshah Khan and his true followers, the Khudai Khidmatgars. For this purpose these documents were invaluable. Their contents could rip the veil from his enemies faces, especially those who used Islam as a means for strengthening the British imperialim and their colonial regime. This would exonerate Badshah Khan and send his opponents to hell. My purpose, however, was not to malign anyone in particular, but to reveal the true spirit of patriotism underlying our struggle. I want to stop the dirty, filthy rumour-politics which was corrupting the psyche of innocent and devout Muslims. In our country, Muslims have always been denied access to truth and historical evidence. Luckily, however, history has a way of revealing itself sooner or later, no matter how much effort is made to camouflage it with pretty untruths. Just as a diamond glimmers even when buried in kimberlite, so also does truth ultimately emerge! Time has proved the inevitability of this process.

As I have said before, the purpose of writing all this is not to insult anyone but simply to narrate the truth. Concealing truth based on historical evidence is a sin. Having felt so shaken at the facts I uncovered, I wondered how those "true believers in God and the Prophet" would have felt who claimed that they had staked everything for religion! I would have overlooked many shortcomings of the Muslim League, had they been honest about their loyalties. If they liked the British regime, they should have openly supported it. But I cannot condone their heinous act of supporting the imperialist, arrogant, and, above all, the infidel British rule, while hiding behind the veneer of Islam.

Historical facts should be revealed with complete candour so that tomorrow Muslims know better than to trust these Judases. Before enlisting with any leader, Muslims should ensure that they are, once again, not being led down the garden path. The truth is sometimes bitter, but the events recorded in this book will

enlighten many misinformed, misguided persons. As the British love to say, "This is just to put the record straight." I do not consider it necessary to inform my readers of my political point of view; it is perfectly obvious. But I want to assure them that the documents, upon which the facts narrated here are based, are lodged in the India Office Library, London. Whosoever wishes to verify is welcome to read the originals. Meanwhile, I will attempt to prove all my statements:

"Comment is free, but Facts are Facts"

I wrote originally in Pashtu. This was translated into Urdu by my wife, Nasim, which in turn is now being presented in English. I must thank Dr Syeda Saiyidain Hameed for the pains she took over this task. She has preserved the essence of my own writing most admirably.


WALI KHAN

12th July, 1987
Walibagh, Charsadda,
District Peshawar.

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British and the Politics of Communalism

At the start of the 20th century, the British had become a very strong force in the country. Afghanistan had fallen into their hands through the contrivance of Amir Abdur Rahman. All doors to the USSR had been closed. After the war of 1857, the Mughal empire had been completely routed. No military force in the country was strong enough to combat the British. The Sikhs, too, had been put in their place. Six hundred Princely States were British protectorates; their potentates reported to the Viceroy. The British in India had become a super power.

The British were manipulative people experienced in ways of modern sabotage. They seriously set out to find the best means for establishing control over the numerous small kingdoms and millions of individuals. Although they had fought and won several battles, it was not possible to stand guard over each and every territory. Unity among Indians spelt disaster for the British, which they wanted to avoid at all costs. They knew that if the entire nation of Indians decided to stand up united and urinate, they would carry the British Empire in their flood!

The British had successfully stripped the Muslims of all their illusions. They realized that although the Muslims had ruled the country for centuries they were numerically much fewer than the non-Muslims. Their first strategy was to ally themselves with the non-Muslims and take advantage of the rift between the two, but they soon realized the fallacy of this stand. They saw that the Hindus, although in far excess of the Muslims, were almost non-

existent in the neighbouring countries. In the entire neighbourhood, it was the Muslim rule that flourished: from North Africa to the Balkan States, and from Turkey to Afghanistan. And above all, the Kingdom of Osmania, which was the Turkish Empire and the citadel for Pan Islamism.

At the Battle of Plassey, in 1757, the British occupied Bengal, establishing their supremacy over the eastern region. With the defeat of Tipu Sultan, they became the power-brokers in the South. Central India was swallowed up following the war of 1857. Northern India had a little more strength, but that too was destroyed in 1831 when the martyrs of Balakot fell. Another stronghold of the Muslims, Afghanistan, fell in line after the agreement of 1893.

The British were now India's undisputed rulers. All internal and external dangers had been laid to rest. In 1907, an agreement signed with the U.S.S.R., declared a policy of mutual non-interference in Afghan affairs. Now the British were in a position to sit back and survey their conquered territory!

The Muslims were thus pushed into a corner from which they watched and grieved over their tremendous losses. Official attention now centered upon the Hindus. They were appointed clerks in Government offices and given control over all the petty political processes. In trade, too, they were pushed to the forefront. By freely dispensing political patronage, the British were able to influence the educated and professional Hindus as well. In time, however, their growing unity became a grave threat for the British. They saw the danger of facing a united Hindu front.

Having destroyed the Muslims in the 1857 confrontation, the British realized that there was not one single Muslim who could stand up to them. On the contrary, any Muslim with leadership aspirations was anxious to first prove his loyalty to the British. Therefore, it was expedient to appease the Muslims. In 1905 the British divided Bengal in two parts. East Bengal was separated from the West due to a majority population of Muslims. This was a bone thrown at the Muslims! Gradually, however, they began to enjoy this game-playing; alternating favours between Hindus and Muslims was their best strategy.

The fact that the British were now emphasizing education, albeit for training clerks to look after their offices, had a positive influence upon the Indians. Education opened new vistas of understanding. Travel to other countries exposed their minds to contemporary realities. When they saw how democracy worked in other countries, they became aware of their rights and conscious of their deprivation. The majority of this new enlightened class consisted of Hindus. They constituted the majority, had the power and influence to take advantage of Western education, and, produced successful scholars and prosperous businessmen. The new demands for self-determination arose from them.

The Muslim leaders had learnt their lesson from 1857. They were anxious to unite with the Hindus and with other communities to present a unified front against British imperialism. For example, one of their most respected leaders, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who is regarded as the father of communal harmony, said, on 27 January 1884, at a function held in Gurdaspur:

> We [i.e. Hindus and Mohammadans] should try to become one heart and soul, and act in union. In old historical books and traditions you will have read and heard, we see it even now, that all the people inhabiting one country are designated by the term One Nation. The different tribes of Afghanistan are termed One Nation and so the miscellaneous hordes peopling Iran, distinguished by the term Persians, though abounding in variety of thoughts and religions, are still known as members of One Nation.... Remember that the words Hindu and Mohammadan are only means for religious distinction—otherwise all persons whether Hindus or Mohammadans, even the Christians who reside in the country, are all in this particular respect belonging to one and the same Nation.

Perhaps he did not consider this an accurate reflection of his sentiments. Therefore, later that year, at a gathering of the Indian Association at Lahore, he said:

I heartily wished to serve my country and my nation faithfully.

> In the word Nation I include both Hindus and Mohammadans, because that is the only meaning I can attach to it.... These are the different grounds upon which I call both those races which inhabit India by one word, i.e. Hindu, meaning to say that they are the inhabitants of Hindustan.

Sir Syed said that every inhabitant of India, no matter what his personal belief, can be called *a Hindu* by virtue of his belonging to *Hindustan*. The essence of his teaching was that Muslims had to unite with Hindus against the British. The Hindus being the favoured community were being provided employment and education. The Muslims, on the other hand, were being deliberately ignored. Therefore the only way out for them was to join forces with Hindus.

The British were becoming conscious of this merging trend. They realized that their position would be considerably weakened if the two communities got together and presented united opposition. To counter this the British decided to introduce reforms based on communalism. The first of these, the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, was related to elections to local and municipal committees. According to these, Muslim votes could be cast only for the Muslims and the Hindu votes for the Hindus. In this manner the British laid communalism as the foundation-stone of democracy. This was the first blow they inflicted upon Sir Syed's ideals. By proposing a communal rather than a national basis for politics, they forced the Hindus and Muslims into a position whereby if they wanted to enter municipal or community politics, their electioneering was limited to wooing their religious brethren, and fighting on religious rather than political issues.

The British were delighted with the success of this policy. In 1912, East and West Bengal were once again united as one province. The British realized that although the Hindus were in majority in India, their total population was concentrated only in this country; there were not too many of them anywhere else in the world. But the Muslims were spread all over; from Afghanistan to Turkey, from the Balkan Provinces to Northern Africa. They became concerned about the strength of the Muslims, and the

movement of Pan-Islamism. At the start of the First World War the British were bent upon wiping out the Ottoman Empire. How could they turn themselves round, and now side with the Muslims in India? Therefore, once again, they stopped their Muslim patronage.

During this time the second series of reforms were introduced, called the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. These also used communalism as the basis for elections. During the First World War when the British attacked Turkey, the Indian Muslims united to oppose their move. What unnerved the British was Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party joining Maulana Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali in this movement. They realized that their two-nation theory was in danger.

The Khilafat Committee placed four proposals before the Muslims: (i) returning all official titles; (ii) resigning from the Government employment; (iii) resigning from the army and the police; and (iv) refusing to pay taxes.

The British focussed their attention on the second and third proposals, since these were causing the greatest harm and disrepute to the Government. They twisted the facts and interpreted them as a Hindu plot to throw the Muslims out of Government organizations. This was one way to eliminate their chances for advancement. Thus the British successfully turned this exemplary national unity into communal politics.

To destroy the Hindu-Muslim unity the British relied upon their Muslim subjects. The Khilafat Movement was primarily a Muslim movement in which the Hindu participation was a matter of principle. The British encouraged the Muslims to break the unity fostered by Khilafat because they knew that this was the best manner of disillusioning the Hindus. The first anti-Khilafat announcement was made by the Nizam of Hyderabad on 22 May 1920. His "firman" stated that since the Khilafat was an anti-Muslim movement it was henceforth declared illegal. During the Khilafat Movement, Gandhiji and the Ali Brothers had visited Aligarh Muslim University. To reduce the impact of their visit, the British incited the Muslims of Aligarh against the Hindus, on the pretext of protecting Muslim rights.

On the second of November 1921, Mohammad Shafi, a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, presented a two-pronged scheme:

(i) To weaken the movement for a united India, it was essential to lure away the Muslims; this could only be done if the British signed the Peace Treaty with Turkey.

(ii) An Anglo-Mohammadan Union in the interest of the British Empire should be organized.

On 21 September 1922, Viceroy Lord Reading wrote to the Secretary of State for India:

> I have just sent you a telegram, which will show you, how near we have been to a complete break between Muslims and Hindus. I have been giving the greatest attention to this possibility, and I have had the greatest assistance from Shafi on my Council, who is a highly respectable Mohammadan.

As time passed the British realized that the success of their mission was dependant on the cooperation of the Muslims. They decided that first they should announce their willingness to surrender control provided the Hindus and the Muslims were ready to sink their differences. Then they should utilize their influence over the Muslims to make sure that the two parties never cooperated. This was a sure way of creating dependence upon themselves. On this subject the Secretary of State for India, Birkenhead, wrote on 22 January 1925:

> The more it is made obvious that these antagonisms are profound, and affect an immense and irreconcilable section of the population, the more conspicuously is the fact illustrated that we and we alone can play the part of the composers.

The British had to adopt several underhand tactics to reach their goals. But reach they did. On 1 January 1925, the Viceroy announced to the Secretary of State, "The bridge Gandhiji had built to span the gulf between the Hindus and Mohammadans has not only broken down, but, I think, it has completely disappeared."

It worried them somewhat to see the Muslims divided into many factions. All factions, however, were prepared to accept the leadership of the British, while none was prepared to accept the leadership of anyone of their own people. In the same letter, the Viceroy wrote that although the Muslims were united in their support of the British Government but, "there is no outstanding man to compose the differences and head them."

After the meeting with Jinnah, the Viceroy was convinced that Jinnah could be won over. Therefore, he turned his attention towards the Muslim League. On 21 March 1929, he predicted:

> The two wings of the Muslim League are to meet in Delhi at the end of this month, with a rapproachment between Sir Mohammad Shafi and Jinnah. Jinnah may be expected to gain, before long, his former commanding influence in the Muslim League.

During those days, in addition to all other movements, there were two factions of the Muslim League. The first faction was headed by Sir Mohammad Shafi and the second by Jinnah. The British were shocked when even Jinnah declared his support for joint electorates. Efforts began to swing him towards segregated elections. On 20 May 1929, the Viceroy wrote:

> I had a long talk with Jinnah a few days ago, which made it very clear to my mind that he and all the Bombay people, who are not disposed to Congress, are disposed to swing towards our direction if we can give them help later.

Such clairvoyance! Even before the meeting was held the Viceroy knew that the two parties would make peace and that Sir Mohammad Shafi would clear the way for Jinnah. The next step was to organize the party and to raise funds. On 26 November 1929, the Viceroy wrote:

> I hear that suggestions are being put out that government should intervene in some way towards raising funds in order to organise proper Muslim representation, and, of course, we

should like them to have the best advocacy they can find.

The British spared no effort to help establish a well-funded and strong party. On 2 February 1931, the Viceroy wrote an account of his meeting with Sir Fazl-i-Husain, "He [Fazl-i-Husain] developed the view that the only chance of some progress was that a strong party should come into being which should devote itself to fighting the Congress."

An organization was needed to fight against the Congress, and the only available organisation was that of the Muslims. Like masters of the game the British were directing the players from behind the scenes. It seemed as if the Muslim League had played right into British hands. On 9 February 1931, Irwin addressed his party members:

> I told him [Sir Mohammad Shafi] that I thought they would all have to fight hard and that it was no good supposing that a few packed meetings or newspapers articles would do the job. They must go out as whole-time missionaries and carry the flaming torch throughout the length and breadth of India. They must be prepared to build up a great organisation which might focus all constructive efforts to fight the Congress... and they proposed to get to work, vigorous and comprehensive. This is encouraging and I only hope their good resolutions do not fade away. The League prepared a scheme, the financial aspect of which was the responsibility of the Princely States.

This was going according to British plan: first to unite the Muslims of India under a proper organisation, and secondly to tell the world that they were unable to relinquish power because of the hostility between the Hindus and the Muslims. During the First Round Table Conference the British took maximum advantage of the communal differences. The next step was to create the conditions which would turn the Muslims against the Congress.

Although Gandhiji was present at the Second Round Table Conference, the British continued their power play. In this regard Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State, wrote on 2 October 1931,

"The delegates are much further off with each other than they were last year and I don't believe that there is a least chance of a communal settlement in the minorities committees."

On the one hand the British wanted to use the Muslims against the Congress, on the other they wanted to use the Harijans to divide the Hindus further on the issue of caste. This was a sure way of reducing the Hindu strength. They were delighted that in addition to the Princely States, they had virtual control over Ambedkar, the leader of the Harijans. On 28 December 1932, the Viceroy wrote, "Ambedkar had behaved very well at the Round Table Conference, and I am most anxious to strengthen his hands in every reasonable way."

Gandhiji, however, spoiled their game. To protect the Harijan's rights and to accord them a dignified place in society, Gandhiji started a "fast unto death". Ambedkar was faced with a dilemma. If he sided with the British, he would be held responsible for Gandhiji's death. If, however, he made a settlement with Gandhiji, he would have to do without British patronage. At last Gandhiji's fast unto death proved successful. Under the pressure of country-wide public opinion Ambedkar was forced to concede the Gandhian way which promised to restore the Harijans to their rightful place in society. The Poona Pact was signed between Gandhiji and the Harijans. This pact bore Ambedkar's signature. Having thus lost the Harijans, the only remaining hope for the British were the Muslims. Here another problem arose. When Lord Willingdon took the place of Lord Irwin as the Viceroy of India, Jinnah departed for England, leaving India for ever! This sudden departure was due to certain differences between Jinnah and Willingdon, when the latter was the Governor of Bombay. The circumstances were as follows. As Governor of Bombay, Willingdon invited Jinnah for a party. Jinnah was accompanied by his Parsi wife. Lady Willingdon took one look at Mrs Jinnah and disapproved of her attire. She asked the A.D.C. to bring a shawl for Mrs Jinnah, since she would be feeling cold because of her "inadequate" dress. Jinnah felt that his wife had been insulted and the couple immediately left the party. This caused a strained relationship between the two men. When Willingdon arrived as

Viceroy, Jinnah thought that his best bet was to leave the country. Therefore, his name was conspicuously absent from the list of Muslim names sent for the Third Round Table Conference. The six Muslim representatives were: His Highness Aga Khan, Hon'ble Chaudhary Zafarullah, Dr Shafaat Ahmed Khan, Sir Abdul Rahim, Sir Mohd. Yaqub, and Sir Mohd. Iqbal.

Meanwhile, the British were smug in the knowledge that, thanks to their efforts, no accord could be reached among the various communities. On 31 October 1932, the Viceroy wrote:

> The Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims are to meet on 3 November at Allahabad to endeavour to arrive at an agreement which will do away with the communal accord. I am assured by those who know that no agreement will ever be reached.

In the light of these new developments the British were assured that if elections were held the two communities would never see eye to eye. It was said that in comparison with the Second Round Table Conference there were a lot more differences between the Hindus and the Muslims during the Third Round Table Conference. The British were delighted to invite the various Indian leaders to London and allow them to wrangle in full public view. They hoped that whenever the parties reached an impasse, they could triumphantly announce to the world that theirs was not the blame!

From the time of Lord Irwin the British had known that if elections were fought on a communal basis it would blow the emotional lid. Among Muslims the stronger parties would be those which had a religious platform. This would also be incidentally advantageous for the British. First, the Muslim candidates with a religious platform would be pitted against the Congress candidates. Second, Islam would be used to turn the voters against the nationalistic Muslims. In this manner communal representation would take precedence over national representation. All hopes for future Hindu-Muslim unity would be dashed.

Although the Secretary of State for India wrote several letters to Willingdon asking him to refrain from holding elections, Willingdon was still insistent because he felt that the Congress

lost all their grit. Their Civil Disobedience Movement had been a failure. In the strongest words he expressed that Gandhiji was a spent force. The reports submitted by his officials had convinced him that the communal tensions would be so strong, and so much hatred would have been aroused between the two communities that there would be no scope for a Congress victory. The only problem was the lack of a strong opposition to the Congress. On 9 September 1934, he wrote, "But alas! Our backers are a flabby crowd without any courage, while the Congress, however stupid their actions, are not afraid of fighting."

To fill this political vacuum, the Viceroy decided to create a Government party. On 24 September 1934, he wrote:

> I have written to the Governors asking them to give a hint to the Ministers to help pro-Government candidates and also asked them, if opportunity offers, to see that good candidates are selected...we have to sit up here and say nothing except in private...on publicity we are doing the best we can.

PREPARATIONS FOR STATE ELECTIONS

In 1936 Lord Willingdon's term as Viceroy ended. He was replaced by Lord Linlithgow. In London, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, was replaced by Lord Zetland. Together, these two gentlemen handled the Hindu-Muslim situation in such a manner that there was not the slightest likelihood of any reconciliation . His (Linlithgow's) philosophy was identical to that of Irwin. Elections fought on a communal basis would bring in a Communal Assembly. There was no possibility of any nationalist Indian becoming a member of this Assembly. Hindu and Muslim members were expected to look at secular issues through religion tinted glasses! To protect their political future they were expected to woo their electorate. Politics would now be steered by communalism rather than nationalism.

Regarding the present situation the Viceroy wrote that differences existed within the Congress Party. The relations between Gandhiji and Jawaharlal were strained. For this reason Gandhiji

had summoned earlier a meeting in December although the Congress was not due to meet until April of next year. Gandhiji wanted a new Party President. There was however a difference of opinion about who should be the President. Gandhiji wanted Rajagopalachari while Jawaharlal wanted Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

When the Assembly elections were held, eight out of eleven States went to the Congress [see Appendix]; now the British were in serious trouble. The Indian nation had announced its decision in favour of the Congress. There was no doubt left that when, in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Act, the Parliamentary elections were held the Indian people would vote for the Congress Government.

Reviewing the outcome of the elections, the British had no alternative other than preparing a strong alternative to the Congress. Glancing in all directions the British found three powerful forces that could be pitted against the Congress Party. The most loyal of the three was the group consisting of rulers of the 600 odd Princely States. These States could neither hold elections nor establish a national and democratic government. The second group that could hurt the Congress was of the scheduled castes. The British raised the slogan that the Congress was an organization of Brahmins and high-class Hindus and that Harijans were a separate race. Churchill estimated their members to be four crores. The third group was of the Muslims who were estimated to be ten crores.

Jawaharlal Nehru organized a group to oppose the Princely States which he called the States' People's Conference. The puppet rulers of the States realized that when the "real rulers" of the country could not stand upto the Congress, what chance did they have? The British had anyhow drained them of all power. There was not a single individual among these rulers with any self-respect, or ego. On their part the British knew that they could squeeze nothing more out of these rulers. The Secretary of State for India, Amery, was so disillusioned by these Princes, Rajas and Nawabs, that he wrote on 1 October 1943, "It has been a real mistake of ours in the past not to encourage Indian Princes to marry English wives for a succession of generations and so breed

a more virile type of a native ruler."

His implication was that this race of rulers should be allowed to become extinct.

Meanwhile, Gandhiji had solved the Harijan problem. His fast unto death left a deep impact . The Hindus told Ambedkar that if he was really interested in Harijans he should throw in his lot with Gandhiji. Ambedkar had no choice but to join hands with Gandhiji. Gandhiji broke his fast the very same day Ambedkar became his co-signatory on the Poona Pact. In this manner British lost their second means of support. Now their only hope was the Muslims.

After the departure of Lord Willingdon, Jinnah returned to India. The new Viceroy gave the following account of his meeting with Jinnah on 9 September 1937, "He took very strongly the view that we did not pay sufficient attention to the Muslims, that there was the real risk of the Muslims being driven into the arms of the Congress."

He further stated that Jinnah was suspicious about his meeting with Gandhiji, "He [Jinnah] suggested that the interview [with Gandhiji] was largely responsible for the lifting of the ban on Abdul Ghaffar Khan's return to the Frontier Provinces and the fall of the Abdul Qayum Ministry."

In other words, Jinnah was flattering the British to the extent of saying that if his own Muslim brother was to align with the Congress, he would still align with the British. The interesting fact was that Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum was not even a member of the Muslim League! Since this party did not exist in the Frontier Province, the Assembly did not have a single Muslim League member. Jinnah's feeling upset at the fall of the Qayum Government was due to the fact that he was a government agent. His contempt for democratic institutions was proven by the fact that he did not attach any importance to the event of the fall of the Qayum Government as a result of a vote of no-confidence. This matter became apparent at the next meeting. On 19 August 1938, the Viceroy wrote, "He [Jinnah] ended up with the suggestion that we should keep the centre as it is now. That we should make friends with the Muslims by protecting them in the Congress provinces, and if we did that, the Muslims would protect us in the centre."

Such aggressive horse trading! The British knew that General Elections would result in a Congress victory. Therefore they were scratching around to find a way of cancelling them. Jinnah did not see any harm in turning this predicament into a vehicle for his own political progress. At any cost, he would rather see the power remaining with the British than be handed over to the Indians.

On the subject of the Princely States the Muslim League policy was identical to that of the British. On 29 January 1939 the Viceroy wrote, "I gathered further that a resolution was actually passed at Patna to the effect that the All India Muslim League would no longer be able to stand aside if Congress intervention in the affairs of the states continued."

Jinnah was against according any democratic right to the people who lived in the Princely States. Of the 600 Princely States only ten had Muslim rulers. The Muslims of Kashmir were striving for their rights against the Hindu Maharaja. In their anxiety to please the British the Muslim League forgot the existence of their fellow Muslim brothers. They challenged the Congress for the rights of the Hindu rulers of Kashmir.

On 28 March 1939, the Viceroy wrote regarding another meeting with Jinnah, "But he [Jinnah] was satisfied now. He thought that the present system would not work, and that a mistake had been committed in going so far."

The above statement proves that Jinnah was annoyed about the rights given to the States. He maintained that India did not need any final transfer of power, and that those who made such demands were unaware of the existing conditions. Democracy could not prevail in a country like India. It was a mistake to have held elections in the States and to have handed over the rights to the elected representatives. This statement of Jinnah was a godsend for the British. The British had prayed long and hard for an indigenous political party which would become the sworn enemy of democracy, support British policy, and be prepared to fight its enemies!

By this time the British had spread into every corner of the world and they proudly claimed that the sun never set on their Empire! Millions of men and women had become British

jects. The wealth of the colonies was siphoned off into the mother country. Its armies were comprised of the youths of these nations. Being an international power, the British policies had to conform to international expectations. They were concerned about the Congress victory in the assembly elections, but a far greater source of concern was the situation in Europe. Hitler was grad-ually establishing Nazi rule over the smaller countries of Europe. In Italy, Mussolini was holding sway. The British had exhausted all their material resources, and, to quote a Pashtu proverb, when it comes to a battle for power there is no scope for a battle of wits! In December 1939, they were forced to declare war against Germany. This was a formidable undertaking because the Germans were a dreaded enemy. The British were fortunate to have the English Channel between themselves and Germany. Else they would have fallen headlong into the Nazi pit.

When the Government of Great Britain declared war against Germany, they did it on behalf of India also. The Congress objected to this policy. How could such a declaration be made without the consent of Indians? On the basis of the recently held elections the Congress was the country's rightful representative. Therefore it was essential to seek their consent. The British showed surprise at the negative reaction of the Congress. They said that a fascist power had taken hold of the world and was suppressing the entire human race. To protect human freedom all reasonable nations were fighting against this power. Why should the British be expected to take the Congress' permission before committing India to this worthwhile cause? To this, the Congress replied that on principle they too supported the ideals of peace and freedom, and on the same principles they were against the fascist regime. It was only natural that India should support the struggle for freedom, considering the fact that she was herself a slave nation. Today when they have declared war against Germany, the British claim to be the champions of freedom. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If the British really believe in what they say then they should start by implementing their high ideals in their own home territory. The Congress further demanded that the British should announce their "War Aims". If this war was being

fought for freedom and peace, then they should make an official declaration that when the allies win, in keeping with the same principles, India, too, would be freed. Only on this condition would India participate in this war. The Congress made it clear that they did not wish to take unfair advantage of Britain's present predicament. They wanted the British to make an official declaration, because it was only in the light of this that Indians would have the incentive for participating in the war. Then this war would equally be fought for India's own freedom. The British, however, were in no mood to accept the Congress proposal. Prime Minister Churchill made the famous declaration, "I did not become the Prime Minister of Great Britain so that I could gamble with various parts of the British Empire."

This high-handedness displayed by the British made the Congress declare that this war was an internal European war which had nothing to do with freedom of India. Therefore, to participate in it was to strengthen the chains of slavery. I was present at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee where the Congress President, Jawaharlal Nehru, explained the view that "if, as a part of their War Aims Declaration, the British stated that, provided the allies won this war, they would give India her freedom, we shall then be fighting for the liberation of our own country, otherwise we shall be fighting to defend our chains."

This decision of the Congress was the last straw. The British greatly regretted their decision to hold Assembly Elections. Now they were facing the consequences and finding themselves conceding the will of the Indian people. So as not to repeat the mistake, they were convinced that General Elections should be cancelled altogether. How could the British bear to see the Representatives of the British Crown, like the Governors of various states, subjected to advice from their own ministers? They were appalled to see that during the turbulent times when they were engaged in a life and death struggle, the Congress had dared to withdraw its support. They knew that without the Indian army they could not govern such a vast Empire. These various factors brought them to a bursting point, until they were forced into an open combat with the Congress Party.

The European war thus altered the shape of Anglo-Indian Politics. Until this time the British had strongly favoured a federal form of government. They were concerned neither with the Muslims nor with Jinnah. They were encouraging the Muslim League to pose as a strong opposition to the Congress. They felt that they could use the League as a political leverage for bargaining with the Congress for power sharing. But the Congress wanted complete power. This issue placed the British and the Congress on two ends of the spectrum, and became a prestige point. It appeared to be a life-and-death matter for India and Britain.

As a protest, the Congress ordered all its members to resign from the Provincial Cabinets. This dramatic move was to shock the world into the realization and recognition of the principle underlying the decision; the British reluctance to accord India her freedom. For the British it was a slap on the face! They were mortified. From this point onwards their entire outlook changed, their attitude, their promises, and their policies.

Meanwhile the air had become thick with war-clouds. The British tried to pull themselves together. Having given up their hopes on the Congress, they now pinned them upon Jinnah. But Jinnah was the leader of a party which had not formed the government in any province! In the NWFP there was the Congress, in Sind there was Allah Baksh Somru, whose Government was solidly opposed to the Muslim League.

The Viceroy had maintained his cordial relations with Sir Sikander Hayat of Punjab and Maulvi Fazlul Haq of Bengal. Occasionally he sought their political advice. In view of the impending war, the importance of Punjab had increased. Sikander Hayat had told the Viceroy not to worry too much about Jinnah, because Punjab and Bengal were already supportive and would, therefore, not listen to him. On 31 August 1939 the Viceroy wrote:

> Sikander's admirable statement on Saturday last seems fairly effective to have spiked the guns of Jinnah and the Muslim League.... It seems to be pretty clear that the relations between Muslim League, Punjab and Bengal and other important

> Muslim centres are becoming definitely rather strange and that the chances of a breakaway are considerable... I do not propose to make any move to him [Jinnah] until there is an outbreak of war or some other development necessitating immediate contact with all party leaders.

Three or four days later the war was declared. The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State on 5 September 1939, "I feel it wiser to be patient with Jinnah and endeavour to lead him into the direction which we desire. And indeed if I can give any help to these Muslim leaders to get more together than they are at the moment I shall do so."

Only five days earlier, the Viceroy was happy to see tense relations between Sikander Hayat and Jinnah. He was pleased that not only Punjab and Bengal but all the other important Muslim centres were annoyed with Jinnah. It seemed that they were severing relations with the Muslim League. But today, after the declaration of war in Europe, he was forced to perform a classic political somersault.

There can be no doubt that the British were trying to get the various Muslims functions together, to primarily serve their self-interest.

Since the outbreak of the war in Europe the British became convinced about the wisdom of not holding General Elections. Nawab Ismail, leader of the Muslim League in U.P., made a suggestion to the Viceroy about which he wrote to the Secretary on 7 October 1939:

> The Nawab repeated that it was essential that any declaration should make it clear that a democratic system at the centre is not acceptable to the Muslim community, and went on to urge that the Congress claim to speak for India and to control defence was perfectly inadmissible.

Another leader of the Muslim League, Sir Abdullah Haroon sent a telegram to the Viceroy:

Sir Abdullah Haroon took the view that democratic development

> in the West did not suit India.... The Muslims have no differences with Great Britain except over federation, which should be dropped. They wanted the British to stay and they are now growing popular with the Muslim community.

Nawab Ismail Khan also objected to a federation on the basis that it was not acceptable to the Muslims. Sir Abdullah Haroon argued that democracy was not in keeping with the temperament of the Indian people. So what was the use of a federation? He went one step further and said the Muslims wanted the British never to leave India. It was only natural that a British agent nurtured on such sugar pills could not stand the bitter dose administered today by the leaders of the Congress.

At its meeting held under the Chairmanship of Jinnah, the Central Working Committee of the All India Muslim League passed a resolution:

> Muslim League [is] irrevocably opposed to any federal objective, which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the people of the country, which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state. [G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement*, p. 218]

In making the above statement, the Muslim League claimed to be speaking on behalf of all Indians. Their second argument was more dangerous, namely, that since the country is composed of several nationalities it could not become a single nation state. The resolution goes on to state:

> The committee further urges upon His Majesty's Government to ask for an assurance that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advances for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament

without such consent and approval. [G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement,* p. 219]

When the Viceroy of India announced that General Elections will not be held, the Muslim League Working Committee expressed its views in the following words:

The Working Committee appreciates the declaration of His Excellency the Viceroy which is in the interest of India, and particularly the Musalmans, that the federal system embodied in the Government of India Act 1935, stands suspended. They wish that instead of its being suspended it had been abandoned completely. [G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement,* p. 217]

The above statement demonstrates that the Muslim League was one step ahead of the British Government. While the British used the word "postponed", the Muslim League preferred to see the election suspended for ever.

In Pashtu there is a proverb that the infantry moves faster than the cavalry: this summarises the above situation. Unfortunately all these demands were made on behalf of the Muslims whose total population was no more than 10 crores.

At the annual meeting of the Muslim League Jinnah stated:

We felt we could never accept the dangerous scheme of the Central Federal Government embodied in the Government of India Act 1935. I am sure that we have made no small contribution towards persuading the British Government to abandon this scheme of a Central Federal Government. [G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement* , p. 230].

How proudly Jinnah claimed his share in persuading the British to abandon their idea of creating a federation! The question arises whether the decision to cancel General Elections was made by the British or the Muslim League? The British acted on the advice of the leaders of the Muslim League, but to whose advantage?

Whose Government was it anyway? How willingly the Muslim League permitted the British to use their arms to fire at their own people! What could be greater misfortune than a country to have given birth to a political organisation which was content with its slave status, and wore its chains with pride? The Muslim League was a unique organisation which shot down a proposal for transfer of power and returned the controls to the colonisers. The British and Muslim League were converging towards a complete understanding. On its part, the Muslim League offered to promote British policy. The British Government responded by bringing all the Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League. Meeting with Jinnah started all over again. On 5 October 1939 the Viceroy wrote, "He [Jinnah] thanked me with much graciousness for what I had done to assist him in keeping his party together and expressed great gratitude for this."

The party was Jinnah's but keeping it together was the Viceroy's responsibility! The Viceroy said that Jinnah complained bitterly about the excesses committed by the Congress Government against the Muslims. The Viceroy replied that to the best of his knowledge no excess had been committed. As a matter of fact, he added, this feeling may be an outcome of the Muslim League paranoia. To this, Jinnah replied that one example of excess was the Frontier Government ruling that Hindi should be made a compulsory subject in all schools.

The above statement has no semblance of truth. Jinnah had to scratch around to find proof of his allegation. But he could not have selected a more absurd example. The Frontier Government had declared a compulsory language, but it happened to be Pashtu. Perhaps Jinnah, being so out of touch with real India, could not tell the difference between Hindi and Pashtu.



The British Turn a Political Somersault

The British were seasoned players in political gamesmanship. They were determined to crush the freedom movements and stop at nothing to fulfil their imperialist policies.

In his letter dated 4 December 1939 the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State for India:

> I am fully alive, as my letter to you about Jinnah's questions will have shown, to the objection to allowing the Muslim minority to turn itself into a majority with the right of veto and that does seem to appear to be a position that we can accept.

This letter is written to explain his stand on the Muslim League Working Committee's proposal that the British Government should give it assurances that "no declaration of constitutional accord for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim League."

To put it bluntly, the above statement is an open plea to turn the Muslim minority into a majority, and to accord it the power of veto. It is all too clear that the civilized, egalitarian British ruler did not give a damn for basic human rights, democracy or self-determination. He blatantly declared, "This does seem to appear to be a position that we can accept." Having closed his eyes and ears to facts, he promoted his own interests, using the Muslim League as their vehicle.

The Viceroy suggested that the Muslim majority states should be

separated from the North West. The Secretary, however, having the advantage of a comprehensive political view, saw the situation from a wider angle. He wrote to the Viceroy that while the Hindus were only confined to India, Muslims were spread from the China border, all the way to Turkey. A dangerous situation will arise if the Islamic Nations, once again, turned towards Jamal-ud-Din Afghani's Pan Islamism. What if they joined hands with the Russians and presented a united opposition to the British Empire? All British-India policies, so far, had been directed against the Muslims. India had been seized from them. The Ottoman Empire had been fragmented. Therefore, the Secretary of State's fear of retaliation by the Muslims was justifiable. Central intelligence was asked to prepare a comprehensive report on the above subject. This report was then submitted to the Secretary of State for India:

> Having held detailed discussions with different Muslim groups such as the League, Wahabis, Khaksars, and other groups with special interest in Afghanistan and tribal areas, I have concluded that the differences between Hindus and Muslims have reached a point at which there is only one solution: partition. Thus, shortly, a nation of Muslim India must be established.

On the question of the Muslims creating a defensive position with the help of Russia; the report says:

> Such aid is out of question. If once Bolshevik aid is accepted, Islamic principles will be submerged. And if an opportunity is given to Russian influence to be felt South of the axis, all Muslim nations will degenerate to the level of the Soviet Central Asiatic [Muslim] State.

This point is further clarified, "Muslims will not ask favour from the anti-God Bolshevik Russia." On the subject of Pan Islamism, the Viceroy stated: "In the Turkish Treaties are seen the barring of Bolshevism from the Islamic world, and a rapid development of the line up of Muslim nations against Soviet expansionist policy."

While listing the advantages of his scheme the Viceroy frankly

stated that the success of this scheme may result in Muslim forces uniting to form a solid front against the Russians. Pan Islamism may become a steel grip around the Bolsheviks. The British were smart enough to befriend those Muslims who were likely to help them in implementing all these policies. These "devout Muslims" were prepared to utilize Islam in drumming up support for the British against the Congress. For the British it was smooth sailing, once they had established control over the League, the rest could be done by manipulation. The outstanding question was that of Russia. The intelligence report made it clear that the English proposed to use Islam against Russia. In India the Muslims were ruled by a *Kafir* race, the Christians. So to make a distinction between *Kafir* and *Munafiq*, they started calling the Russians *anti-God*. This was a clever use of semantics to create a Muslim aversion for Russia.

THE PAKISTAN SCHEME

Several times the Viceroy explained to Muslim leaders like Sir Sikander Hayat and Maulvi Fazlul Haq that their demand that the control not be handed over to the Congress and no elections be held, was a very negative attitude. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the Viceroy or the Secretary of State for India to persuade the British Parliament that if Congress had won the elections why should it not form the Government? The Viceroy made an appeal that the Muslim leaders adopt a positive and constructive attitude. He said that a civilized world would not accept the supremacy of the minority over the majority. It would not allow their constitutional, legal and democratic demands to be ignored. Sir Sikander Hayat agreed with this point of view. The Viceroy referred to it in a letter to the Secretary of State for India:

> He [Sikander Hayat] thoroughly understood the necessity and importance of getting on to a constructive line and having a scheme of his own on which to stand, before attempting any propaganda in England.... He would let me know confidentially how matters went in the meeting of the Muslim League

Working Committee on 3 February.

After attending the meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee Sikander Hayat and Maulvi Fazlul Haq, together, went to meet the Viceroy. The Viceroy wrote that Sikander informed him:

> That I should be interested to learn that the Working Committee of the Muslim League has now instructed a sub-committee to draft a constructive programme. I said I was delighted to hear it and that I should await its terms with the greatest interest.

Following the Working Committee meeting, Jinnah met the Viceroy on 6 February 1940. The Viceroy wrote, "After the usual compliments he [Jinnah] opened the proceedings by asking me what were we to do, assuming that we meant Muslim League."

During this lengthy meeting there were several important exchanges between the Viceroy and Jinnah. The Viceroy stated that Jinnah himself asked the question, what next? What annoyed him was that where else in the world would the leader of a freedom fighting party seek advice from its colonial rulers? The Viceroy repeated again and again that he was tired of Jinnah's arguments:

> At the risk of wearing him I was bound to repeat that it was quite useless to appeal for support in Great Britain for a party whose policy was one of sheer negation.

This was a strange meeting! The Viceroy referred to the elected Governments established in various states. Jinnah suggested that he should dismiss the Congress in the manner similar to that adopted by Lord Willingdon. The Viceroy stated that the present situation was very different from what existed in the time of Willingdon. The Congress had been elected to form the Government in eight States. If they wanted they could completely cut themselves off from the Empire. Jinnah, however, insisted that unless the Congress was crushed he could trust neither the

Empire nor its representatives.

One State Government of special interest to the British was the Frontier Province. At a previous meeting the Viceroy had told Jinnah that if he tried hard it would be possible to prevent the formation of a Congress Government in NWFP. Jinnah promised to consult his colleagues on this subject. Having done so, he informed the Viceroy that his colleagues were not confident of forming the Government. However, if Governor Cunningham agreed to help them they might be able to form a Government in the Frontier. He then enumerated the advantages of a League Government in the Frontier, and stressed that the Viceroy should explain them to Cunningham. Jinnah added that he was most anxious to see this happen, since he was convinced that there could be no better advertisement of the real position of India, whether before the country or throughout the world.

Ironically, the greatest single impediment in the combined policy of the Muslim League and the British Government was the Frontier Province itself. First, it had the largest majority of Muslims, secondly, it had a strategic location relative to Russia. The fact that this province was governed by the Khudai Khidmatgars instead of the League went against the British External and Internal Policy. The Government of Khudai Khidmatgars could be used neither against the Congress nor for the British. Jinnah's attention was riveted upon this issue. To establish a non-Congress Government in NWFP would create the right impact on the rest of the world. Hence his insistence was that Cunningham should help in establishing the League. In previous elections not even one League candidate filed his nomination papers. As a result, the Assembly did not have a single member from the Muslim League.

The Viceroy reassured Jinnah, "I would communicate his news to the Governor and he [Jinnah] and his friends would in due course, and by one means or the other, be put in possession of the Governor's view."

From the above it is evident that at this point the Muslim League and the British Government were in an identical frame of mind. Mr Jinnah's brash question, "What do we do now?" elicited an equally brash rejoinder from the Viceroy:

> Jinnah, by realizing that the British were ready to patronise his party, went on to suggest to the Viceroy to dismiss the Allah Baksh Somru's Sind Ministry. The Chief Minister had made speeches recently, copies of which he would send me, which made the position in Sind impossible if the Chief Minister remained in power. I said I would see the text of the item.

The English wanted to make Muslims realize that to obtain British patronage, they should throw in their lot with the League. The Viceroy had no hesitation in propagating this attitude. On 21 April 1940 he wrote, assuring the Secretary of State for India, that he need have no fears. If a Congress confrontation occurred then:

> All I can say is that if Congress are set on having a fight here, they are going to have a fight not only with us, but also with the Muslims. [I am glad Jinnah has made the statement].

To summarize, the British attitude was that if the Congress was out for a confrontation, 'we are not alone! We are wearing the colours of our beloved!' The Viceroy had strengthened his alliance with the Muslim League. The Congress would now have to take on the League along with the British.

At this time, the League was like a sandbag, which the British were using as a buffer. If the Congress took the offensive, the sandbag would take the brunt of it leaving the British unscathed. What better means of self-preservation could they have discovered? If the Muslim League was prepared to put the chain of slavery around India, what better token of friendship and love for the British regime could it offer?

3

Different Interpretations of Pakistan

The Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, told the leaders of the Muslim League that the Government of Great Britain would not tolerate negative politics. This view was conveyed to the Muslim League Working Committee through Sir Sikander Hayat. Therefore, various sub-committees started preparing a concrete plan of action. The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State for India that Choudhry Khaliquzzaman had suggested to Lumley, the Governor of Bombay, that India should be divided into three dominions. It seems that Khaliquzzaman wanted to create one dominion each for Hindus, Muslims, and Rulers of Princely States.

The Governor of North West Frontier Province, Sir George Cunningham, wrote to the Viceroy that upon his return from the Muslim League Convention Sardar Aurangzeb reported to him:

> The scheme which they [Muslim League] were now contemplating would involve the creation of 6 or 7 Indian dominions...and that this novel scheme now holds the field in preference to the original Pakistan proposal.

Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, had detailed discussion on the above subject with Sir Feroz Khan Noon. He suggested that the North Western part of India should be separated from the rest of the continent, in a manner similar to Burma, and a new country, Pakistan, should be created. The Secretary said that

he saw, "almost insuperable difficulties in the way of our acceptance of such a policy." Feroz Khan Noon's response to this was, "If it was so he would not himself encourage it when he returned to India." [letter dated 13 December 1938].

These were different schemes. Chaudhry Rehmat Ali, a student of Cambridge, had an esoteric scheme for Pakistan. Sir Mohd. Iqbal proposed yet another format. What remained to be seen was what the British had up their sleeves?

THE BRITISH CONCEPT OF PAKISTAN

The above schemes were being hatched by the Muslims. The final decision rested with the British. When the British saw that their objectives could not be met by the schemes presented by Sikander Hayat Khan or the Muslim League Working Committee, they unilaterally rejected all the proposals submitted by the Muslims. Chaudhury Zafarullah, a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, was asked to submit a map of two dominions. On that subject, on 12 March 1940, Viceroy Lord Linlithgow wrote to the Secretary of State for India:

> Upon my instruction Zafarullah wrote a memorandum on the subject, Two Dominion States. I have already sent it to your attention. I have also asked him for further clarification, which, he says, is forthcoming. He is anxious, however, that no one should find out that he has prepared this plan. He has, however, given me the right to do with it what I like, including sending a copy to you. Copies have been passed on to Jinnah, and, I think, to Sir Akbar Hydari. While he, Zafarullah, cannot admit its authorship, his document has been prepared for adoption by the Muslim League with a view to giving it the fullest publicity.

The Viceroy explains this further. Since Zafarullah was a *Qadiani* he had to be cautious. The Muslims would become irritated if they found that this scheme was prepared by a *Qadiani*. The Viceroy said that Jinnah had been given a copy to make the Muslim League adopt it and publicise its contents. Sir Akbar was

given a copy because he was responsible for fund raising. The dates take on a special significance. The Viceroy's letter to the Secretary of State was written on 12 April 1940. The Pakistan scheme had been despatched earlier. Twelve days later the Muslim League adopted this very proposal at their Lahore Annual Meeting. It was called Pakistan Agreement.

Sir Zafarullah's term on the Viceroy's Executive Council was expiring in March. Due to his loyal service, however, the term was extended. Two days after the Muslim League had adopted this proposal, on 25 March 1940, the Viceroy wrote:

> The Congress are putting forward a preposterous claim which they know is incapable of being accepted. He [Jinnah] will put forward just as extreme a claim, of the impracticability of realising which he is probably just well aware; but the existence of which, will, while reaffirming the Muslim attitude of hostility to the Congress scheme, take away some, at any rate, of the damaging charges which are hitherto being levelled against them [Muslim League] that they have no constructive ideas of their own.

MUSLIM LEAGUE, A BRITISH PARTY

When the Muslim League accepted the Viceroy's proposal [author, Sir Zafarullah], the British were convinced of their dependability. It was natural, then, for the British to refuse to recognize the existence of any party other than the Muslim League.

During those days, a large representative gathering of nationalist Muslims was held in Delhi. The Assembly was chaired by the Chief Minister of Sind, Allah Baksh Somru. The Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, asked the Viceroy to report on this gathering. On 14 May 1940, the Viceroy wrote:

> I attach no particular importance to the Delhi Conference of the Muslims which took place a few days ago. It has been well-organised and the Congress press machine has written it up admirably... We both are, of course, aware that there is a *not*

> *unimportant* Muslim element outside the Muslim League.... Indeed, I am sure that *Jinnah remains the man to deal with* on the Muslim side.

The British deliberately ignored those Muslims, who, along with the Congress, were struggling for freedom. Their very faith was called "questionable". More than 1,000 representatives, who had gathered together under the leadership of an elected Chief Minister, were totally disregarded. The Viceroy did not mince his words when he wrote to the Secretary of State that "Jinnah is our man and we accept him as a representative of all Muslims."

The Khaksars were in a peculiar position. The objection to other Muslims was that they were not assisting the British but the Khaksars, in all humility, had offered help. On 24 May 1940, the Viceroy wrote, "Meanwhile the Khaksars have formally renewed their offer to me of 50,000 men to help in the war."

Their offer to fight for the British in the war against Germany was rejected due to Jinnah's negative attitude. "Jinnah accepts no reponsibility for Khaksars or their activities since they have declined his advice." The Viceroy adopted the following stand:

> Considering the present attitude of the Khaksars in Punjab, it would not be advisable for me to enter into any correspondence with them or their leaders, and I propose, accordingly, to leave the telegram unanswered.

The British were trying to make it very clear to every Indian Muslim that except Jinnah and the Muslim League, they were not ready to accept any other party. To gain British support, the Muslims were obliged to join the Muslim League. Earlier, the British had severed relations with the Congress because they were not prepared to assist them in the war against Germany. Their inconsistency becomes evident in their refusing the help of 50,000 Khaksars, while at the same time, rejecting the Congress because they did not offer 50,000 men to fight the same war!

On 14 May 1940, at the end of his term, Lord Zetland wrote his farewell letter. The new Secretary of State for India L.S. Amery's

first letter is dated 16 May 1940.

JINNAH AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

When the Congress resigned from eight provinces, pursuant to Section 93, the Governor's rule was established. Jinnah requested the Viceroy to appoint political, unofficial advisers in each one of these eight provinces. This meant that the Muslim League would assume an advisory role in each one of the provinces vacated by the Congress Government. According to Jinnah's proposal, "Hindu provinces" should also have been handed over to the Muslim League. Not only did the League have no official status in any of these provinces, it had never won a single election! Therefore, by making this demand, Jinnah finally incurred the displeasure of the British. The Viceroy wrote on 10 July 1940:

> I hope that Jinnah will not continue to press his extravagant claim. If he does, I think myself, that we may definitely have to consider whether we should continue the efforts which I so far made to keep the Muslims together, whether we should not let the balance of the Muslim League as represented by Sikander and Fazlul Haq have their break with Jinnah. But I don't want to see such a break, if we can reasonably avoid it.

The British knew that behind the facade presented by Jinnah,, the Muslim League was a shambles. On 28 August 1940, he wrote, "I hope that Sikander and Fazlul Haq will be able to bring pressure on Jinnah to make him toe the line; if he does not, I shall go without him."

The British were well aware that the Muslim Leaguer lacked any foundation; he leaned heavily upon English crutches. If those were pulled from under him, he would fall on his face. The British had no doubt that there would always be a sufficient number of sycophants among Muslims who they could count upon. When the word got around that the British were annoyed with Jinnah, every Muslim leader started offering his services. The Viceroy wrote about such an offer by the Chief Minister of the Nizam of Hydera-

bad, Sir Akbar Hydari. The letter is dated 29 August 1940:

> You may be amused to hear that Hydari, during our conversation a few days ago, coyly hinted to me, that if there should be trouble with Jinnah and Muslim League, there was, at any rate, a very prominent Muslim, who could steer the country through the troubled waters that may lie ahead.

The Viceroy said that he thanked him, saying that the Nizam's leadership was more suited to Hydari of Hyderabad. These were "lover's quarrels", an old habit of political gamesters! The British were deliberately giving so much importance to Jinnah and the Muslim League because they were convinced that if ever there was any talk of a settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League, Jinnah having reached a point of no return, would never agree. He knew that the Muslim League drew its entire strength from British support. On their part, the British had agreed that either Jinnah would implement their policies or they would implement them on their own, without Jinnah:

> I still think it important to hold the Muslim League together if we can do so. And in those circumstances, there is nothing for it but to be patient with Jinnah, though one's patience is beginning, definitely, to run out.

During this time Jinnah made the following demand:

> The Muslim League should be taken into full and equal partnership with His Majesty's Government in the ruling of this country, and authority shared with them. [Viceroy's letter, dated 5 September 1940]

This implies that all Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Harijans, should be bypassed and the Muslim League and the British become equal partners in governance. The Muslim League had now claimed represantation of the entire country.

The Viceroy was about to appoint an Advisory Council which

would exclude the Congress. He had already spoken to the leader of the scheduled castes, Dr Ambedkar, and the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, Aney. Jinnah, however, refused to participate because he was not given full control of this Council. The scheme collapsed and the Viceroy had to personally apologise to Ambedkar and Aney. At that time the Viceroy did not consider it necessary to ask Jinnah what was his representative status in the 1937 election? On 11 September 1940 the Viceroy wrote:

> He [Jinnah] is subjected to very considerable criticism from various sections of the community. He had against him the Prime Ministers of the two majority Muslim provinces. The line he had taken is unsympathetic to large numbers of Muslims of position, even in Muslim minority provinces such as Bihar and U.P.

In addition to Bengal and Punjab, the two Muslim majority provinces, Sind and NWFP had very strong organisations opposing Jinnah. Despite this the Viceroy said, "Indeed I am sure Jinnah is the man to deal with on the Muslim side."

The British had decided to sort out one by one the problems of keeping the Muslim League on a healthy track. For example, Punjab. Here the Unionist Party had formed the Government under the leadership of Sir Sikander Hayat. The Party included Hindus and Sikhs. Sikander Hayat was finding the Punjab situation steadily deteriorating due to the Muslim League's insistence upon partition. These conditions prompted the non-Muslim Indians' demand that the British articulate their policy regarding Pakistan. The Viceroy was strongly opposed to a public announcement. On 1 March 1941 he wrote, "It should not only be a mistake but it would be very near a breach of faith were we to do anything of the sort."

In the same letter the Viceroy wrote that Sikander Hayat told him that there was a difference of opinion between him and the Muslim League Working Committee on the question of Pakistan. He expressed his desire to resign from the Committee. The Viceroy sent a message to the Punjab Governor, Sir Henry Craik, to stop Sikander Hayat from resigning, "This is not the moment at which

I want to see any split in the Muslim League. I think it is very important [tiresome, as its activities may be in some ways] to maintain it as a solid political entity." He then spells his interest in keeping the party intact:

> That is more desirable since we are moving into the next phase of Gandhi Satyagraha Campaign, and any fissure in the Muslim ranks, more particularly over this vital question of Pakistan ... would be a very great encouragement to the anti-war party and might well make our position in dealing with Satyagraha more difficult.

The British were indifferent to the condition of the Muslims, and sceptical about the viability of Pakistan. They were using the League as an anti-Congress missile, hoping, that in case of an open challenge, they would be able to fire it at the enemy.

Sikander Hayat made a statement which aimed at pacifying his Unionist Party. The Secretary of State, Amery, refers to it in his letter dated 8 October 1941. Sikander Hayat proposed that the British make an official statement that if, after a given date, the various political parties were unable to arrive at a decision about a unanimous constitution, then the British Government would have no choice but to formulate a constitution of their own choice. In the margin of this letter is a brief note in the Viceroy's handwriting, "...and make it perfectly certain that the Muslims would refuse to play till they brought us in."

The Viceroy could not have declared his policy in clearer words. He was successfully creating a climate which would enable the Muslims to hold out against a unified stand, unless the ultimate control was left in British hands. In this regard there is an incident concerning Allah Baksh Somru, the Chief Minister of Sind. Earlier, Somru had chaired a Convention of the Nationalist Muslims. Since he had no sympathies with the Muslim League, he had incurred the displeasure of the Viceroy. As the representative of an elected State Assembly, Somru was a member of the Viceroy's Defence Council. In reponse to the Viceroy's request he presented some proposals to the Defence Council, which were an

effort to forestall communal discord. He suggested that Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad be freed from the prison. In his letter dated 11 October 1941, the Viceroy wrote an account of their altercation on this issue:

> He asked me, "when am I likely to hear about your decision?" I replied, "You will hear nothing. You are not one of my Advisers, but the Prime Minister of Sind... I have not the least intention of telling you how I propose to handle my business and I trust you understand that." He said, "You are very frank." I said, "I am bound to be frank. This is my business and my responsibility."

It was ironical that the Viceroy of India did not allow a member of his own Defence Council the right to receive feedback on his proposals. On the contrary, he personally consulted the leaders of the Muslim League on national and political issues. His manner of speaking to a national leader was most offensive. The British spared no effort to make it clear to all Muslims that unless they paid homage to Jinnah, they would remain non-entities for them.

The British wanted to parade Jinnah and the Muslim League before an international audience. An opportunity arose when, on the invitation of the British, the Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek visited India. He expressed interest in meeting Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru. The Viceroy wrote back saying that since he was not on speaking terms with these leaders it would be difficult to arrange a meeting. On 26 January 1942 he wrote to the Secretary of State for India, "I know you would at once take the point of his seeing Jinnah as well as the other two. I shall have to coax him to receive the Head of the Muslim League whether he feels inclined or not."

Chiang Kai-shek insisted on finding a solution to the Indian problem. He was worried about the growing influence of Japan. First Britain, then the occupation of Singapore and Burma, and now India! Both Chiang Kai-shek and the President of the U.S. were pressurising the British to solve the Indian problem. The Americans found it strange, that, despite the fact that the Congress

had formed the Government in eight provinces, today, there was Governor's rule in each one of them. Thus the real power rested with the British. The United States, however, insisted that today's wars could not be fought without the cooperation of the nation.

The British realized that whatever they had lost in Europe could be multiplied many times over in Asia. But for the first time they felt that they might lose India. In the light of these new circumstances the British, once again, reviewed their Indian policy. So far they had supported a united and federated India. The only reason for strengthening the Muslim League was to make it a worthy opponent to the Congress. Ambedkar, too, supported the political split while the power remained in British hands.

> He [Ambedkar] was perfectly content himself, he said, with that state of things, and in favour of the Pakistan idea, because it meant that the British will have to stay in India. [Viceroy's letter dated 19 November 1940]

When the British realised that they may have to leave India, they stopped insisting upon the creation of a Federated-Union. And the partition proposal, originally conceived as an irritant and a bargaining tactic with the Congress, was now sent in all seriousness through the good offices of Sir Stafford Cripps. This was the year 1942. The demand for Pakistan had gathered no momentum, the Muslim League had taken no initiative. Mean-while, the British were single-mindedly pursuing their own interests. Had the U.S. not insisted, they would have used the World War as an excuse and never agreed to hold talks with the Congress. To appease the U.S., Stafford Cripps was sent forth. The following letter written on 23 March 1942, is an example of their self-serving attitude.

> I now have considerable hope that whether the scheme succeeds or fails, that is to say it is accepted or rejected, they may be looking at the propaganda value involved in the face of American opinion, a balance of credit to our side.

The Secretary of State for India, Amery, was looking at the same

situation from another angle. He explained his view in his letter dated 10 March 1942, "Consequently the entire way out and incidentally a way of gaining a little time was to send someone to discuss and negotiate."

This tactic served several purposes. First, it bought a little time. Secondly, the United States became convinced that the British were serious about finding a solution to this problem. The proof was that a responsible Minister of the Government sent only for this purpose. In their hearts, however, the British were convinced about the impossibility of reaching any agreement. The Viceroy wrote, "After all, once it is laid down that there must be agreement, and no coercion of important minorities, then, the only conclusion is that things must wait indefinitely."

The Secretary of State for India in his letter dated 24 March 1942, makes his position clear, "Jinnah, I shall have thought, will be content to realise that he has now got his Pakistan in essence, whether something substantive, or a bargaining point."

Having been thus assured that he would get his Pakistan, why would Jinnah bother reconciling with the Congress? The British had laid a couple of strict conditions. First, the Muslim League and the Congress had to affect a reconciliation agreement, and secondly, they had to protect the rights of the minorities. Since these conditions could never be fulfilled who was the loser? Jinnah would never get Pakistan and the Congress would lose their eight provinces. The British had won hands down!

In his letter to Viceroy Linlithgow, Amery assured him that whatever proposals they had sent through Cripps were favourable to the British:

> (1) The Viceroy will have to remain not merely as constitutional Governor General but as a representative of broader Imperial aspect of Government for a good long time to come.
> (2) Supposing that Pakistan does come off, there will possibly be two Muslim areas, the whole of the State, Hindu British India [if that does not divide itself], and, finally, at least one important primitive hill tribal area.
>
> When the entire country is thus broken up and there is no strong

Central Government, it would be impossible for the various units to maintain their military, naval and air strength. Therefore, once again, they will become dependent on the British. In this frame of mind Amery wrote, "There will, therefore, have to be someone in the absence of a Central Self-Governing Federal Scheme, to take control of these matters."

Amery further assured the Governor-General that until and unless the Congress and the Muslim League arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement, the question of transfer of power does not arise. And even if the impossible becomes possible, it would further the British cause.

> So whatever you do or agree to, you will better keep in mind the desirability of retaining Delhi and a considerable area around it, as an ultimate federal territory of an eventually united India, and not let it pass in the hands of any one of the Dominions, that may temporarily emerge out of the first experiment in constitution making.

This was the essence of the Cripps Mission. The Viceroy assured the Secretary of State that during the Cripps Mission he had maintained contact with Jinnah. On 14 April 1942, he wrote, "However, I was at pains, without delay, and before Cripps left, to sound Jinnah through Feroz Khan Noon, who has been a most useful intermediary, with the result which I have already reported to you by telegram."

It was an absurd situation. The British had accepted the principles of partition, but the Congress was violently opposed. And how could the Congress be overlooked? It were the Congress' efforts which had shown up all the way, Congress movement, Congress protest, Congress sacrifice, Congress imprisonment, Congress abdication. The Congress did all the work and the Muslim League got all the plaudits! The Muslim League remained a party minus a movement, minus sacrifices, minus seats in the Elected Assemblies and minus any political power.

The Stafford Cripps Mission was successful. On 6 July 1942, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State giving him good

news, "Jinnah's statements in the last few days have brought out, emphatically, the continued reluctance of the Muslim League to see any compromise reached except on their own terms."

Blinded by their self-interest, the British lost all sense of principle or fair play. Despite the fact that the Muslim League was a political non-entity, the British regarded it the sole representative of all Muslims. Another fact worth noting is that out of a pop-ulation of 40 crores, the Muslims constituted only 25 per cent. On what principle did the British agree to uphold the position of the minority over the majority? How could the British try to impose Jinnah upon the non-Muslim provinces? Would Jinnah have allowed the Congress the same right in the provinces which had a Muslim majority? The British had lost all sense of right or wrong. The truth was that the British cared neither for Muslims nor Hindus. They only cared for the Empire. An impasse between the Congress and the Muslim League was a great advantage to the British. Therefore, they prevented the Muslim League from affecting a conciliation with the Congress. Unfortunately for them, the Muslim League got entangled in its own mesh. The power remained securely lodged with the British. The net gain from the League's dog-in-the-manger attitude was that India fell 'smack' in the British lap.

BRITAIN'S SECOND ENTRENCHMENT

The British went all out to crush the Congress National Movement. But the Congress maintained its firm stand. On no condition was it prepared to surrender India's freedom and her right to self-determination. The British decided to compromise with their principles. So long as they could find a new weapon to use against the Congress, all was afair game! Therefore, why not the Communists? Any political party which opposed the Congress deserved their support; its ideology was irrelevant. Pursuant to this strategy, the Viceroy proposed removing the sanctions against the Communist Party of India. The bargain was that the Communist leader M.N. Roy would openly oppose the Congress. In his letter dated 7 July 1942, Amery wrote:

> I believe there may be much to be said for giving much more encouragement to Roy and every kind of left wing Communist, students, peasants or trade union organisations.... It may be that the elements we encourage now, may not be reliable in the future but they may be influenced in a better direction, in the sunshine of official favour.

It is easy to understand the British mind, but difficult to comprehend that a great leader of the Communist Party of India was prepared to compromise with a capitalist colonial regime. Organisations of students, labour, trade unions, farmers did not hesitate to put their strength behind an anti-national force. So deftly had the British played their hand that Islam and Communism, two opposing enemy forces were prepared to work together in the service of capitalism and colonialism. The lion and the lamb were drinking from the same pool!

Two sworn enemies expressed a unity of purpose in serving their common benefactor. The British heaved a sigh of relief. Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha, Communist Party of India, Harijans, Princely States, had all rallied around them. The only post to be conquered was the Congress. The United States meanwhile, were given the impression that a solution was being sought through the Cripps Mission. The British played the Congress-Muslim League discord at such a high level that the world attention became diverted from the real issue. Thus the British were able to appease their international critics. The Secretary of State wrote privately to the Viceroy, "The sooner you pounce on them the better." [letter dated 24 July 1942]

He suggested that all the leaders be exiled to Uganda. The Viceroy wrote back that Gandhi was ill. Amery replied, "Then send him to Aden, but get rid of him at any cost."

In his correspondence, the Viceroy gave the Secretary the good news that the nation was becoming disappointed in Gandhi. That the Congress had become unpopular and did not have the strength to run the movement. Therefore, this was the best time to take on the Congress. In August 1942 when they launched the Quit India Movement during the All India Congress Committee meeting at

Bombay, the British pounced upon them and arrested all the members of the Working Committee. Then they proceeded to crush the movement. Villages and processions were bombarded. Once again the prisons overflowed with freedom fighters. On the subject of air bombardment, the Viceroy wrote on 17 August 1942:

> I am most grateful for your support over the use of the air power against saboteurs. I am certain that we ought not to shirk from using any of the means that are at our disposal in dealing with the movement so dangerously revolutionary as the present one.

The Viceroy had foreseen the Congress intentions. He realized that they were waiting for the right opportunity. That sooner or later, when things became really tough for the British, only then would they launch the movement in all seriousness. In the same letter he writes:

> We have this different and far more important reason to be thankful that we have brought on this business at a time when the war position is not such as to offer any immediate threat to India, whether from the West or from the East. I have not the least doubt that Gandhi's plan was to wait for bad war news before raising the standard of revolt.

The Congress had not declared official non-co-operation, nevertheless, the British used brute force. It will be recalled that they had recommended whipping for political prisoners. The Secretary of State declared all terms of punishment legal only so long as there was no press. He did not want to be questioned by his own parliament, or the USA or any international body. The surge of sentiment and sacrifice, that arose among the Indians, came as a surprise to the British. Their advisers and informants had assured them that the nation was disillusioned with the Congress. But the valour and sacrifice of the young and the old, the women and the children, told a different story; hence the marshalling of the entire police force, militia, army and, finally, aerial bombardment! On 24 August 1942 the Viceroy wrote, "I continue to be rather puzzled

that our intelligence should not have been able to give us more warning than it has of the ways things were likely to go." Referring to the Governor of Bihar, he said, "He and his Government were taken by surprise."

A well seasoned politician like the Viceroy should have known that these lower officials told their superiors only what they wanted to hear! The British thought that they had successfully thrown out the Congress Party. This impression is recorded in a letter written by the Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill. This is what happened. The nation, led by the Congress Party, made innumerable sacrifices for freedom and the British had increasing difficulty in suppressing them. Seeing this, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek put pressure on President Roosevelt to persuade the British to give due respect to these popular representatives of Indian public. President Roosevelt sent Chiang Kai-shek's letter to Churchill. Churchill wrote back:

> Congress Party in no way represents India and is strongly opposed by over 90 million Mohammadans, 40 million Untouchables, and the Indian States comprising 90 million...the military classes on whom everything depends are thoroughly loyal. In fact, over a million have volunteered for the army.

It was characteristic of the British to turn blind to anything that was not in their interest. They had no respect for the will of the people reflected in the members of the eight State Assemblies elected by popular vote. As for the entire Muslim Population, the British had conveniently lumped them with the Muslim League. The growing nationalism was a continuous cause for concern. Every possible effort was underway to create cracks in the Indian national unity. Muslims were already in the bag. Harijans, thanks to Ambedkar, were also supportive. And now for the Sikhs! The Secretary of State wrote to the Viceroy and asked him to find out whether there was any possibility of the Sikhs demanding a Sikhistan, along the same lines as the Muslim League was agitating for Pakistan? Amery's hope was that if the Sikhs could be encouraged to demand a separate state, it would create a major

problem for the Congress, and become a considerable drain upon its political strength. The Viceroy, who was much closer to the situation, knew that encouraging the Sikhs to demand separatism would create a tremendous rift in Punjab, and result in a two-fold disadvantage for the British. First, Sir Sikander Hayat and his Unionists, who formed the Government in Punjab, were loyal and obedient to the British. The demand for a separate state would create a problem between the Muslims and the Sikhs, and the Congress would get off scot free. This would be counter-productive for the British, whose real purpose was to hurt Congress. Secondly, Punjab was the prime area from which the British recruited the army. Therefore, it was inexpedient and untimely to create enmity between the people who would be expected to fight on the same side. On 7 September 1942, the Viceroy wrote opposing the Secretary's proposal:

> I am certain that if we did show the very slightest sign of backing "Sikhistan" seriously in the least degree, not only shall we aggravate communal tension gravely in Punjab, but we should never hear the end of it.

At one time the British had suggested creating a separate State for the Harijans. This was another means of weakening the Hindus. But the Secretary of State said: "Protection of Scheduled Castes is of course impossible on a geographical basis." He did, however, suggest that if these untouchables were converted to Islam or Christianity they could be given special protection!

Although the Viceroy opposed the above scheme, he continuously sought ways of feeding the communal fire. All leaders of the Congress Party had been thrown into prison. Jinnah's state-ments were sounding hollow because there was no one left to offer a rejoinder. The Congress was the undisputed hero of the freedom struggle. It had sacrificed everything in the cause of freedom, its young and old, its men, women and children. The nation was solidly behind the Congress, not a single Indian was brazen enough to side with the British. The British were meanwhile playing a game of patience. They made friends with the Hindu

Mahasabha with the intention that when the partition issue arose, they could be called into the ring and be pitted against the Muslim League. This would serve the dual purpose of creating irreconcilable differences between Hindus and Muslims, and show the rest of the world, [especially U.S.] that there were other political forces besides the Congress, who were opposed in principle to the Muslim League demand. Since all Jinnah could hear was the echo of his own voice, the Congress leadership being in prison, the Hindu Mahasabha also served as the rival team for him and his party. The Viceroy wrote on 15 December 1942:

> I have endeavoured to encourage the Mahasabha etc. by reverting to the topic of the unity of India, though I trust in terms sufficiently guarded so far as the Muslims are concerned to avoid giving Jinnah a legitimate grievance. But I have also thought it well, for the point is a most important one, and the centre of our position, to bring out that the difficulties of this country are not due to our reluctance to transfer power, but to the fact that we have offered to transfer power.

The British were clever manipulators! They were able to utilize different and opposing forces to their advantage! The Viceroy approached Hindu Mahasabha for the unity of India. He approached the Muslim League and Jinnah for partitioning the country. This was an excellent method to set these two forces on a collision course. Jinnah had been driven to a point from where, according to the Viceroy, "The Muslims will do no business except on their own terms."

And their unequivocal "terms" were the partitioning of India and creation of Pakistan! The Mahasabha leaders claimed that partitioning of India was like carving up the holy cow. Both parties were firmly standing their ground. The British were making every possible effort to tell the world that they were prepared to transfer power, but for these irreconcilable differences. The Viceroy wrote that Jinnah was beginning to make such demands that, "it is almost inconceivable that the Hindu majority could accept them."

GANDHIJI'S PROPOSAL TO FORM A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Gandhiji and all other Congress leaders were in prison. When Gandhiji started his fast there was a nationwide movement for his freedom. In a letter to the Government, Gandhiji said that the Congress had no objection if the British Government handed over the power to Jinnah and he established a Government. This letter of Gandhiji caused worry in the British camp. But in his letter dated 16 February 1943, the Viceroy assured the British Government that Jinnah had refused to participate in the leadership convention, and, along with Liaquat Ali Khan, refused Gandhiji's offer.

> And his statement and that of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan in the Assembly have dealt pretty effectively with the suggestion that the Muslim League are willing participants either in Gandhi's fast or in his suggestion that a National Government can be formed by them with his goodwill in a day.

What more could the Congress do? To what lengths had its leaders gone for creating mutual understanding. To the British they said that although we have won the elections and it is our right to govern, but you are free to hand over the right to Jinnah so long as India becomes self-governing. This offer elicited no response from the British, but Jinnah and Liaquat Ali are strongly opposed to forming a National Government. A fine display of arrogance! All the deceit, cruelty, cunning, notoriety, which were characteristic of the British-Indian policy, were faithfully transcribed in the Code-Book of the Muslim League. And how proudly the League bore this ignominy. How heroically they carried the British flag of shame. If they were really concerned with Islam and the Muslim rights they would never have refused the offer to govern the whole of India. Is it because they could not allow the British to surrender power? After all, their conflict was not with the British but with the Congress. What did they care if their enemies were languishing in prison as a consequence of their freedom struggle?

The British correspondence is remarkable because of their complete candour. They wrote back and forthwith utmost frankness, exposing many faces and personalities. They spared no one, not even themselves. On 8 February 1943 Amery wrote to the Viceroy:

> I don't believe you will ever get Indian politicians settling down to a reasonable discussion of their own internal problems, so long as they can shirk them by placing the blame on an alien Government. To that extent, there is really something in Gandhi's plea that Indians can only agree once we are out of their way.

MUSLIM MINISTERS

As I said earlier, when Gandhiji's fast evoked no response from the Government, a few members of the Viceroy's Council handed their resignations in disgust at this indifference. All of these were non-Muslims. Disappointed with their attitude, the Viceroy bestowed all his attention on the Muslims. He was confident that they would never give any demonstration of self-pride or self-respect. This is exactly what happened. A Muslim, Azizul Haq, was given charge of the Ministry of Food. The Viceroy assured the Secretary of State that this appointment would not cause any embarrassment to the British. In his letter dated 2 May 1943, the Viceroy said:

> I saw him [Azizul Haq] yesterday and gave him a talking to. I said that I would run the Food Department myself though not publicly for the time being, and he readily accepted that public responsibility will, of course, be entirely with him, and he will have to defend the action of the Department in Public and, of course, keep in touch with what is going on inside. As regards Commerce, Industry and Civil Supplies, I begged him not to make the mistake of immersing himself in a great deal of detail, that was properly to be handled by the Secretaries, not to overload himself or slow down action by frequent interference

from his high level. He took all this very well and expressed himself ready to play.

It is interesting that these non-Muslim Ministers who had resigned had been selected personally by the Viceroy himself, so also the Muslim Ministers. The difference between their characters, actions and self-respect, is the precise reason why the British placed faith in Muslims whether they were Government officials or Ministers. At the same time Secretary of State, Amery sent instructions that the resignations of all those non-Muslims, who had supported Gandhiji's stand, be accepted. He also ordered that if there was the slightest suspicion that any non-Muslim officer was sympathetic to the Congress, he should be asked to quit his job.

JINNAH AND THE EXPLANATION OF PAKISTAN

After the death of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Sir Khizar Hayat Tiwana was appointed the Chief Minister of Punjab. He was supported by the Unionist Party which included Hindu and Sikh members and Ministers. Since the Muslim League was giving different interpretations of Pakistan, these non-Muslim Punjabis demanded that their Chief Minister persuade Jinnah to explain his idea of Pakistan. In the Agreement which was adopted at the Lahore Convention there was mention not of "one state" but of "several states." Now Jinnah was on a new tangent namely that a "Muslim" corridor be built between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Khizar Hayat told the Viceroy that Jinnah's interpretations were creating confusion, therefore he should be asked to clearly explain his Pakistan idea. This was especially important for Punjab, he said. Jinnah's explanation would provide the proper framework within which people could make up their mind about Pakistan. The Viceroy made one excuse or another to postpone this public explanation of the Pakistan idea. He was not interested in the rationale behind Pakistan, neither was he interested in any religion or party. His interest in planning and publicising Pakistan was based upon his desire to deepen the rift between the Congress

and the Muslim League. A less defined idea made it more advantageous for the British. Vagueness made it appear dangerous, hence an object of fear for the opposition. On 4 May 1943, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary:

> From his [Jinnah] own point of view half of the strength of his position is that he has refused to define it [Pakistan]. Thus I have no doubt that the famous corridor by which he proposes to link North West Pakistan with North East Pakistan, a corridor which would presumably run via Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad and Patna, cutting off the area North of the corridor from the Hindu majority in the South of it, would almost inevitably figure, and he would be a fool if he did not make all sorts of accepted demands in respect of tariffs, defence, the use of ports.

The British were satisfied that Jinnah's outrageous demands would reduce the possibility of his agreement with the Congress. There was no reason for the British to seek clarification from Jinnah. The truth was that the proposal was not clear even in Jinnah's own mind. For example, the problem of the corridor. How was it possible that a corridor, running from Lahore to Calcutta, should fall under the Muslim jurisdiction? Secondly, how would this 1500 miles corridor be maintained? How much Army would need to be deployed to guard it? A thousand questions arose, which proved one fact. The Muslim leaders had no clear concept of Pakistan. The British were aware of the absurdity of the corridor proposal. In his letter dated 6 May 1943, the Secretary of State Amery wrote, "That the practical case, indeed, against Pakistan seems to me overwhelming. Was a special school of logic required to understand Pakistan? What was the British game, after all?"

GANDHIJI'S LETTER TO JINNAH

When Gandhiji's letter to the Government of India did not achieve any result, he wrote directly from his prison cell to Mr

Jinnah. At that time, Prime Minister Churchill was on a tour of the United States. When he learnt about Gandhiji's letter, he sent a message, "Winston telegraphed from America urging that there should be no communique and the letter simply suppressed." [Letter dated 24 April 1943] This letter was suppressed by the British.

The British were not concerned that, having refused Gandhiji's offer Jinnah was becoming very unpopular. Therefore, if Gandhiji's letter was handed to him there may be slightest possibility of reaching an agreement. The Viceroy did not agree with the policy of suppression because he was convinced that the British had elevated Jinnah to a point from which he could not even negotiate, leave alone compromise! The Congress, on its part, had bent over backwards by offering him the whole country. What more could they offer and what more could he refuse? Given these circumstances the Viceroy could not see why the Government of India should discredit itself by suppressing Gandhiji's letter? They wanted to show to the world that they were ready to quit control provided the Indian leaders were in basic agreement with one another.

Jinnah was offended. He went to the extent of challenging the British Government. The Viceroy wrote that Khwaja Nazimuddin spoke his mind in Delhi when he said that he was solidly behind Jinnah and ready to resign on the issue of the suppression of Gandhiji's letter. Although Jinnah was annoyed with the British, he made a strange statement about which the Viceroy wrote on 1 June 1943:

> Meanwhile the fact that Jinnah has only associated himself, in his public statement on Gandhiji's letter, with the principle that there can be no communication with Gandhiji so long as the Mahatma does not call off the policy of last August, is a very valuable advance.

Gandhiji's August proposal was that the British should quit India and that Jinnah should hold discussion with him. Gandhiji had said that during these crisis times when the world was at

war, the country was in a state of turmoil, and Germany has taken Japan and the whole world by storm, it was necessary that India, too, should think about her future. Jinnah agreed to hold discussions with Gandhiji on one condition, that he withdrew his demand for Quit India. To repeat, Jinnah would meet Gandhiji, only if he agreed to give up his struggle to free India. Jinnah's demands were fast becoming ludicrous. Gandhiji's movement was directed at self-determination against the colonial British Rule, how did it affect Jinnah or the Muslim League? Had Gandhiji made the same proposal to the British it would have been appropriate for them to lay down a condition such as the one stipulated by Jinnah. The Muslim League had assumed the role that was more suitable for the British Government. In this manner Jinnah rationalized the British decision to suppress Gandhiji's letter. This is like the story of the man who asked his friend to lend him his dog to guard his harvest. The friend replied that his dog was dead. Then he went on to say that even if he were alive, he would not have given him. Similarly, Jinnah said that whether or not the Government gave him Gandhiji's letter he was replying to it all the same! And his reply was precisely what the British wanted it to be. Jinnah's action was greatly appreciated by the Viceroy. The Secretary of State Amery expressed his admiration for Jinnah in his letter dated 2 June 1943:

> I confess I admire the skill with which Jinnah had taken advantage of your deflation of Gandhi...while at the same time adroitly saving his own face by making it clear that the only letter which would have satisfied him and which he dared you not to forward, was one abandoning whole Congress policy [i.e. to the extent of making his condition identical with yours].

When one considers these events one reaches the conclusion that leaders of the Muslim League never considered for a moment how their policies would benefit Muslims. They were blinded to the Muslim cause, their only concern was to fall in line with the British and happily follow their policy to the letter.

4

Jinnah's Status in British Eyes

Until this time the British were determined to stay in India. In London, the Secretary of State was worried about the Viceroy's favouritism towards Jinnah. A man so aggressive and unreasonable, may, in the long run, become a nuisance for the British. The Viceroy often wrote that he was making every effort not to allow any dissension in the League. This caused the Secretary a few more grey hair! What if the party became unified and Jinnah obdurate? This would then become a greater nuisance than the Congress and Gandhiji. Sensing his discomfort, Viceroy Linlithgow decided to quell Secretary Amery's doubts, for once and for all. His candid analysis is contained in his report dated 10 June 1943:

> Your comments on Jinnah's attitude... I think he probably looks a little more alarming from London than he does here. I don't, however, think he wants a row with the Government. Though on the other hand [like unfortunately all these leaders] he insists on being as rude to the Government [and to his political opponents] as he thinks he dares. I doubt if anyone takes it very seriously, and his threats do not cause me any sleepless nights, as I have consistently felt and said both to Zetland and you. Jinnah would be quite as bad a master as Gandhiji. But Jinnah is not in as strong a position as Gandhiji and the Congress, and he is never likely to be in the near future, since he represents a minority, and a minority that can effectively hold its own with our assistance. Nor, of course, is his organization as deep rooted

> as that of the Congress. I would expect him to be likely to continue to be not merely non-constructive, but positively destructive, and to play his hand so as to get maximum in the way of commitments favourable to his community and the maximum in the way of hurdles to be taken by the Hindus but without facing a showdown with the Government.

This needs no further elaboration. The British admitted that Jinnah had neither power nor organization. He was the leader of a minority. A minority which could survive only on the strength of British support. The Viceroy, thus assured his superiors that Jinnah was a one hundred per cent British stooge! The interesting conundrum is that if Jinnah lacked power and organization, how could he be considered the custodian of Muslim rights? The British declared that they had called the elections so that the Indian public could elect its representatives. These would then become the spokespersons for the country. Jinnah's status among such political heavyweights was extremely fragile. The British knew that Jinnah himself was clearly aware of the vulnerability of his position. At a meeting held in Lahore, which approved the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah revealed to his colleagues that until now the Viceroy thought Gandhiji was all in all. But now he sang a different tune, "After the war [began] I was treated on the same basis as Mr Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr Gandhi."

Fully aware of his tenuous position, Jinnah was surprised to find himself ranked along with Gandhiji. He was conscious of the fact that so far he had never won a popular election and that his organizational skills were nil. Therefore his political life hung by the thread of British patronage. And to that he clung fast. He was clever enough to realize that he was the government's most potent weapon against the Congress. He, therefore, proceeded to take the maximum advantage of his position as canon fodder. But he kept a degree of restraint upon himself so as not to alienate the British by exploiting their vulnerability with his profligacy.

Seeing that the Secretary of State was still sceptical about all this, Linlithgow wrote again on 4 October 1943, imploring him not to

give too much credence to the press reports:

> But I believe, as I have often said to you in these matters that the Muslims [i.e. Jinnah] though they are bound to abuse us in the interest of keeping their place in the public eye, and so safeguarding their reputation as good nationalists, have nothing to gain from the disappearance of the British connection or from a further weakening of that connection, and do not want any such weakening.



Frontier Province and the British

If the British policy is closely examined, it becomes apparent that it was based on generating hatred between Muslims and Hindus. In pursuing this policy the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was a political monkey-wrench! The biggest problem confronting the British was the ninety-two per cent Muslim population in the NWFP. The location of this Province was itself a critical factor. Although the expanse of the British Empire was such that the sun never set at once on its every part, they considered the Frontier their horizon because here they were pitted against a well-matched enemy. It bordered on Russia, where the Czarist empire extended to the river Amu in Afghanistan. After the Soviet Revolution of 1917 the British had to face several problems. River Amu, which until now was a geographical boundary, became an ideological boundary as well. In order to protect themselves from this ideological revolution, the British felt the need to create a counter ideology. What ideology? During the First World War, the world saw the British make a vitriolic attack upon Islamic unity. In India power was seized from Muslim rulers. Having taken the ocean route to India, the British had, with their own eyes, seen the sweep of Islamic influence. Muslims dominated the entire area from the Balkan States to the Chinese border. On the other side they were spread from North Africa to the mid-West. The most potent Islamic power was the Ottoman Empire in Turkey. The British realized that they had to storm this entire Islamic bastion before they could hope to rest in peace. This was the only way to grab India's

tremendous wealth. By the end of the first war the British had crushed the formidable Ottoman Empire, carved up its exemplary Islamic unity, and installed their puppets upon the pieces of broken territory.

At the end of the war, the British were pleased to see how effectively they had stemmed the Islamic tide from the Turkish side. But now they were faced with the Russian revolution. All the capitalist nations including the British, tried their best to nip this revolution in the bud. First they conspired with counter revolutionaries. When this failed they imposed sanctions against the USSR. They hoped to destroy the revolution by hurting the economy. This too did not work. Now the British were in a panic; they had to think of a new technique for countering this idealism. At last they reached the conclusion that no matter what their modus operandi, there was only one missile that would work—Islam. Islam and Communism could be used in hostile positions on this political chessboard, while the British master-minded the game. Thus they were forced into strengthening the very Islam they had destroyed by defeating the Turks and other Islamic nations. They, however, feared that if the true Islamic spirit was kindled, it would cause great harm to the "infidels". Another difficulty was that only recently they had waged an open battle with the Islamic Khilafat. Clearly, they did not have any use for the real Islam. They wanted an Islam which would align with their capitalist colonial empire and become an ideological weapon for them. They wanted to use Islam as a military crescent which stretched from Turkey to the Chinese border, and which could be strung around the neck of the USSR.

To strengthen and complete the crescent an Islamic stronghold had to be created from Turkey and Iran right upto the China border. To achieve this, it was essential to separate, in the name of Islam, the northern part of India which bordered on the Russian territory. This was expected to serve the dual purpose of protecting the British from the USSR, and of continuing their colonial regime over India. The British were anxiously seeking allies for this venture. There was no place for "trouble makers" like Badshah Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgars! The British were hoping to

create hatred between the Hindus and the Muslims, which was the precise reverse of the Khudai Khidmatgars' philosophy. The British were using Islam to save their Empire; the Khudai Khidmatgars were fighting in the Islamic spirit to waste their Empire. They wanted self-determination. They wanted their national wealth to benefit the poor, the meek, and the down-trodden. For this purpose they united with the party which was fighting for freedom. That was the Indian National Congress, a national body, which included Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians. Admittedly there were more Hindus, but this was due to their proportionately larger numbers. The Congress was neither interested in opposing Russia nor was willing to do so. It was only concerned with getting rid of the British. The British knew that within the country their real enemy was the Congress. The Congress' nationalist aims were anathema to British objectives. To quote Iqbal:

Religion does not teach
mutual discord
Strung on a single strand
we are one
we are Indians.

The British 'conjectured' that just as they could use Islam as an idealistic force against Russia, so also could it be used as a disruptive force against the Congress. It could become a communal tool for creating hatred between the Hindus and the Muslims. It could also be used as a counterfoil to the communist ideology. The greatest impediment to this strategy was that of the Khudai Khidmatgars. They were not prepared to eschew the national movement, even if it were tainted with religious discord, nor were they willing to use Islam to oppose Communism. Another major problem for the British was the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the Frontier Province and its adjoining tribal areas. The British were also worried about its location at the border of Afghanistan, where the Pakhtoons were split up, thanks to their dividing line. Although several battles had been fought in the area, the British

were not at ease with the Pakhtoons. Under these circumstances it was disturbing for them to find another important national movement arising from that hostile ground. Any merger between the two national movements could become a death blow for British Imperialism. Unfortunately for them, Hindu-Muslim hatred could not find fertile ground here. Above all, the valiant men of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement were so contemptuous of British atrocities, both personal and political, that no amount of harassment could make them squeal. The British realized that they could do nothing to make them deviate from their chosen path.

MULLAHS AND KHANS

The British operated on two levels. First they used physical force and, secondly, material resources to overturn the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. They were confident of crushing the movement, with Government machinery and brute force. They collected all their gophers, such as Sirs, Nawabs, Khan Bahadurs, Khan Sahibs, Jagirdars, even the Honorary Magistrates. Thousands of young men were thrown into prisons; children of the Khans were used as hired guns. The Khudai Khidmatgars got a rough deal: their children were left destitute, their homes were ransacked and the Haripur Prison became the graveyard for these God-fearing men. But their overwhelming sacrifices left the British with no choice other than to accord the Frontier a status of equality with the other states. When, in keeping with the provisions of the 1935 Act, elections were held, the British saw all their hand picked men being defeated one by one, by the Khudai Khidmatgars. Although the Khudai Khidmatgars did not attain an absolute majority, out of the fifty Assembly seats they won nineteen. This election proved two points. First, there was no party as well organised as the Khudai Khidmatgars. Secondly, that their popularity was such that even British patronage could not guarantee victory. The most astounding defeat was that of Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum. He lost his seat to Abdul Aziz Khan, a Khudai Khidmatgar from the village of Zaida. Nawab Sir Mohammad Akbar Khan of Hoti lost to a member of his own

family, Khudai Khidmatgar Amir Mohammad Khan, popularly known as Khan Lala. Arbab Sher Ali Khan of Tehkal, lost to Arbab Abdul Ghafoor of his own family. In Kohat, another pillar of the British, Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan was defeated by Mohammad Afzal Khan of Latambar. Among the members who defeated the Khudai Khidmatgars were three Nawabs, two Nawabzadas, two Khan Bahadurs, and four Khan Sahibs. Among the Hindus also there were four Rai Bahadurs and two Rai Sahibs.

After the election when the British took stock of the situation they realized that no matter how strong the Nawabs, Khawaneen, Khan Bahadurs, Jagirdars and Zaildars were, unless they were politically organized, they were no match for the Khudai Khidmatgars. It was surprising that no matter how carefully the British picked their candidates, they could not make a collective impact upon the electorate. Another interesting fact was that the Muslim League did not exist in the Frontier. Therefore, the Assembly had no member from that party. Except the Khudai Khidmatgars, all other members had won as independents.

The British knew that the Pakhtoons had two leaders: the spiritual and the temporal. Until now the British had only depended on their temporal leaders. They soon learnt that the Pakhtoons were proud and brave people who had not learnt to unite due to the proliferation of their feudal units. Individualism was more their style. Each small kingdom had its own elders, Khans, Mullahs and leaders. Unlike a typical feudal order, decisions were not made by the feudal lord but by national *Jargas*. Since these leaders were subject to the will of the people, the British were afraid of approaching them. They were, therefore, advised to somehow get rid of the elders of old Pakhtoon families and create their own leadership. Having planted their own saplings, they could, later on rest in their shade. The advantage of creating such leadership would be their total dependence on the British. Since their entire wealth, name, status, would have been gifted by the British, they would not dare to show the slightest divergence from their path. Any indiscretion would mean the end of pomp, patronage and plenty. These men, carefully nurtured like hothouse plants, prefixed with titles which they neither earned nor deserved, were

nourished on British left-overs. Their children had readymade jobs in the civil and armed services. The British had thus created a special class of people stamped with the seal "Approved by the Crown". They had special official influence, their recommendations were accepted, they were given Honorary Magistrate Status and they pronounced judgements, even on murder cases. They played with peoples' fate by pronouncing prison sentences, or ordering releases. The British preferred to present them as national leaders, disregarding the old families, or respectable elders who were the true representatives of the people.

Along with this policy, the British had decided to break up the collective life of the Pakhtoons. They had smashed the Pakhtoon nation, fragmenting it into tribal areas, agencies presenting a piece to Afghanistan, another to Baluchistan. In fact they got so carried away with their nation-butchery that they were unwilling to allow their self-created Nawabs and Khans to unify, their motive being to encourage dissension and enmity. The more they vied with one another for one-upmanship, the more easily they fell in the trap of British Imperialism. In their effort to prove their superior loyalties they tried to outdo one another in bowing and scraping before the British. For a short while this plan worked well. But when the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement began, the poor and the destitute found a forum at which they could be heard. At first the Government tried to suppress them, but after the election they realised that the tools they were using had their limitations. Although as individuals their faithful minions had a certain influence on their constituencies, unless they were prepared to work as a unified group, they could not take on a national movement. This fact became especially apparent when prime British candidates, Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum Khan and Sir Mohammad Akbar Khan, were routed by modest individuals from the Yusuf Zai tribe. The British realised that the mutual rivalry they were encouraging among official title holders was proving harmful to their own cause.

The Indian experience taught the British that their purpose could only be fulfilled only if Islam was used to steer politics. The foundation of the Muslim League was laid in September 1937 at Abbottabad, by the Mullahs. The event was presided over by

Maulana Shakirullah of Naushera, the President of Jamiat-ul-Ulema. He became the first President of the Muslim League. The Secretary was Maulana Mohammad Shuaib of Mardan, also the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. It is a remarkable coincidence that the Ministry constituted in April 1937 under Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum, was dissolved due to a no-confidence motion, on exactly the same day on which the Muslim League was founded.

After a whole year had passed, despite his limited powers, Dr Khan Sahib made a few revolutionary reforms in the Province. This caused concern to the British and their flunkeys. These official title-holders became worried about their own political future. This provided a golden opportunity for the British to combat the national movement on both fronts. In September 1938 the leadership of the Muslim League changed hands from Maulana Shakirullah of Naushera to Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan. The Muslim League thus came under the influence of Nawabs, Sirs, Honorary Magistrates etc. This became Britian's temporal defence against the Pakhtoons. Similarly, they organized a party consisting of Maulanas. Details of the above have been recorded in the diary of Sir George Cunningham. Like the Mughal Emperor, Akbar, the British had now organized their support on both religious and spiritual fronts.

THE DIARIES OF SIR GEORGE CUNNINGHAM

Since the entire policy of the British was based on Islam, therefore, it is important to record the diaries in detail. This will further inform the people how the British used these so-called devotees of Islam, followers of the Prophet, and inheritors of *Namaz*, to serve their ends. And their entire faith was sold cheap. It pains me to record certain names, because that may cause embarrassment to their heirs. But I consider it my duty to make my people aware of the intrigue in which they were involved to protect the British sceptre and crown I want my people to become aware of the danger that may overtake them anytime. This mistake should never be repeated. Never should they allow themselves to be manipulated in the name of Islam. These traders and hustlers of religion should

be publicly stripped naked so that their every layer is recognized by future generations. George Cunningham's diaries are a shocking record of men nurtured at the excellent Islamic school at Deoband, who were busy serving the British. With the Holy Book in their hand and the *Tasbih* strung around their neck, these pilgrims set out to spread the word of colonialism, British Imperialism, and, for a few pieces of silver, agreed to serve as the custodians of slavery for the Indian people.

Sir George Cunningham's diaries are available at the India Office Library, London. If someone needs proof or wants to investigate further, that is where he should look. I have made official trans-cripts which are used throughout this book.

The British policy of communalism could not work in the Frontier Province. Here, Muslims were in such an overwhelming majority that they were not afraid of any other community. Secondly, the Pakhtoons were so confident of their own strength that no one could impose any unwanted policy on them.

It became obvious that any people who were ready to tackle a strong, cruel and oppressive race like the British could not be cowed down. Therefore, the British generally sought out the Maulanas; and in the tribal areas and Afghanistan, they especially combined forces with the Maulanas. These religious leaders were expected, to align with the British against Russia. During the Russian Revolution of 1917, the British realized that along with the military strength a new ideology had emerged. Their experienced eye focussed on Islam as the only way to confront and confound the ideological strength of the Russians. When faced with a real danger in the person of Amir Amanullah Khan, they used Islam against Muslims. With utmost cunning, Islam was used against a Pakhtoon ruler and the Muslims of Afghanistan. When Hitler's armies darkened European borders, the British, once again, found their boundaries endangered. At that time we witnessed Islam being used in India to further British interest. It served as a useful ideological weapon against the USSR. During turbulent times in the Frontier Province, the British once again used Islam. The Nawabs and Khawaneen were brought under the Muslim League banner. Islam as a political force was strengthened not only in the

Frontier Province, but also in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan.

Cunningham wrote that Kuli Khan was being used as the Mullah liaison. He was commissioned to work secretly with the tribal Mullahs and with others who were not prepared to come out in open support. It was a simple case of establishing an Islamic stronghold to combat the *Kafirs*, including the Bolsheviks. The first Mullah recruited by Cunningham was Mullah Marwat. He was formerly connected with the Khaksar movement. Kuli Khan assured him that the only way he could serve Islam was by raising the slogan of *Jehad* against the enemies of Islam. Through Mullah Marwat, Kuli Khan established relations with the office bearers of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Sarhad, and their supporters in India. These Mullahs, many of whom had consistently been anti-British, began to speak and write against the Russians and Germans. Subsidies were paid to all Mullahs through Mullah Marwat.

It was the responsibility of these Mullahs to tell the nation that since the British were believers in the book, *Ahl-e-Kitaab*, even marriage with them was legal. On the other hand, the Russians were Bolsheviks; not only did they not believe in a revealed book, they did not believe in the existence of God. Therefore, the British and the Muslims were united in their common aspiration to fight this infidel race. They were required to continually remind the Muslims that enlisting in the British Army and fighting along with the British is a service to Islam.

Cunningham records that he persuaded the leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Sarhad to go to Waziristan and convince Faqir Ipi that since the British were at war against the Germans and Italians, Faqir should not bother them because they were now fighting against an infidel race. Their war, in its own way, was a *Jehad*, therefore, Faqir's *Jehad* against them should be called off. The British were conducting this intrigue with utmost secrecy. Their enemies had no suspicion that such documents and letters were being exchanged. Cunningham was happy that Faqir's deputy, Mohammad Waris's, letter written to Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Sarhad was friendly in tone. It became evident that Faqir and his companions had no inkling that the Mullahs were accomplices of the British, with explicit instructions from them.

With the outbreak of war in Europe, differences arose between the British and the Congress. Congress Governments in eight provinces were dissolved and events started moving towards confrontation. Since Germany and Italy were their chief adversaries the British decided to soft pedal their anti-Soviet propaganda, and use all of it against Italy and Germany. Cunningham made three groups among the Maulanas. The smaller Mullahs were handed to the local Khans. Those slightly superior in rank reported through the Deputy Commissioners. The senior ones had a direct line to the Governor Cunningham:

> I have not been in touch with any of the smaller Mullahs myself. I have done it through the following agents with whom practically all my connections have been verbal; as little is put on paper as possible. Ghulam Haider of Sherpao village...he told me that he thought he could work through about nine or ten Mullahs including those of the following villages: Razzar, Kot, Tarnab, Tongi, Utmanzai and Umarzai later Prang and Charsadda.

Cunningham wrote that he had asked Ghulam Haider of Sherpao village to meet each Mullah on an individual basis, prepare him to serve the true cause of Islam, give him forty-fifty rupees, tell him that he will receive another visit after four months, at which time he should be prepared to brief the authorities about his activities to date. Cunningham asked the Khan Bahadur to hint to the Mullahs that if their work proves satisfactory they could expect a government pension. In return, Khan Bahadur told Cunningham that certain Mullahs were most untrustworthy. Better, if they were called in each month, but they should be well paid. Cunningham said that he had given Ghulam Haider of Sherpao village Rs 600. The list of Mullahs from districts Naushera and Peshawar was handed to the Deputy Commissioner, Iskander Mirza.

The Mullahs of Swat, Baneer, Mardan and Rani Zai were the responsibility of the Prime Minister of Swat, Hazrat Ali. Cunningham wrote, "The Wazir-i-Azam [Hazrat Ali of Swat] sent me a list of the Mullahs through whom he is working. He is paying them an

average of Rs 15.00 per month."

This was unfair, for the Mullahs of Hashtnagar and Doaba were paid only Rs 10 per month. The Mullahs of Kohat were the responsibility of the Deputy Commissioner of that area. The Mullahs of Bannu were entrusted to Nawab Zafar Khan and Taj Ali. The latter was Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider's son.

Cunningham had given Rs 600 to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, Mohd. Aslam, to pass along to three spiritual leaders of that area, Ama Khel Faqir, Pir Musa, and Pir Zakoori; two hundred rupees a piece. They were given the assurance that if their work was satisfactory they could get a raise!

Regarding Syed Abdul Jabbar of Satana, Cunningham wrote that he was connected with Hyderabad Deccan, and was paid by the Prime Minister, Sir Akbar Hydari. That Hyderabad would pay for the work that was done for the British was perfectly acceptable to Cunningham. He reports that Khan informed him that work was successfully completed at Sawabi, and that he had sent his cousin to look after the affairs of Bajaur. The Afridi Mullahs of Khyber were the responsibility of the political agent, Bacon. Cunningham had a long standing relationship with Maulvi Barkatullah, the leader of the Mujahideen:

> My arrangement uptil now with him [Maulvi Barkatullah of Asmos] has been that he comes to see me once or twice a year. Barkatullah said he could also do a good deal through ten or twelve Maulvis in different places throughout Bajaur Mohmand country.... I paid him Rs 1000. I asked him to recruit ten or twelve Maulvis from Bajaur within this amount, and contact me in a couple of months.

Cunningham, then, gave a detailed account of the activities of Kuli Khan and the Maulanas. It seems that a lot of work was accomplished through the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. They organized several assemblies, passed a few motions, printed pamphlets and made contacts by touring various areas. In Cunningham's records there is evidence of anti-Congress propaganda along with anti-war statements. "Maulana Mohd. Shuaib toured the Mardan

district, condemning Satyagraha. A pamphlet by Maulana Midraullah condemned war situation and was anti-Congress."

Cunningham's next concern was that having spent the money to court the Mullahs, it must now be ascertained whether or not they were actively engaged in anti-Congress propaganda. He wrote that several spies were despatched to various mosques to observe and report back whether or not the Mullahs were working for their allowances, or absconding from the assigned job! The reports pleased him since they stated that the Mullahs were working hard for their money and were happily trafficking in Islam for a monthly sum of fifteen rupees. The progress made by Hazrat Ali of Swat was a special source of satisfaction. "Hazrat Ali, Wazir-i-Azam of Swat, is doing excellently in Swat and Buner, he uses Pir Baba Ziarat. Hazrat Ali now covers the whole of Swat, Buner and Mardan border."

Cunningham wrote that the Pir of Musa Zai came to visit him at Peshawar. He was friendly with Sher Ali. The latter was able to enlist the support of the Pir Taunsa. He had agreed to go along with him but unfortunately for him became involved in a civil suit.

In Khyber the political agent entrusted his work to Maulana Abdul Baqi. He placed implicit trust in him and claimed to have given him Rs 1000.

When the war broke out, and Hitler became the supreme dictator, the British had to face defeat from all directions. They became concerned that the USSR, taking advantage of the situation, may move towards India. To forestall this possibility the Jamiat-ul-Ulema declared at their annual general meeting that if Russia attacked Afghanistan it was the duty of all Muslims to join the *Jehad* against them. When the British were satisfied that there was no fear from Russia, Cunningham issued an edict, "I advised Kuli Khan to modify his anti-Bolshevik propaganda and to concentrate more on propaganda against Germany and Italy."

Deteriorating relations between the British and the Congress led them to start using the Maulanas to oppose the Congress. It is difficult to conceive how a true Muslim could bear to side with his sworn enemies. Right from the time of Sultan Salahuddin until the Ottoman Empire, the British had routed the Muslims. The

British-Indian army had showered the Great Mosque with bullets. They had seized the throne from the Mughal Emperors. The memory of their treatment of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, and his children will long linger in human memory. Then, before the very eyes of their brethren in the Frontier Province, how badly they treated the Pakhtoons in Afghanistan. Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, Amir Sher Ali Khan, and, finally, Amir Amanullah Khan, all these Muslims were destroyed by the British. Were the Mullahs unaware of all the atrocities inflicted by the British on the Khudai Khidmatgars from 1930 onwards? Their bombing and attacks on the tribal areas were no secret for the Mullahs, and neither was their military action on Wazir, Masood, Afridi and Mohmand. The war against true believers and 'Mujahids' like Haji Sahib Turang Zai and Faqir Ipi was inspired and instigated by the British.

The Mullahs were concerned neither with Islam, nor Quran, nor with the faith itself. These followers of the Holy Prophet were busy selling religion for ten or fifteen rupees a month. The British were their *Muftis* and *Qazis*. Their religious sanction came from the British. Having raised the sword in the name of Islam, they were prepared to pounce upon the "enemy" at the slightest nod from the British. If the British called the Russians "infidels", the Mullahs echoed "Yes". If the British declared the same for the Germans, the Mullah's nodded in agreement although the Germans like the English were *Ahl-e-Kitab*. The Mullahs did not concern themselves with the principles: they waited upon the pleasure of the British. When it was a question of damning Italy, the Mullahs echoed the British sentiment without recognising that Rome was the seat of Christianity, and Vatican city, residence of the Pope.

When the British needed Islam to resolve some of their internal problems, they summoned their "indentured slaves". In the Frontier Province their problem was that their opponents were the Khudai Khidmatgars who were all Muslims, and their leader Badshah Khan was a *Haji*, schooled in the best traditions of Islam. He had founded Islamic schools, and served the Islamic cause in every possible manner. His lifelong mission was to throw out the British. These Mullahs, having sold their souls to the British, came

out in open confrontation with the Khudai Khidmatgars. I have no personal objection if a religious scholar jumps into a political foray. But these traitor Mullahs accosted the patriots and true Muslims in the name of Islam, all for gaining favour with the British. Cunningham wrote:

> Jamiat-ul-Ulema toured in Kohat District in June of 1942, and in Peshawar and Mardan in July, doing intensive propaganda; anti-Axis, on the Islamic theme, generally, and anti-Congress on the Pakistan theme. Mullahs in Peshawar and Mardan intensified their anti-Congress propaganda in July/August 1942.

This means that the British had engaged the Mullahs to work for the Muslim League. The Mullahs were being used as needed, according to changing scenario of the World War. The British had attached them to their cause in a manner such that they rationalized their policies based on a contorted interpretation of Islam. When they felt secure on the Russian front they began to deploy the Mullahs against the Khudai Khidmatgars. Cunningham wrote, "Wazir-i-Azam of Swat is now employing eighteen Mullahs at Mardan and thirty two at Pir Baba Ziarat, paying each one of them thirty rupees per month."

Cunningham further wrote that Maulana Mohd. Shuaib and Maulana Midrarullah came to see him at Nathiagalli. They brought a detailed, Urdu pamphlet which was intended for distribution in the Zillahs and tribal areas. It was an excellent pamphlet; anti-Congress, anti-Japan and anti-Germany. What better proof could there be that these Mullahs wanted to "serve" Islam, and in what better way could they "serve" it then perform *Jehad* with the militancy of their pen? They pronounced Islamic Judgements [Fatwas], but these were first approved by the British before they were announced:

> Maulana Mohd. Shuaib and Maulana Midrarullah came to see me at Nathiagalli on the 26th August and produced a long draft in Urdu of the pamphlet which they proposed to issue both in the Districts and in Tribal Territories; all good anti-Congress,

anti-Japanese and anti-Marxist stuff. They were extremely friendly.

The British did Islam a good turn by recording the names and addresses of these Mullahs. There were twenty-four Mullahs from the Peshawar district, of whom six were from the city of Peshawar, thirteen from the Tehsil Charsadda, three from Tehsil Naushera, and eighteen from Mardan and Swabi. And so it goes. It is humiliating to read how these interpreters of religion sold their conscience to the political agents and bartered Islam for a few pieces of silver! It is further painful to see proof of their false judgements [Fatwas] upon true sons and patriots of India. What amazing manipulations! To preserve their imperial regime the British were able to raise and organize a band of servile Muslims who never demanded a free India. On the contrary they resisted the freedom movement, and fully supported the British, confident of material support from them and moral support from their so-called interpretation of Islam.

The British strategy was to befriend those families whose heads were involved in the freedom struggle. The two most important persons fighting the *Jehad* against the British were Faqir of Ipi and Mullah Pawandah. Another crucial link was Haji Sahib Turangzai of Mohmand. The British were most interested in ingratiating themselves with these three individuals. And their greatest triumph was to win over the sons of these valiant patriots, Mullah Pawandah's son Fazal Din and Haji Turangzai's son Padsha Gul. If one were to assess the state of things it becomes apparent that there were very few influential persons in the districts and tribes whom the British had not obtained for a price. After the death of Haji Sahib Turangzai and Mullah Pawandah, Faqir was the only stalwart whom they could not buy!

An interesting incident occurred when, after the outbreak of the war in Europe, the British tried to persuade the Afghans to throw out the Germans. To pressurise the Afghans, they invited Shami Pir to the tribal territory, instructing him to incite the people against the Royal Family of Afghanistan. When the British were satisfied that the task had been successfully completed they called Shami Pir, to the Vana cantonment in Waziristan. They settled with him

for £25,000. Shami Pir performed a disappearing trick! Having seen this task successfully completed the Secretary of State for India was thrilled. He asked the Viceroy to make a similar deal with Faqir. The Viceroy's reply is dated 14 July 1938, "There is, I fear, no possible chance in dealing with him on the same basis as Shami Pir. He is not only implacable, but also completely incorruptible. Who would rid me of this turbulent Priest?"

6

Mullahs, Khans and the Muslim League

In a previous chapter I had observed that the foundation for the Muslim League in the Frontier Province was laid by the Mullahs. The President of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Sarhad, Maulana Mohd. Shuaib, was the President of the Muslim League. The Secretary of the Jamiat was also the League Secretary. These two Mullahs had a direct line to Sir George Cunningham. But the British realised that they had better separate the spiritual from the temporal. The political and worldly affairs were assigned to the Khan Bahadurs and Jagirdars, while the spiritual and religious to the Mullahs and Pirs. It is interesting to see that these agents of Cunningham later became leaders of the Muslim League; their names were: Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan of Sherpao, Nawab Zafar Khan and Taj Ali from Bannu became immortalised in this context. In this manner the Pirs and Mullahs independently joined the Muslim League. Pir Sahib Manki Shareef, Pir Zakoori and other Mullahs played political games from a religious base, impelled and applauded by the British.

One added advantage of working with these Mullahs was that the tribals could also be used to work for the British, because no Government official was allowed to enter these areas. Since there was a news black-out, there was no other means of influencing the inhabitants of the tribal areas.

Cunningham saw that the servile state to which the Mullahs had been reduced, made them ideal for performing all his dirty tasks.

He, therefore, started using them against the Khudai Khidmatgars. Cunningham wrote that at one time the Mullahs of Yusufzai were anti-Government. Now, thanks to the new policy, they switched their loyalty everyday. First they were anti-USSR, then anti-German, anti-Japan, anti-Hindu, and, finally, anti-Congress. The anti-Congress sentiment was greatly welcome because it meant pro-Muslim League! The British Government identified themselves with the victory of the Muslim League:

> The success of the Muslim League in these by-elections was generally accepted as being a victory for the British Government over the subversive elements in the country [Governor's report, 24 August 1943].

The Khudai Khidmatgars were also creating problems for the British. They launched civil disobedience and resigned from the Government. The area was brought under Governor's rule. This was a province with the largest Muslim majority. During the last elections the Muslim League did not exist in the Frontier Province. Therefore there was no possibility of even a single member being elected from that party. This was a big disappointment for the British. In his letter dated 16 January 1940, the Viceroy wrote that Jinnah came to see him. Referring to Dr Khan Sahib's resignation he asked whether in the Frontier Province there was any possibility of another party forming the Government? Jinnah requested that he be allowed to consult with his colleagues before answering this question. He also said that it would be a good idea to request the Governor to take special interest in this matter. One month later, Jinnah told the Viceroy that he had spoken with other leaders of the League. They felt that they were not capable of forming the Government by themselves. But if Governor Cunningham cooperated with them they might give it a shot. Then Jinnah enumerated the advantages of forming the Government. If this Government were to be formed it would be a slap on the face of the Congress. The second advantage would be that the news that a Muslim majority province had formed a non-Congress Government, would spread like wild fire. Jinnah added that he was most anxious if

possible to see this through, because he was confident that there could be no more salutary lesson for the Congress and no better advertisement of their real position in India. The entire world would realize that a non-Congress Ministry has been established in the NWFP. He was, therefore, most anxious to bring this matter to a successful conclusion.

The political situation in India may be described as follows. The British, and its ally the Muslim League, both wanted it to be widely known that the Congress was a Hindu movement. The Muslim League was the one and only representative of the Muslims. The fact that the Frontier Province was governed by another party, the Khudai Khidmatgars, destroyed the very basis of their argument. Therefore the British were hell bent on throwing the Frontier into the arms of the League. The Viceroy assured Mr Jinnah that he would consult with Governor Cunningham and then get back to him.

Another incident related to the above events is narrated by Iskander Mirza. At that time he was the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. The following is an incident from his autobiography. The Nawab of Bhopal had invited him for a tiger hunt. On his return he went to see Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who sent him to Quaid-i-Azam. This incident occurred in March 1943. Iskander Mirza wrote that Jinnah had already established a social contact with his mother. First he asked him whether he was a Muslim. He said, "Since the days of the Prophet."" Then he asked, "Do you consider me the leader of the Indian Muslims?" He said, "Yes." Jinnah averred that the League had not formed the Government in a single province in the country. "But if you tried, a Muslim League Government could be formed in the Frontier Province." Iskander Mirza said that he was only a Deputy Commissioner. This task could be accomplished by none other than the Governor. He added that the Muslim League did not exist in that province, and its leader Sardar Aurangzeb Khan was a very corrupt individual. Jinnah asked him to leave aside Aurangzeb's strength and weaknesses. No matter what the organisational condition of the Muslim League, it was imperative that it form the Government. As a Muslim, it was his duty to make it happen.

Iskander Mirza wrote that, later, when Sir George Cunningham returned form his tour of Kabul, he sent for him. No sooner had he sat down, than Cunningham started speaking about the tremendous pressure he was under to form a new Government in the Frontier Province. He said that the Government of India wanted to prove that the Frontier was not with the Congress. Those were the times when, as a result of the Quit India Movement, several members of the Assembly had been thrown in prison without the benefit of a trial. The Governor was having a field day! He invited Aurangzeb Khan to form the Government. Iskander Mirza wrote that he did not have any faith in Aurangzeb Khan. There was only one individual worthy of trust, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar of Peshawar. At that time, he was with the Ahrar and opposed to the Muslim League and was close to the Congress. Iskander Mirza wrote that Nishtar was not very partial to Jinnah Sahib either. He was a witness to Jinnah being cursed by Nishtar at the Mahabat Khan Mosque. Iskander Mirza called Nishtar and appealed to him in the name of Islam. Upon his insistence, Nishtar left the movement and joined the Muslim League. In this manner he became a Minister in the Aurangzeb Cabinet. Iskander Mirza wrote, "This Aurangzeb who used to grovel at my feet became the Chief Minister due to my efforts." On the subject of Aurangzeb, Cunningham wrote:

> Aurangzeb is extremely amenable and anxious to do what I want. He seems to have forgotten that the function of a Minister is to advise the Governor. Nearly every file comes from him with a note, "I solicit the advice of H.E. the Governor." [Cunningham's diary, 19 July 1943]

Aurangzeb and his companions knew where the real seat of power was located. To have enabled the Muslim League to form the Government from an Assembly where there was not even a single person elected from their party, was a task that could have been accomplished only by the British and their Deputy Commissioners. Dissension arose among the party members. First, a bitter enmity started between Aurangzeb Khan and the Provincial President Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan. When Cunningham saw the

condition of the Government he realized that such a deplorable state of affairs could damage the Muslim League. In his diary dated 27 May 1944, he wrote:

> There is no doubt that the name of the Muslim League Administration is simply mud nowadays owing to the scandalous way in which they buy votes. In order to increase their numbers in the Assembly, the Muslim League had started illegal practice.

After one year of their Government, Cunningham tried to release the Khudai Khidmatgars Assembly members one by one. On the other hand, factions started forming within the Muslim League which resulted in a two-way split. One was Aurangzeb Khan's ruling party, and the other that of Saadullah Khan, along with the people who had received no political kickbacks.

These skirmishes continued. In November 1944, Saadullah Khan informed Jinnah that he could no longer support the Ministry and that, if a no-confidence motion was moved, he would vote in favour of it. [Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan, p. 131]

The Governor was making every effort to keep the Government alive. For that reason he did not call the 1944 Autumn Session. His excuse was that there was no work for the Assembly. The Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party presented the Governor with a memorandum containing twenty signatures requesting that the Assembly be called to debate the no-confidence motion against Aurangzeb and his Cabinet. The Governor rejected the memorandum. In the spring session of 1945 when the Assembly was reluctantly called the no-confidence vote went through, with Saadullah's anti-Government vote.

Cunningham and his Junior Officers were aware of the damage done to the Muslim League by the Aurangzeb Government. This bargain proved very costly because it resulted in the Muslim League acquiring a bad name, and its breaking up into several splinter groups. But the British were still unwilling to concede the Province to the Congress or the Khudai Khidmatgars. The British

policy was to brazen it out by using official agents to worm their way into the province and the tribal areas.

THE ELECTIONS OF 1946

Provincial elections were held in February 1946. The Congress got a significant majority vote and an absolute majority in the Assembly. The British were visibly upset when the Congress won the Muslim seats. The League concentrated all its efforts in District Hazara, where it won eight out of nine seats. The British even tried every tactic, including delegating special officers, to ensure a few more seats for the League. For example, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu as well as his wife toured the district, and, whenever anyone invited him for a meal, he always asked that his wife be presented with a scarf! This is a euphemism for "Vote for the Muslim League!" The wealth of the Princely States and efforts of Mullahs and Khan Bahadurs were all directed towards promoting the League. For the British, this was an embarrassing defeat. The Muslim League won only one seat from the entire district of Mardan, which belonged to Sir Mohammad Akbar Khan. Similarly, one seat was won from Peshawar, two from Bannu, and none from Kohat.

The elections posed another problem for the British and the League; the election issue was Pakistan, but was exaggerated to include *Kufr* and Islam. Most of the British supporters were Pirs and Mullahs who demanded, in the name of Islam, a separate Pakistan. When the British realized that the League could not be expected to win by democratic, legal, political and constitutional means and that the Province would remain loyal to the Khudai Khidmatgars, they started contemplating a different course of action.

From Dera Ismail Khan, on the Jamiat-ul-Ulema ticket, two members were elected. When they joined the Khudai Khidmatgars, Dr Khan Sahib had a total of thirty-three seats and the Muslim League seventeen. When Dr Khan Sahib formed the Government, Cunningham, having completed a lengthy term of Governorship, was replaced by Sir Olaf Caroe. During the sensitive months of

1930, Caroe had been Deputy Commissioner in the Frontier. He had shown exceptional cruelty to the Khudai Khidmatgars. Later, he returned to Delhi and joined the Central Government as Foreign Secretary. Meanwhile, a new Viceroy had arrived on the scene. Lord Linlithgow was replaced by Lord Wavell. When Linlithgow left India, he spoke these famous last words, "I think I can claim to be handing over to Wavell a pretty well set stage so far as the political position is concerned, though one that would need constant attention and constant handling."

There is no denying the veracity of the above statement. During his tenure as Viceroy, Linlithgow had the political fortunes of India well under control. When, in June 1945, Lord Wavell called a Conference in Simla, he invited the leaders of various parties to find a political solution. His stand was clear. He wanted to tell the world that he was prepared to make a settlement, but whom should he settle with if the Hindus and the Muslims persisted in their mutual disagreement? The conference was not expected to find a solution to the problem. It was held to bring the leaders face to face so that the situation could reach an impasse and subsequently deteriorate.

The Simla Conference approved Wavell's first suggestion that a Central Executive Council be formed. At the start he had indicated that there would be a Muslim and a non-Muslim party. Jinnah became adamant on the point that no one else had the right to represent the Muslims, and, moreover, no one had the right to appoint any Muslim Minister on this Council. His intention was clear: that the Muslims and non-Muslims should have equal representation. At one end of the political spectrum was Jinnah, and on the other all the inhabitants of India; Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Parsis. India had a population of forty crores of which ten crores were Muslims. While the Muslim League had not formed the Government in a single province, the Congress had formed the Government in eight provinces, which included provinces with Muslim majority. Muslim League had not whiffed at the sweet smell of success even in the Muslim provinces! Of the one hundred and seventeen seats in Bengal, the Muslim League had won forty and of the eighty-four in Punjab, only one.

They had no seat in Sind or in the Frontier. Wavell asked Jinnah how many Muslim Ministers should there be on the Council? Jinnah expressed the view that, "They must all be nominated by the League and must all be Leaguers. None, except himself, as head of the Muslim League, could nominate the Muslims on the new Council." He insisted that if the Muslims were opposed to any issue before the Council, the decision should be made by a two-third majority, a kind of communal veto!

The Chief Minister of the Punjab Unionist Party, Khizar Hayat, made the first claim in the selection of Muslim Ministers. The Congress submitted two Muslim names in deference to the Frontier Province, and Sind which was ruled by the nationalist party of Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh Somru. Wavell claimed that Jinnah wanted a proportionate representation. "If he really meant this, it is obvious that he never had any intention of accepting this offer. It is difficult to see why he came to Simla at all. The root cause of the failure was, of course, Jinnah's intransigence and obstinacy." [Wavell, pp 155-56]

Jinnah should have been asked a question good enough to fetch a response to a political aphorism "who was the bread winner, and who the consumer?" All the sacrifices, so far, had been made by the Congress. Thousands of persons staked their lives in this movement. Many more were clapped in prisons. Having done all this, at long last, when there was the slightest glimmer of hope, what business did Jinnah have to extend his begging bowl, not only for his own, but for others' share as well?

Wavell went on record, stating that he found Jinnah's attitude unfair and unacceptable. Yet he was not willing to accept the provincial nominee, Khizar Hayat, or the elected representative, Sind's Chief Minister Allah Baksh. He refused to recognise Dr Khan Sahib who was the popular choice for Chief Minister of the Frontier Province. Jinnah's obdurateness was responsible for defeating the purpose of the conference. The Muslim League's obstinacy enabled the British to say that since the Indians could not reach agreement, the power should remain with the British Government. H.V. Hodson, a great supporter of the League, and sworn enemy of the Congress Party, wrote in his book *The Great Divide*. "A

minority party with unsupportable claim had been allowed to veto the whole project for advancing India's Self Government."

Earlier Stafford Cripps had proposed that after the war, when the Constituent Assembly framed the Indian Constitution, "Any province would be free to keep itself out of the proposed union and to retain its prevailing constitutional position. If such non-acceding provinces so desire, they could have their own separate union analogous to the proposed Indian Union." This was the first step towards the acceptance of the demand for Pakistan, and the final decision on that matter.

Lord Wavell concluded the defunct Simla Conference on the note that the Congress should recognise the League as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims. Dr Khan Sahib, who was present, asked Wavell, "I am the Chief Minister of the largest Muslim Province, but not a member of the Muslim League. What do you have to say to me?" Lord Wavell had tried to forget the fact that the 1937 elections, called by the British, out of the eleven Indian Provinces not a single one had a Muslim League Government. Even the Muslim majority states had a non-Muslim League Government. Not a single League member was elected from Sind and the Frontier Province and only one from Punjab. [See Appendix]. Only in the Muslim minority provinces the League had a presence. The British, meanwhile, were insistent that unless the Congress accepted the Muslim League as the sole representative of all Muslims, there could be no agreement. Upon what basis could the Congress accept this? The Congress had won a glorious victory, eight out of eleven States had elected Congress Governments. But the British continued to be blinded by self interest. To quote the Pashtu adage, "The truth may be true, but the *real* truth is might!" The British were using the Muslim League for its own private game. They could not care less about the League or Islam. These games were being played to tell the world that while the British were ready to relinquish power, the Indians were not ready to assume it. The British strategy was to exalt the League to such heights that it became incapable of handling reality. To this end they fulfilled every single legitimate or illegitimate demand of the League. Therefore, at the Simla Conference held in 1945, the

British had only one purpose; to impress upon the Muslims that if anyone wanted to be recognized and represented, his only course was to sign up with the Muslim League. I firmly believe that the scheme for Pakistan was not intended for the benefit of the Muslims. The British needed an Islamic bastion to complete the defence it had built from Turkey to the China border. This was an "Islamic Wall" that was raised against the ideology of the USSR. They were only interested in safeguarding their capitalist, colonial regime. And if this interest could be served by Islam and the Muslim League, what better luck could they have?



Wavell's New Scheme: The British Need for Pakistan

After the Second World War, when the conditions settled the British revised their policy in the light of a new set of circumstances. When Germany attacked the USSR, it gained steady victory until it remained only a few kilometres from Moscow. The British, therefore, lost their constant fear of the USSR. Their attention was now centred upon Japan, which was steadily advancing upon all their colonies. When Japan attacked Burma, and the Calcutta bombing started, the British had a real cause for alarm. On a point of strategy they decided to realign themselves with Afghanistan. If they were to lose India, then instead of losing it all to Japan and Germany, they decided to disregard the 1893 Durand Line, which separated the Pakhtoon territory from Afghanistan, and allow it to revert to the latter. They thought it would be better if Afghanistan got Pakhtoonistan than either Germany or Japan capturing it. Correspondence flowed back and forth. Cunningham's agent, Padsha Gul, son of Haji Sahib Turangzai, started propaganda on behalf of Afghanistan. Although the British were here, yet they turned a blind eye to Padsha Gul's agents, who visited the mosques and delivered 'Khutbas' in the names of King Zahir Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan.

As soon as the USSR attacked and ravaged Germany, and drove the Germans back to Berlin, the British realized that the USSR was still a formidable enemy. Although their entire country was

pillaged, their cities destroyed, and two crore Russians wiped out, the USSR still had the strength to chase away the Germans. This compelled the British to, once again, turn their minds to building a Military Crescent against the USSR.

Knowing how powerful the Congress was, the British thought it better to allow Afghanistan to regain Pakhtoon territory than hand over the whole of India to the Congress. This would have two advantages. First, India would be deprived of a natural defence by losing the mountain range on its Northern Frontier. This loss of a natural geographical border would seriously hurt India. The British knew how essential it was to control the Northern Passes. If the Afghans ruled this area, India would never be able to rest with ease. Secondly, Afghanistan would become a British ally, and there would be many occasions to repay the friendship.

But the victory of the USSR entailed a change of heart. Once again, they regretted their contemplated magnanimity towards Afghanistan. The question arose how to combat the USSR? In his diary, Wavell explained this issue in detail. Anyone who has not read Wavell's diaries will find it difficult to understand his policies. Even a discerning individual like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was taken in by Wavell. His outward impression was so positive that in his book, *India Wins Freedom,* Maulana refers to him as an honest and sincere individual.

When Wavell started his term as Viceroy, he had already been Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. He viewed the Congress as a sworn enemy because of the difficulties they had created for the British during the European war. They had organised movements against the British, and made every attempt to sabotage their war effort. Along with the Congress organisation there existed a patriotic and learned Muslim Jamaat. This group also challenged the British and demanded freedom for India.

Wavell's letter, dated 10 August 1946, addressed to his private secretary detailed his "Breakdown Plan". He wrote that there was no likelihood of any agreement between the Muslim League and the Congress. As soon as the impasse became public knowledge, the British Government would demand his return. Therefore, he wanted to place his scheme on record. He instructed his secre-

tary to appoint a committee of five senior officials to work out the details. The committee should prepare a confidential report containing recommendations for implementation of the plan.

Wavell's scheme was as follows. The disputed areas between the Congress and the Muslim League were located on the border. The Pakistan scheme was divided into two parts, North West and North East. These were areas with a Muslim majority. Wavell suggested that the areas with a Congress majority should be handed over to them and be given complete autonomy. The British, along with their army, civil servants, and families should move into areas with a Muslim majority. Since Wavell was a professional soldier he knew that if the North East and North West were separated from India and left under British control, what effect would it have upon the Indian defence policy? The territories were specified; in the East, Bengal and Assam, in the West, the Frontier Province, Punjab and Sind. Delhi would be under direct British control, and the rest would go to the Congress. At the end he stated that it was likely that the Muslim League would not object. Then he went a step further, "In fact the Muslim League would presumably welcome the plan." Wavell then called Sir Feroz Khan Noon and asked him to find out his leaders' reaction to this plan. He returned with the answer that the League had no objection.

When one looks at the whole scheme, and thinks about its ramifications, one is astounded at the mentality of the Government, the Viceroy, and his Senior Officials. The Congress is severely penalized from the beginning to the end. India is deprived of her geographical and political boundaries. It is flanked on either side by China and Russia. Its partition is planned to occur in an atmosphere of hatred, and its borders are given to Pakistan. Given these circumstances, what defence would the Indians have against external forces? "I pointed it out that Pakistan issue affected not only India, but the whole *empire*". (Wavell, the Viceroy's Journal p. 218)

It is not difficult to understand British politics, strategy and intrigue, but it is difficult to comprehend why the Muslims were allowing themselves to be strung along? While it is true that the

League never rose to fight the British, the fact remains that if the British left India due to the relentless struggle of the Congress, would India's freedom exclude Muslims? If the war of independence was confined to the states with a majority of non-Muslims and Muslims remained slaves, they had none to thank but the leaders of the Muslim League.

Another fact that becomes clear is: why the Frontier Province became a thorn in the British flesh? This was because among the Muslims the only group which was aware of the British duplicity were the Khudai Khidmatgars. They aligned themselves with the Congress to throw out the British rule. It was embarrassing for the British that a province had ninety-three per cent Muslims and they were decidedly anti-League. Another concern was the strategic location of the Frontier, which proved an impediment to the British design of a defence wall against Russia. The British were using every means at their disposal to deflect the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. They were gathering the support of temporal and spiritual leaders to topple their organisation. On the religious as well as the political platform, they were promoting the Muslim League. They had one paramount desire: destroy all opposition. The Province would then be handed over to the League so that the British could use it for their internal politics, and foreign policies.

8

Cabinet Mission and the Second Simla Conference

In Britain elections held at the end of the war saw the defeat of the Conservatives, and a Liberal victory. Atlee replaced Churchill as Prime Minister. In India Wavell announced General Elections. He was hoping to take advantage of Sir Stafford Cripps' announcement, and the position that the British had accorded to the Muslim League during the Simla Conference. The British had conceded the Muslim League demand for Pakistan, and were not prepared to recognize any Muslims other than those associated with the League. The public realized that communal voting would clear the way for the Muslim League. Therefore every factory owner, mill owner, and businessman lined up for signing up with the League. For purely selfish motives, rulers of Muslim Princely States declared their loyalty to the League. Officials openly started working for them. Wavell had made his stand clear. "[He] told him [Mudie] to impress on *everyone* that to support Congress at the expense of the loyalists was not my policy." [Wavell, p.177] Wavell recognized only two parties, the Congress and the Loyalists. The Muslim League was included in the list of the Loyalists.

After the Elections, a Cabinet Mission of three arrived from Britain. It consisted of Sir Stafford Cripps, A.V. Alexander and the Secretary of State for India. They started work immediately. It was proposed that a meeting be arranged between Jinnah and Nehru not with any hope of reaching an agreement, but, to quote

Wavell, "Purely for publicity value to show that we have done our best to secure agreement." [Wavell, p. 248]. This is illustrative of the intent that lurked behind the conciliatory attitude of the British. The question arises: conciliation between which two parties and how? What does the outcome of the Simla Conference prove?

For the Second Simla Conference, Government invited only the Muslim League and the Congress, four members from each. The Congress delegates were Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Badshah Khan. The Muslim League delegation consisted of Jinnah, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Nawab Mohd. Ismail Khan and Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar. The entire group consisted of two Hindus and six Muslims. Wavell wrote that Jinnah's very first action was to refuse to shake hands with Maulana Azad. This was a fine example of the spirit of brotherhood among Muslims. Always bending over to please the British, clasping hands with Hindus, fondly greeting members of the opposite sex, but such antipathy towards their own brethren!

During the First Simla Conference Jinnah had perched himself on a high pedestal. He knew that he was responsible for the conference debacle. He was not willing to accept anything less than Pakistan. The Congress took the opposite stand. This Conference was a failure because due to the Muslim League's added insistence that it be accepted as the representative of Muslims all over India. The Cabinet Mission declared that if the Congress and the Muslim League did not agree it would have to impose its decisions on both parties.Therefore, on 19 May 1946, the Mission declared India as a Union. The Union would have control over three departments, Defence, External Affairs and Commerce. The Indian states would be divided into three groups, on the basis of Muslims and non-Muslims. The first group would consist of Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan. The second would include Bengal and Assam, and the third Bombay, Madras, Bihar, Orissa, U.P. and C.P. The plan was that these nine Assemblies would select members for the Union Legislative Assembly. This Assembly would be the legislative body for the Union and its three departments. It would work with the British to formulate the terms and conditions for self-government.

The State Assemblies would formulate their respective statutes, and decide whether or not they wanted group constitutions. The grouping was not made binding. Every province was given the right to cut loose from the group after a period of ten years.

If we study these proposals it becomes evident that they had accepted most demands of both parties. The Congress wanted unity, and this was what it got in the form of a weak federation proposed by the Mission. The Muslim League was afraid of the numerical superiority of the Hindus. But the religious basis of grouping allayed their fear. With the exception of three subjects, the Provinces had been given all the rights.

The Cabinet Mission announced that an Interim Government would be formed at the centre under British supervision. This Government would be formed following the elections of the Union Legislative Assembly. It further declared that if any party did not accept the Mission plan of 16 May, it would be excluded from the Interim Government.

The leaders of the Muslim League had a problem. Most of them came from Provinces which had a majority of non-Muslims. If they could have stayed with Group 'A' Assembly, things might have remained under control. But that would have left Jinnah and Liaquat Ali in that group. Therefore, they asked Wavell if the Assembly of a particular Province could elect a member from another Provincial Assembly. When Wavell gave the green signal, these Leaguers got into the Union Legislature from Bengal, although they were representatives of Bombay and U.P.

COMPOSITION OF THE UNION LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Group A

State	Non-Muslims	Muslims
Madras	45	4
Bombay	19	2
UP	47	8
Bihar	31	5
CP	16	1
Orissa	9	0
Total	167	20

Group B

State	Non-Muslims	Muslims
Punjab	8	16 (4 Sikhs)
NWFP	0	3
Sind	1	3
Total	9	22

Group C

Bengal	27	33
Assam	7	3
Total	34	36

It became clear to the Muslim League that the delicate balance of thirty-six Muslims and thirty-four non-Muslims in Group C was dangerous. If the non-Muslims were to play the game of influencing one or two members, it could tip the balance. The same problem existed in Punjab with sixteen Muslims and twelve non-Muslims. In addition to this, Punjab faced another problem: the Unionist Party, which had formed the Government, included Hindus and Muslims as well as Sikhs. But the real problem facing the Muslim League was that the Mission had strictly announced that if any party disagreed with these proposals, it would not be included in the Government. The Muslim League realized that once they were left out, they would be left out forever. Their members would happily quit the party.

9

Muslim League Withdraws its Demand for Pakistan

At a meeting of the Muslim League Working Committe the proposals of the Cabinet Mission were discussed. On 6 June 1946 these proposals were accepted. The Indian Union was established as a federation and the demand for Pakistan was withdrawn. The Muslim League was convinced that these proposals would be unacceptable to the Congress. They would object both to the group divisions and compulsory participation. But at the Congress meeting held on 25 June 1946, these proposals were accepted.

Wavell was most disappointed at Congress' acceptance. He, too, was confident that the Congress would not cooperate. He had, once again, started thinking of his Breakdown Plan. On 25 June 1946; he wrote:

> The worst day yet...Congress has accepted the statement of 16 May...Cripps having assured me categorically that the Congress would never accept the statement of May 16th. The Congress manoeuvres have now put us in a very difficult position. Both with Mr Jinnah and the formation of an Interim Government.... Unless we decide that the Congress is dishonest, as it is in fact, and refuse to regard it an acceptance. [Wavell, p. 304].

In this matter, Wavell was helpless. The impediment to his plan was created by the British High Command. The Secretary of State

for India and others found Wavell's advice unacceptable. The decisions being made in England were giving Wavell heartburn. He hoped that the Mission would return to Britain and, once again, he would be left with the decision-making. When the Muslim League relinquished its idea of Pakistan, Wavell stated openly that this development would hurt the British Empire. Uptil now Wavell had assured the Muslim League that no decision would be made without their whole-hearted consent, and, if no decision was made the Government could not be handed over to the Congress Party. But now the Mission had stated that if any party opted out of the agreement, it would not be included in the Government. Wavell's disappointment with the Mission's firm handling of the matter is evident in this excerpt from Hodson's *The Great Divide*; "The Viceroy was not prepared to carry on if they gave way to the Congress demands." [Hodson, p. 151]. In his diary, Wavell stated, "We then discussed the Congress letter of acceptance which is really a dishonest acceptance, but it is so cleverly worded that it had to be regarded as an acceptance." [Wavell, p. 305]

On 22 July, Wavell forced himself to write to Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah. The Central Government would consist of fourteen ministers: six of the Congress, of whom one would be a Harijan, five ministers of the Muslim League and three would be appointed by the Viceroy of India, one of whom would be a Sikh.

The Congress suggested certain additions to this proposal. First, that this cabinet be completely autonomous, the power of veto be taken away from the Viceroy, and he serves as the constitutional head. Nehru raised another point. He was not happy about the minorities representation. But the real quarrel arose on the issue that each member state of the three groups should have the right to individual decision-making. The Congress felt that if the groups made collective decisions then the smaller member states, having fewer votes, would have no opportunity of making themselves heard. For example, Assam, in group 'C' should be able to make its own decision. The same should be applicable to the Frontier and Sind in group 'B'. If Assam and Bengal make a joint decision, Assam's vote would not count. In group 'B' where Punjab had twenty-eight votes and Sind and the Frontier four and three

respectively, the smaller provinces would be swallowed by the larger. The Muslim League insisted that the decision should be made by the group as a whole.

Jinnah called a meeting of the All India Muslim League Council in Bombay, and, once again, asked them to study the situation. On 27 July 1947, the Muslim League Council stated that since the Congress enjoyed an absolute majority in the Central Legislative Assembly, it would make decisions based upon their numerical strength. It severely criticised members of the Mission and announced that, in view of the above circumstances, the Muslim League take back its earlier decision and the plan of 16 May was no longer acceptable to them. The Council gave its Working Committee the right to prepare a plan for Direct Action. When this decision was made it implied direct confrontation with the British. Jinnah saw himself surrounded by people bearing British titles, such as Sir, Nawab, Nawabzada, Khan Bahadur, Khan Sahib and Jagirdar. Therefore, it was decided that the British titles and decorations should be returned.

Jinnah objected to the format of the Interim Government. First, the Muslim League was not given representation equal to that of the Congress. Secondly, the Congress was not prevented from naming a Muslim representative. Thirdly, that the communal vote was not propagated, i.e. a system which would ensure that the concerned community only would vote upon the issues which affected it. No right-minded person could accept these objections. On what basis could the Congress and the Muslim League be given equal representation? The country consisted of ten crore Muslims and thirty crore non-Muslims. The Muslim League was supported by only two provinces. All other provinces were behind the Congress. Regarding their second objection, why should the Congress not appoint Muslim Ministers? It implied that to please the Muslim League, the Congress should give out that it only represented non-Muslims. If Jinnah was really sympathetic with Muslims he should have been happy to see a Muslim become a Congress Minister. The truth of the matter was that the Muslim League was up the creek without a paddle!

After the First Simla Conference, on the strength of Wavell's

financial and moral support, the Muslim League created a climate for the acceptance of the Pakistan proposal. The British insisted that the Muslim League was the exclusive representative of all Muslims. For this reason, during the elections, the aristocracy, businessmen, Jagirdars, financiers, rulers and Muslim officials had tried to ensure the success of the Muslim League. When these very people saw that the Muslim League had given up its demand for Pakistan in favour of a United India, they became concerned about their own survival. These self-seekers had carved an imaginary niche for themselves in Pakistan. Business houses had made unlimited amounts of funds available in the hope that in Pakistan they would enjoy a monopoly. Government officials had given their wholehearted support, hoping that they would receive unprecedented promotions. When they heard that the Muslim League had relinquished the Pakistan plan they were most perturbed. The Muslim League's troubles had just begun. From 1940 onwards they had spoken of nothing else but Pakistan. They had given it not only a political but a religious impetus. They had laid their entire political game at the doorstep of Islam. When they gave up the demand for Pakistan, it seemed that they were shirking their religious duty. What about the two-nation theory? Where were those endless proposals and schemes, those Presidential addresses, those speeches? They sacrificed their most cherished ideology to power brokerage. People would ask for that promised portion of paradise, called Pakistan, which was the election slogan of the Muslim League! Now that they had resigned their claim, and foresaken their "religious responsibility" how would they face the public?

The Muslim League had no political or national identity. All their leaders enjoyed British titles, and their entire strength was drawn from British support. The crutches upon which they leaned were made in Britain. The moment the members of the Cripps Mission pulled these crutches from underneath, they fell flat on their faces.

The British were facing yet another complication. In the last several years they had played a single tune, "What can we do? Since the various parties in India can never see eye to eye. Alas! We have

no choice but to keep the power to ourselves!" This tune had now become a mono-tune! Since both parties had agreed to the Cabinet proposal what excuse were they left with? The blow landed right between the eyes. The Breakdown Plan, authored by the Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell, was waiting in the wings. Now that the Muslim League and the Congress had come together, all other plans went up in smoke!

After the departure of the Mission, Wavell established a Central Government consisting of Government officials. His real intention was to start his old game of political ping-pong with the Congress and the Muslim League being bounced back and forth. But back home, the High Command became adamant. It insisted that since the Muslim League had turned down the proposal, only the Congress should be invited to form the Government. Wavell wrote back stating the following:

> I would say that His Majesty's Government has the fullest intention of handing over the power to Indians, I wish a united India. But they do not recognize the Congress as representing all India and have no intention of handing over power to the Congress alone. [Wavell, p. 333]

The British have cultivated a habit of turning away from any matter which is not in their direct line of interest. This was a classic instance of double standards. The objection they were raising for the Congress, had earlier been raised for the Muslim League. This experience further proved that the moment the British tightened the reins, the Muslim League slowed to a docile trot, to the extent of abandoning the Pakistan idea.

Meanwhile, countrywide unrest had started on this constitutional impasse. Strikes broke out all over the country. The British realised the importance of taking one party into confidence. Therefore, Wavell called Jawaharlal Nehru to discuss the establishment of an Interim Government. He said that some means should be found for reconciliation with the Muslim League. He also asked that a few Cabinet positions should be left vacant for the Muslim League. Wavell was thus forced to invite the Congress to

form the Government, "I dislike intensely the idea of having an Interim Government, dominated by one party, but I feel I must try to get the Congress in as soon as possible." [Wavell, p. 326].

The Secretary of State cabled approving his proposed approach to Nehru. Wavell, however, was not pleased. He impressed upon the Muslim League that if they still refused to enter the Government, there was not much else he could do. He had to obey the commands of the Right Honourable Gentlemen in Great Britain.

10

Direct Action Policy of the Muslim League

As a political party the Muslim League was responsible for defining their policy prior to presenting their demands. Before deciding on a Direct Action Policy they should have given it a careful treatment. In this context there was a basic difference between the Congress and the League. The Congress was blatantly anti-British. The Muslim League Direct Action Policy, however, was not anti-British; their struggle was against the Congress. They opposed the Congress as a Hindu party. Their political platform and propaganda was based on the promise that all the powers and responsibilities were being usurped by the Hindus. So preoccupied were they with the Congress that they seemed to have forgotten about the British. Therefore, it was natural that the Direct Action would occur among the various factions in the country. Since Jinnah referred to the Congress as a Hindu Congress his policy was directed against the Hindus. Thanks to the untiring efforts of the British, the Hindus and the Muslims were not battling with each other on political issues, but were pitched in the battle of Direct Action.

16 August 1946 was declared as the Direct Action Day, and was commemorated in Bengal, where the Muslim League had formed a Government under H.S. Suhrawardy. He announced Direct Action as Government policy and declared a general holiday so that official demonstrations could be arranged. When one stops to think

one wonders why Bengal had to participate in this? Did they not understand that if Hindu-Muslim riots erupted here the fire would consume the whole country? And what would become of the Muslims in those provinces where they were in minority? One of the peculiarities of Muslim League politics was their superior strength in provinces with non-Muslim majority. Could they not visualise who would get hurt if communal riots erupted in these provinces?

Suhrawardy led the Direct Action. The result was predictable. Rioting broke out. The Muslims ignited the spark while the Hindus poured oil. Then the Sikhs created more havoc. In Calcutta the Muslims were in minority. The Sikhs controlled the transportation in the city. All the taxis were owned by Sikhs. Jansson wrote:

> Whole streets were strewn with corpses. Men, women and children of all communities. Impossible to count, let alone identify. If the Muslims gave the provocation and started the holocaust, they were certainly its worst victims, for they were in minority in the city.

Calcutta was the commercial centre. Thousands of labourers and mill workers converged on the city. There was a large influx of people from the neighbouring State of Bihar which was relatively poor and under-developed. These transients were mostly non-Muslims. The Calcutta riots drove these people back to Bihar. There they related horrifying stories of killing, rape, arson and other atrocities resulting from the Muslim League's Direct Action. These stories, often exaggerated, led to full scale mass murders in the nearby states. Events occurred which beggar all description.

One fact emerged as the undisputed truth. The only ones which benefited from this rioting were the British. Their one hundred year old communal policy reached a resounding climax: the Muslims and non-Muslims sharpening their blades and preparing themselves to slit each others' throats.

11

Interim Government

It was 16 August 1946. In Calcutta, Suhrawardy's policy turned the city into thousands of funeral pyres. On this very day Jawaharlal Nehru tried to get Jinnah's cooperation in forming the Interim Government. Nehru's scheme was that fourteen ministers would be appointed at the centre: six Congress, five Muslim League, three Christian and one Parsi. Jinnah was obdurate. He insisted that no Muslim could be appointed to the Cabinet unless he was a member of the Muslim League, and, if Nehru did not promise to abide by this, he would not agree to conciliation. On this one issue the entire agreement broke down. Jinnah's logic was hopelessly convoluted. Two provinces had a Muslim majority: the Punjab and the Frontier. The Frontier had 93 per cent Muslims but it was represented by the Khudai Khidmatgars and not the Muslim League. How could Jinnah and his party represent this province? But the basic anomaly was that the Muslim League wanted more than its share in the Central Government. What right did the Muslim League have to demand that the Congress should not allow any Muslim to represent it?

The person in a tight spot was Wavell, whose Breakdown Plan had collapsed. He asked Nehru to leave five cabinet positions vacant in case the Muslim League agreed to come in. When Nehru did not agree Wavell decided to talk to Jinnah. When Jinnah declared that there was no room for further discussion, Wavell gave up. Finding his patience wearing thin, he called Gandhiji and Nehru to discuss the forthcoming session of the Legislative Assembly. He

continued to try to stop the Congress from forming the Government. Finally the Government of Great Britain strictly forbade him to interfere. On 24 August 1946 the first Interim Government of India was announced under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru.

Nehru announced the formation of his Government. He left two places vacant for Muslims so that the Muslim League could represent Bengal and Sind. On the same day, that is, 26 August, in a message broadcast to the nation, Wavell, once again, invited the Muslim League. He stated that if the Muslim League wanted to come in even at this late hour, they would be accorded their old status and the previous conditions would still apply to them.

Wavell could not bear to see Jawaharlal Nehru form the Government. He openly confronted the British Government with the issue of the Muslim League. Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State, opposed all his policies. Despite severe reprimands Wavell did not change his stand. Another event which Wavell wanted to avoid at all costs was calling the Assembly into session. The Congress made several efforts to convince him that following the establishment of the Interim Government, the Assembly should be called. Wavell was unwilling to comply. He knew that once the Assembly was called into session the last part of the Cabinet Mission Plan would be complete. And then the British would be left with no choice other than handing over the entire control to the same Assembly. And once the State Legislative Assemblies got down to business, the implication would be that the British Government had accepted India's federal polity. Wavell was not prepared to accept this. On his own he had made the decision that if the Congress insisted on calling the Assembly he would, then, not even bother to seek the cooperation of the Congress, "The Viceroy, who was being pressed by the Congress to call the Assembly, felt he would rather lose their cooperation than go ahead with constitution-making on a one-party basis."

Wavell saw partition as the most advantageous way for the British to conclude the Indian chapter of their colonial magnum opus. He was trying to create a political impasse which would assume the dimensions of the collapse of constitutional machinery, hoping that the British Government would be forced to ask him to

implement his Breakdown Plan. Wavell's proposals greatly perturbed his superiors and they concluded that they could not justify to the parliament so drastic a policy and that on this ground alone his plan was impossible. They said that if withdrawal from India became unavoidable, then withdrawal should take place from India as a whole.

Meanwhile, Wavell continued his two-pronged effort. First, to include the Muslim League in the Interim Government, in order to create an impediment for the Congress. Secondly, to make every effort not to call the Constituent Assembly. It was quite obvious that Wavell was trying to withhold from the Indian people what the Cabinet Mission had given away as their right. Directives to the contrary kept arriving from London but Wavell paid no heed.

On the one hand, Wavell was greatly perturbed that the Muslim League had gone out of hand. On the other hand, the League was having a rough time. The leaders of the Muslim League were individuals who had received some form of titles or decorations from the British. Sycophants such as these lack moral courage and intellectual fibre. They are obedient to whoever happens to be in power. If they could serve the British Government, it was possible, provided they became disappointed with the Muslim League. They would then promptly align themselves with the Congress if it meant personal gain. Some of them would happily hold cabinet positions as members of the Congress Party. They were firm believers in "he who pays the piper calls the tune!"

When Wavell reopened discussions with the Muslim League, and summoned Jinnah, he wrote, "Jinnah was less aggressive and aggrieved than I had expected, and easier to talk to." [Wavell, p. 351]

When the Congress took the oath of office it was agreed that the Viceroy would not interfere in matters pertaining to the cabinet. Earlier, Wavell had written a strongly worded letter to the British Government stating that the Congress should not be allowed to form the Government by itself. The Secretary of State had replied reminding Wavell that since the Muslim League had reversed its decision regarding the 16 May proposal, they could not enter the cabinet. The Government gave further specific instructions to

Wavell that if it was essential to talk to Jinnah he should be approached through Nehru, the leader of the Interim Government. Wavell's stubbornness becomes apparent in the following remark, "Nehru complained that the approach to the Muslim League to form the Interim Government, had been made over his head." [Wavell, p. 390]

After several meetings and discussions held by Wavell it was agreed that the Muslim League should be allowed to participate in the Interim Government, on condition that they withdraw their decision against the proposal of the Cabinet Mission. They were asked to accept the 16 May proposal. In order to obtain positions in the Interim Government the Muslim League had to bite its tongue! The Pakistan proposal was abandoned and they agreed to join the Government of Indian Federation. Another issue that had been a thorn in their sides for several years suddenly became a non-issue, namely that no Muslims other than ones belonging to the Muslim League could sit in the Central Cabinet. Barrister Asaf Ali remained a Minister in the Central Cabinet. In one case, however, the Muslim League acted on principle. Of the five Muslim League Ministers one was a Hindu by the name of Joginder Nath Mandal. A Harijan by caste, he represented the Muslim League.

On 15 October 1946, the Muslim League joined the Interim Government. Three members of the Nehru Government, Sarat Chandra Bose, Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan and Syed Ali Zaheer submitted their resignations. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, I.I. Chundrigar, Raja Ghazanfar Ali and Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar were appointed Ministers. Wavell's keenness to see the Muslim League join the Government is proved by his disregard for the requirement imposed by the Secretary of State that they repudiate their statement of July and accept the 16 May proposals for a united India. Wavell gave the following assurance to Nehru:

> Jinnah had undertaken, in reply, to call a meeting of the Muslim League Council and to reverse its decision against the statement of May the 16th.... The Working Committee Meeting was not summoned until more than three months later, and then they declined to call the League Council to reconsider their decision

of July 1946. [Hodson, p. 174]

The Muslim League was still embroiled in its Direct Action. The Viceroy did not consider it necessary to warn them that now that they had become a part of the Government they better withdraw this policy, since it would then become Direct Action against their own Government. On the question of the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah said that it should not be called in the near future. Postponement would give a breather to the Interim Government. Wavell would also get a respite, as he would not have a confrontation with the Congress. This statement makes it apparent that the British and the Muslim League had a common objective and, therefore, were fighting on the same side.

It was sad to see that while the Congress and the Muslim League were parcelling out the Ministries, India was burning in the fire of Direct Action. Frequent riots were taking place in different parts of the country. In October, Hindu-Muslim riots occurred in the Noakhali district of East Bengal. Thousands of innocent people were killed. Stories of the riots in Calcutta and Noakhali spread in the country. While Hindus were killed in Noakhali, Muslims were slaughtered in Bihar. These riots, which occurred in the month of November, are associated with the most horrendous stories. The whole of India was aflame with communal hatred, enmity and prejudice. Wavell was confident that the increased hatred between these two communities would result in the British becoming indispensable for India. His plan would then materialize, i.e. the British would move their entire belongings to the Muslim majority provinces, namely, Pakistan. The Muslim League, too, wanted to prove to the world that it had become impossible for the Hindus and Muslims to co-exist. Partition was the only recourse left.

The Congress was trying to bring in the Federal Court to resolve the differences arising between the Congress and the Muslim League on the proposal of 16 May. Jinnah, as usual, rejected this proposal. Wavell wrote:

> They [Congress] were apparently prepared to agree that the question of whether the sections make the constitution for the

provinces or the provinces make their own, should be referred to the Federal Court, but this Jinnah would not accept. [Wavell, p. 371]

The Congress and the Central Government became concerned about the communal riots. Nehru warned Wavell that while the entire country was being destroyed, the Muslim League, claiming to be the sole representative of Muslims, was participating in the Interim Government, and using its Direct Action policy against its own Government. The Congress made a last ditch attempt to force Wavell to make the Muslim League agree to the 16 May proposal and become a part of the Constituent Assembly. If they did not agree then Wavell should compel them to get out of the Government. If Wavell did not agree then the Congress was left with no option other than resigning and handing over the entire country to Wavell and the Muslim League! They also demanded that the Viceroy should call the Assembly into session.

Wavell was stuck. He could see no way out. The Constituent Assembly of India was called into session on 9 December 1946. Jinnah immediately announced that the Muslim League would not participate. He announced that the Muslim League rejects the proposal of the Cabinet Mission. After this announcement it became impossible for the Muslim League to remain part of the Government. Although Wavell was disappointed, he was still not angry with Jinnah. He sent a complete report of the prevailing situation to London. He said that if the Congress proposal was accepted the country would be plunged in a civil war. He proposed that two representatives, one each of the Congress and the Muslim League, should personally go to London and discuss these matters with the British Government.

Jinnah and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan accepted this invitation. But the Congress declined saying that this was a waste of time. The British did not want a solution; they were playing these political games and gambling with the future of a country to please their favourite party! When the Prime Minister of Britain found out that Nehru had refused, he sent him a personal invitation. Wavell wrote that when Jinnah was told that Nehru had declined the

invitation, he, too, withdrew his acceptance and announced that he would go only if personally requested by the Prime Minister. "Perhaps he [Jinnah] thought that as Nehru had a personal appeal from the Prime Minister, it behoved his dignity to have one too." [Wavell, p. 385]

Nehru left for England but the second candidate Sardar Patel refused to go. Wavell was playing games only so that the Muslim League remained a part of the Interim Government. After Jinnah's refusal to accept the 16 May proposal there was no rationale for the Muslim League to remain with the Government. But Wavell always remembered the advice given by Sir Winston Churchill. Just as he was taking leave of Churchill, before leaving for India, the Prime Minister had said, "Keep a bit of India!"

With these words still ringing in his ears he had prepared his Breakdown Plan. Wavell arrived in London on 3 December accompanied by the Indian leaders. In a note submitted to the cabinet, he stated, that after reviewing the situation in detail, he reached the conclusion that since there was no question of reconciliation, their only option was confrontation with the Congress. For this combat Wavell offered his Breakdown Plan. The provinces with Congress majority should be given autonomy, and the British, accompanied by their entire army, should move to the Muslim majority provinces.

> They [Congress] are not ready yet for an open breach with His Majesty's Government. Such a breach is, however, a possibility, and we can only face it if we have a definite policy and a Breakdown Plan.

It becomes obvious that Wavell had brought the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League all the way to England for only one reason. He first wanted to have his proposal approved by the Government, then have it announced to the leaders, and finally, let them engage in a round-table discussion. Wavell considered his proposal foolproof, because all he wanted was to save one portion of India for the British; the portion which had a strategic location, the USSR border on one side and the Chinese border on the other.


Predictably, the meeting was a failure. The leaders departed. Wavell tried to stay behind to elaborate his viewpoint but the British Government asked him to return immediately. He left his Secretary, George Abel, behind so that he could explain the proposal in greater detail:

> George Abel telegraphed to say that the cabinet at home has gone back completely, and refuses to have anything to do with the Breakdown Plan. So he is returning at once. [Wavell, 8 January 1947].


As a result of these negotiations the British Government conceded one point. They announced that they were prepared to accept the Muslim League's idea about grouping; thus ended the individual status of the provinces. It was explained that the groups would make collective decisions. For example, Punjab was given the responsibility of group B and Sind and the Frontier were given a secondary status. Similarly, in the East, Bengal became responsible while Assam became a political non-entity.

As planned, the Constituent Assembly of India was convened on 9 December. The Muslim League did not participate. The Assembly passed a resolution declaring its aims and objectives. It also articulated its policy regarding the provinces and the Princely States. With the exception of three Central Departments, all the other rights were given to the provinces. Committees were formed for various departments, leaving a few seats vacant for the Muslim League.


A meeting of the All India Congress Committee was held on 5 January 1947. The meeting accepted the decision of the British Government to give the right to the groups rather than to the individual provinces. The Muslim League did not have any excuse left now. On 29 January 1947, the Muslim League Working Committee Meeting was held in Karachi. After a discussion and delineation of parameters it was decided that since the Congress did not accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, it would be unacceptable to the Muslim League as well. They stated that since the Mission Plan was unsuccessful, all activities proposed in it and underway



Ghaffar Khan with Dr Khan Sahib & Mohammad Yunus (sitting on the ground); Arbab Abdul



Badshah Khan, Gandhiji, Jawaharlal Nehru & Dr Gholam Hossain Sadighi, Leader of the Iranian delegation to the Inter Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 1947




Badshah Khan with Jawaharlal Nehru
at the Simla Conference, 1945



First Historic Meeting of the Khudai Kidmatgars,
Utmanzai, April 1930





Badshah Khan being greeted by Lord Pethick Lawrence,
A.V. Alexander standing behind Badshah Khan, Simla, May 1946



Wali Khan being embraced by his ailing father
in Bombay Hospital, 6 June, 1987



Badshah Khan with Qazi Ataullah, Srinagar, June 1946

should be stopped at once. In view of that the Constituent Assembly should be dissolved.

It is ironical that whereas the Muslim League refused to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan and sit in the Constituent Assembly, it was shamelessly eager to participate in the Interim Government, which was part and parcel of the same proposal. Wavell had turned a blind eye to this absurdity.

12

Removal of Wavell and Appointment of Mountbatten

After this announcement of the Muslim League, Congress demanded that either the Viceroy should ask for resignation of the Muslim League Ministers or the Congress would be forced to take matters into its own hands. When London learnt of this, Wavell was immediately summoned for discussions. At this time he was so engrossed in the Indian political situation that he did not respond to the Government orders. On 4 February 1947, a special messenger arrived in India bearing a letter from Prime Minister dismissing Wavell from his job and appointing Mountbatten in his place. At the same time the British Government made its historical announcement that in June 1948 India would become self-governing.

There was one other consideration regarding India's future. If the Constituent Assembly was acceptable for an undivided India, well and good. The British would then hand over controls to that Assembly. But if the Indians were not agreeable to keeping one Constituent Assembly and one Constitution, then the Government would have to decide whom the power should be transferred to? To some form of Central Government or to the existing Provincial Government? Or was there another reasonable solution which would be acceptable to the Indian people?

The Muslim League was aware that this condition had to be fulfilled before a Central Government for a United India could be

established. Therefore they refused to participate in the Constituent Assembly of a United India. If they wanted partition all they had to do was to refuse to take part in the Constituent Assembly. This was an easy decision. The more difficult one was to decide who should be entrusted with the power following the partition? The British were inclined towards the states. This was an open invitation to the Muslim League to grab power, in whichever state they wanted in Pakistan. The British Government advised the League to get rid of the Unionists if they wanted Punjab and to throw out the Khudai Khidmatgars if they wanted the Frontier included in Pakistan. This announcement by the British Government was made on 20 February 1947.

After this the entire concentration of the Muslim League and its supporters was on these two Provinces. They were desperate to establish their control over them. Having lost the election in both provinces, they had no legal or democratic right. So they had to resort to illegal means. Punjab was not a problem. If Hindu-Muslim riots could be started there, as a result of which the Sikh and Hindu members would be chased away, then the decision would come down in favour of the Muslim League. The real problem was the Frontier; because even among the Muslim members the majority was of Khudai Khidmatgars.

Wavell was trying to convince the British that their only chance for success lay in adopting his Breakdown Plan Sir Olaf Caroe was the External Affairs Secretary in the Central Government. One of his important assignments was to keep an eye on the North-West boundary of India and watch the Afghanistan border. The British feared danger from the Russian side. Their policy regarding Russia was quite explicit. In whatever way possible, Russia should be contained on the other side of the River Amu, within its ideological and geographical boundaries. Since Russia had just suffered an initial setback in war with Germany, the British did not immediately anticipate any danger of an attack from that direction. Their entire concentration was on its ideological boundary. To combat their ideology the British had been wielding the sword of Islam. The problem arose because the Frontier Province bordered Russia on the side of Afghanistan; all the strategic military passes

were located in this area. Until the British were in complete control of this province their "military crescent" policy could not be completed. Wavell could not implement his Breakdown Plan unless he could lay his hands on this most important and sensitive Muslim Province. During the elections the British tried hard, but could not bring this sensitive area under control. Another basic problem that the British and the Muslim League encountered was that due to the Khudai Khidmatgar movement there was a tremendous amount of political awakening among the people. They had already chased away the people with British titles. The poor, the humble and the weak had been able to rise to the top, thanks to this grass-roots movement of the Khudai Khidmatgars.

The British were hell bent on handing over this province to the Muslim League. So far, nothing had produced desirable results. Neither the elections nor the communal rioting gave any foothold to the League. Therefore, Jinnah hatched a dangerous plot, the details of which Iskandar Mirza has written in his autobiography.

Iskandar Mirza had been transferred from the Frontier to Delhi where he was the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence. He wrote that in February 1947 Jinnah telephoned, inviting him to a meeting. During this meeting the first thing he asked was, "Do you consider me the leader of the Indian Muslims? Would you obey my orders?" Iskandar Mirza had no choice but to say, "Yes." Jinnah then said that he was afraid he was not going to get Pakistan unless some serious trouble was created and the best place to do this was NWFP and the adjacent tribal areas. In his view it was important to tell the British that the Muslims were seething with anger at their decision to hand over the country to the Congress. Jinnah explained that if Pakistan cannot be won by negotiations he would achieve it by combat. Iskandar Mirza wrote that Jinnah wanted him to resign from service, go into the tribal territory and start a *Jehad*.

Let us for a moment review the circumstances. It is February 1947. Wavell had been fired from his job. The British Government had announced that the transfer of power would occur in June of 1948. Wavell's departure is a blow to Jinnah and the Muslim League. Communal riots had pulverized the nation. But Jinnah, notwithstanding, wanted to play the most dangerous game and that

too in the Frontier Province.

Iskander Mirza wrote, "He [Jinnah] said according to his information I could achieve this if I really tried." This proves that Jinnah had maintained his contact with Government officials and knew how to create trouble in the tribal areas. It also shows how cleverly British officials could arrange a *Jehad.* Iskander Mirza reflected on various aspects of this problem. He wrote:

> "This could only take the form of raids on the border villages, in the settled area...yet I decided to fall in with Quad-i-Azam's Plan. I had no desire to be branded as a man who was found wanting when the time for action came. With the liberal expenditure of money I would be able to cause some trouble in Waziristan Tirah and Mohmand country. I gave my estimate for the sum of money as one crore."

He asked that a plausible excuse be found for his disappearance from Delhi. "Mr Jinnah had already anticipated these requirements, he had the cover and the money ready. The cover was an appointment with His Highness the Khan of Kalat, and the treasure was provided by His Highness, the Nawab of Bhopal." On the very same day Iskander Mirza met the Nawab of Bhopal who gave him Rs 20,000 for out of pocket expenses. Jinnah assured him that if he was killed during the Mission he would see to it that his family members were well provided for.

Iskander Mirza started work immediately. He collected a few faithful friends from Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar, as well as from the tribal areas. After several discussions a plan was drawn up. According to it he would form liaison with certain loyal supporters in Waziristan Tirah and Mohmand. "But early in May, the Quad-i-Azam sent for me again and told me that, as Pakistan would be conceded, the plan should be abandoned."

Iskander Mirza comments on this incident by saying that Jinnah was a very self-willed leader. He never listened to any advice. To prove his point Mirza relates an incident. When Quad-i-Azam became Governor General. Iskander Mirza asked him to show some consideration to the Muslim Leaguers. "We must try to be

considerate to the Muslim Leaguers, as, after all, they had brought in Pakistan." Jinnah immediately replied,"Who told you that the Muslim League brought in Pakistan? I brought in Pakistan with my stenographer." The above episode proves several points. First, how willingly the high officials of the British Government worked for the Muslim League. Secondly, Jinnah, having failed in achieving his objective through legal and democratic means, was prepared to use gang techniques to destroy the Khudai Khidmatgar Government. He was willing to use the tribals for *Jehad*. Thirdly, the British officials had brainwashed the tribal leaders to the extent that they were prepared to attack their own country at the slightest nod from the Viceroy. And lastly, the Princely states were willing to stake crores of rupees to destroy their own country.

It was not so difficult to topple Khizar Hayat's Unionist Government. On the one hand the Muslim League started a civil disobedience movement. On the other hand communal riots flared up. A large quantity of ammunition was despatched from the Frontier and tribal areas. The Muslim League Leaders imprisonment on charges of civil disobedience became a standing joke. For example, the President of the Punjab Muslim League, Mian Iftikhar-ud-din sent for his daily meals from home. Not only did he throw dinner parties, he often left his prison cell to attend his social engagements. He often spent the night in his own home. In a nutshell, due to the communal situation the Hindu and Sikh members quit the Assembly. As a consequence of the civil disobedience movement, Khizar Hayat was forced to resign on 3 March 1947. But the Muslim League was incapable of forming the Government. Therefore, under Section 93 the Governor's rule was established. When the Hindus and the Sikhs realised that the British were solidly favouring the Muslim League, they began to protest. Communal riots now took the form of large scale massacres, bloodshed and rapes. Finally only one province was left for the Muslim League to usurp, namely the Frontier. Here too, riots flared up and certain tribal areas were attacked. The implication of this was that if the State Government cannot restore peaceful conditions it should resign. If, however, the government mobilised its forces to restore peace, the Muslim League and the sympathetic news media would

cry blue murder and say that the Government was brutalizing the Muslims. The difference between Khizar Hayat's Unionist Government and the Frontier was that while the Unionists were a ruling party which did not have political roots, the Khudai Khidmatgars were an organized and fearless grass roots party. The Muslim League used every combat manoeuvre. They summoned their top leaders to the Frontier, spread false stories about communal riots, and tried to arouse tribal emotions by recounting hair-raising incidents concerning the Bihar riots. Financial support poured in from all over the country. Students from Punjab and Aligarh arrived on the scene. A military officer from Punjab who had resigned from the army was combing the length and breadth of the province, trying to arouse the people. For the first time the Frontier found itself riddled with destructive elements. Until now the Khudai Khidmatgars had fought against the Government, bravely adhering to the principle of non-violence. But the Muslim League's anti-Government movement included the blasting of bombs and the bloodshed of non-Muslims. Some people have made confessions regarding their participation in this carnage, which have been recorded in Erland Jansson's book entitled *India, Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan.* The Chief instructer of the Hingo Police School used to teach the construction and use of bombs. Alam Khan told Jansson that these operations were financed by the Pir of Manki Shareef. Government officials were aiding and abetting the Muslim League in perpetuating this mischief. The President of the student federation told Jansson that an officer of the Khapa Police, Faizullah Khan had open liaison with them. He used to leak information as a result of which they were privy to Government decision-making. Furthermore, they were never beaten up during the protest marches. The police wielded their sticks on the ground instead of breaking them on their backs.

The Muslim Leaguers, imprisoned for civil disobedience, were sentenced to three months under Section 144. These men ruled over the prisons. They were free to leave the prisons, during day or night, wander in the markets, and spend their nights at home. A friend borrowed my car for the night to transport his friend, a Khan to Mardan. The next day after dropping this gentlemen back to the

prison, my car was returned.

During those days the Frontier Assembly was called in session. Major Khursheed Anwar arranged to take one procession each day to the Assembly Hall so that its proceedings could be disrupted. The procession included students as well as the disciples of the Pir of Manki Shareef. Khursheed Anwar advised the students to let the disciples stay at the front, while they should stay behind. Government officials had marked the boundary beyond which no one was allowed to proceed. When the police fired, the disciples were on the front line. Major Khursheed said, "The mission is completed. He wanted to shed Muslim blood, now it has been done." [Erland Jansson, p. 169]

People like Khursheed Anwar and other terrorists freely wandered around the province. While the Hindus and the Sikhs were being victimized and killed; the government officials were left unharmed. The British Governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, and his subordinates were trying their best to topple the Government. On the subject of Caroe, Wavell once wrote, "Caroe himself had never yet reconciled to the idea of our leaving India." [Wavell, p. 329]

Caroe was still hankering after Wavell's Breakdown Plan. The Frontier was its most important link. This is where the watch-dogs of the British Empire had stationed themselves to keep an eye on the boundaries of colonialism. Although they knew that their objectives could perhaps be achieved through the Muslim League but Caroe and his colleagues realized that neither communal rioting nor civil disobedience could topple Dr Khan Sahib's Government. Therefore, they were forced to change their game-plan.

13

Partition Proposals before Mountbatten

When Mountbatten reached Delhi and began his discussions with political leaders, he held his first meeting with Gandhiji. Gandhiji said since Jinnah was prejudiced against the Congress, the best way to remove this prejudice was to dissolve the Interim Government and allow Jinnah to form a new Government. The choice of Ministers should be his. This would prove to the world that the Hindus and Muslims have reached an agreement and are prepared to coexist in peace and harmony. The responsibility of the British would be to protect not the minority but the majority rights.

Mountbatten's second meeting was held with Jinnah. On hearing Gandhiji's proposal Jinnah immediately remarked that this "disease" had become so rampant that its only solution was radical surgery. Jinnah's uncompromising stand was due to the fact that following the departure of Wavell he lost hope of ever getting Pakistan. Another alarming development was the American interest in Anglo-Indian affairs. When relations between the two became very strained America jumped in. The U.S. Government made several attempts to convince Britain to reconcile with the Congress.

On 1 May 1947 two Americans, Ronald A. Hare, Head of the Division of South Asian Affairs, and Thomas E. Weil, Second Secretary of U.S. Embassy in India, visited Jinnah. A detailed account of this visit was sent by the American Charge D'Affairs to Marshall, the Secretary of State. According to this account Jinnah stated that under no condition was he prepared to accept the scheme

for a united and federated India. The Muslim League had decided to insist upon the creation of Pakistan:

> He [Jinnah] sought to impress on his visitors that the emergence of an independent, sovereign Pakistan would be in consonance with American interests. Pakistan would be a Muslim country. Muslim countries stand together against Russian aggression. In that endeavour they would look to the United States for assistance, he added. [Venkataraman, *American Role in Pakistan*, p. 1]

This is a variation on the old British game of hanging around the Soviet neck, the "albatross" of Islam. The second problem Jinnah presented to these Americans was also a part of the British scheme. If the British left a United India in the hands of the Congress it would have disastrous consequences for the western world. The Congress, being a sworn enemy of England and other western countries, would be unwilling to protect their interests in the Middle East and the Gulf. "Jinnah coupled the danger of Russian aggression with another menace that Muslim nations might confront."

That was "Hindu imperialism." The establishment of Pakistan was essential to prevent the expansion of Hindu imperialism to the Middle East [Venkataraman, *American Role in Pakistan*, p.1] Jinnah was trying to persuade the United States that it was politically expedient to build an Islamic bastion against the Russians. If India was allowed to remain unified then the bastion stretching from Turkey to China would be incomplete. This message was being communicated by Jinnah through every American Agent. The slogan was, "Create Pakistan and save the western world!"

Jinnah's proposals began to succeed, thanks to American interference. Iskander Mirza was asked to refrain from attacking the tribal areas because Pakistan was already in the bag. There was no need to fight the *Jehad* ! Right from Linlithgow to Wavell, both Viceroys had twisted the communal situation in a way so as to place the entire destiny of India in the hands of Jinnah. Now, there were three ways open for him: (1) A United India; (2) The Proposal of

the Cabinet Mission, i.e. three groups, or (3) Pakistan. None of these were simple alternatives. Jinnah should have found a way in which the Muslims could be given their rights in non-Muslim States. These leaders had been elected in minority Muslim provinces for the obvious reason that they could protect the Muslim rights. Now the entire matter rested on the decision of Jinnah and the Muslim League.

There were two alternatives: (1) a vast Pakistan with limited rights; or (2) a small Pakistan with complete rights. When the Muslim League rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan for the last time and demanded partition they were told that if India was divided, Punjab and Bengal would have to be split into two parts. Jinnah threatened Mountbatten that he would ask for Sylhet district in Assam. Mountbatten said this demand was legitimate, and would be acceptable to the Congress as well:

> Jinnah admitted the apparent logic of this and begged Lord Mountbatten not to give him a "moth-eaten" and "truncated" Pakistan. The demand for the partitioning of Bengal and Punjab was all bluff on the part of the Congress to frighten him off his claim for Pakistan. But he was not so easily frightened. [Hodson, *The Great Divide*, p. 227]

It was evident that Mountbatten was trying to persuade Jinnah to accept the Cabinet Mission's group proposal. This is why he was continually making him aware of the difficulties that could arise from the creation of Pakistan. He tried to warn Jinnah:

> Nevertheless, wrote Lord Mountbatten while recording the talk, he gives me the impression of a man who has not thought out one single piece of the mechanics of his own scheme, and he really will get the shock of his life when he comes down to earth. [Hodson, *The Great Divide*, p. 229]

When Mountbatten realized how inflexible Jinnah was, he called Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and warned him that if Jinnah obstinately pursued the partition route he would get nothing but, to

quote his own words, a "truncated" and "moth-eaten" Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan stated that he would consult his colleagues and inform the Viceroy. The next day Liaquat Ali Khan visited Mountbatten as the spokesman of Jinnah and the Muslim League. He said, "If your excellency was prepared to let the Muslim League have only the Sindh desert, I would still be prepared to accept it." [Hodson, *The Great Divide*, p. 224]. While this horse trading was going on, another calamity erupted in Bengal. When the Bengalis discovered the imminent danger of the partitioning of Bengal, the Chief Minister of Bengal, Suhrawardy, told the Viceroy, "He could say with confidence when given enough time he could persuade Bengal to remain united. That he could get Jinnah to agree to that and in that event it need not join Pakistan." On the same day Mountbatten discussed this issue with Jinnah. He wanted to find out the latter's views on a united Bengal. Mountbatten records, "'Without hesitation', Jinnah replied, 'I should be delighted. What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta? They had much better remain united and independent'."[Hodson, p. 246]

These historical records and Government documents are a shocking revelation of the fact that these leaders of the Muslim League were completely unconcerned about serving their humble and weak brethren. Their actions were entirely governed by personal considerations.

The most complex link in this chain of events was the Frontier. In 1946 they had rejected the politics of the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan. The British interest was confined to the tribal passes which led to Russia by way of Afghanistan. The Governor of the province, Caroe, presented a proposal to the Central Government that fresh elections should be held so that the new members may decide about the future of the province. Mountbatten summoned the Chief Secretary, de Lafarque, and asked him two questions. First, if elections were held what result could he predict? Secondly, are the Ministers very dissatisfied with Governor Caroe? Dr Khan Sahib had told the Viceroy in the presence of Caroe that if he wanted to meet the leader of the Muslim League he should not look very far for he was standing right in front of him in the shape of Governor Caroe! Lt. Col. de Lafarque expressed his view:

> that a free and clean election in the province was more likely to return the Congress to power than the League, even if Section 93 was imposed. That the Governor, though having a great knowledge of the Frontier, was biased against the Congress Government, and his continuance in office was a menace to British prestige. [Hodson, *The Great Divide,* p. 283]

Following these private discussions with the Chief Secretary, Mountbatten gave up the idea of holding fresh elections. The Muslim state of mind is evident from this incident recorded by Campbell Johnson in his book *Mission with Mountbatten.* During a trip to Peshawar he attended a dinner given by the Governor in honour of Mountbatten. During dinner, he sat next to the Peshawar Deputy Commissioner, S.B. Shah. Throughout the evening this gentleman kept expressing the view that the British should not leave India. Johnson wrote about the ironical turn of events: he and Mountbatten, two Englishmen, wanted India's freedom. And here was an Indian insisting that the British should not leave India!

Since Mountbatten could not agree to the Governor's suggestion of holding fresh elections because they would result in Khudai Khidmatgar victory, he had to find other ways of transferring power to the Muslim League. Another issue arose as a result of the difference between Governor Caroe and the Congress. The leader of the Interim Government Jawaharlal Nehru expressed the desire to tour the Frontier Province, visit the various Agencies and discuss with his tribal brothers India's future and their place in it. Caroe was alarmed. All along he had been trying to impress upon the Government that all tribals were anti-Congress and pro-Pakistan. To prove his point, plenty of false evidence had to be cooked up. The so-called "leaders" of the tribals who presented petitions to the Government were galley slaves of the British. One such example was recorded in Iskander Mirza's book. Iskander Mirza had no hesitation in mounting an attack on India using the tribals of Waziristan, Tirah and Mohmand. These British minions had in thier employ Pirs and Faqirs who could be used to create unrest among the tribals. On 20 April 1946, Masood Malik Gulab Khan wrote a letter to Jinnah:

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,
I, on behalf of all the Masoods of South Waziristan Agencies, beg to assure you of our armed help for the achievement of Pakistan, whenever so ordered by the Muslim League High Command. We have full faith in your leadership in these critical times—wish you a long life and health. I am also ready to send a Masood armed escort as your bodyguard, if so ordered. Pakistan Zindabad. [Erland Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan,* p.175]

It is difficult to believe that an individual from South Waziristan would write to Jinnah in Bombay offering to fight the British on behalf of the League. That he could have written such a letter without the advice and consent of the political agent is unlikely. Anyone, who has inside information about the relationships between the Maliks and the Agents, can smell a conspiracy from a mile!

To Malik Gulab, Jinnah replied, "I am in receipt of your letter of the 20 April, and thank you very much for the sympathies and confidence in my leadership. With regard to my staff, I have my own arrangements. While thanking you for your kind offer, there is no need just now to trouble you." [Erland Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan,* p. 175]. Who asked a Waziristan Chief to address Jinnah as Quaid-i-Azam? Several questions arise, but the most amazing fact is that a Malik of North Waziristan makes a direct contact with an Indian politician. How could he give Jinnah assurance that the entire Agency would be in favour of Pakistan? How come the Political Agent or any other British outpost was unaware of this letter? For the same reason, one of the leaders of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, Yakub Khan, was being threatened with death? His crime was that a Khalifa of Faqir of Ipi had directly written to him. Neither could the letter be produced as proof, nor could any witness prove Yakub Khan's crime. These dual standards were not confined only to Waziristan. Malik Bawar Khan of the Khyber Agency sent a telegram to the members of the Cabinet Mission. "Khyber Agency tribes have full confidence in Jinnah. Muslims cannot accept anything except Pakistan."

[*Khyber Mail,* 5 April 1946]. Malik Gulab Khan had probably secretly despatched the letter, referred to in an earlier paragraph, but Malik Bawar Khan's telegram was published in the English daily of Peshawar. This public display of loyalty did not bother the British.

The above examples explain why Caroe was worried about Jawaharlal's intended visit to the tribal areas? Caroe wanted to stop this trip because the Muslim League was most unwilling to let Nehru visit the tribals. The Pir of Manki Shareef toured the tribal areas and spread the malicious rumour that Jawaharlal Nehru intended to destroy their freedom and make them slaves of the Hindus. Governor Caroe's weekly report to the Centre contains a detailed account of this tour. He wrote that the Pir of Manki Shareef had gone on a tour of Khyber, Mohmand and Malakand. In Peshawar, the Muslim League held a function at which Barrister Qayum said:

> The Hindu-Congress is on the war path. In the tribal belt we have an immeasurable reservoir of strength. You must organise and unite from Gilgit to Quetta. The hour of trial is coming. Be prepared. Islam in India needs your help in this hour of trial. Tell Pandit Nehru that if he wants to talk, he should go to Mr Jinnah. There is no sense in talking to the tribals. [*Dawn,* 13 October 1946]

The events that transpired when Jawaharlal Nehru arrived in the Frontier, despite the advice of the Governor, have been recorded by Erland Jansson in the form of confessions of some of the Government officials. Masood Malik Gulab Khan told Jansson, "The assistant political officer, one Abdul Mannan, was particularly helpful and would encourage and guide them secretly." Malik Gulab Khan also admitted that he paid Rs 200 to snipe at Nehru's plane when it landed at Razmak.

Erland Jansson's conversation with Faridullah Shah, the assistant political officer of Khyber, makes the situation perfectly clear:

At that time Col. Khursheed was Political Agent of Khyber

> Agency. Two or three days before Nehru's arrival Khursheed sent for me and told me Nehru was coming to Khyber. He said that if the tribals would receive him in a docile way, all Mohammadans of this part of the country would go under the suzerainty of the Hindus; as a Muslim I should do something. But at the same time he warned me not to tell him all the actions I would take. Do you know why? He was a religious man, and if he was asked anything he could say he did not know! I went straight to Jumrud where I contacted a certain Malik Kuki Khel called Swatai Khan. The only question he asked was, "What would be the reaction of the political agent?" I told him, "Don't worry." I very strongly told him that nobody was to be killed. They should resort to very heavy sniping. On return from Jumrud I contacted Mullah Sahib of Manki Shareef. He had a lot of disciples among the Shinwaris and Mullagors. So he also went on tour to Landikotal and Mullagor area. [Erland Jansson, p. 186]

The above is an example of the obsequiousness of the Maliks and Khans. I feel that the British spoiled their tribal game by causing the incident at Malakand. Nehru and his party were attacked. They were injured and the truth was out! There was an important geographical difference between Malakand and other Agencies. All other Agencies lay between the tribal areas on one side and Afghanistan on the other. Malakand was located between Mardan, Swat and the Dir State. It was natural that the Maliks of this area were relatively more dependent on the Political Agent. Sheikh Mehboob Ali, the Political Agent of Malakand, had recently been charged with bribery. During the war when he was the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, he had embezzled large quantities of funds during the construction of underground shelters. It is said that his bungalow in his village, Sheikhan, was built with materials stolen from Kohat. Therefore it became obvious why he showed extra efficiency in the attack. People realised that while the other Agencies still retained the tribal spirit, Malakand was secure in the Political Agent's pocket. Without his consent no tribal could have touched Jawaharlal Nehru.

The attack upon Jawaharlal was supposed to prove that the Khudai Khidmatgar popularity had taken a down turn and that the Pakhtoons accepted the political leadership of the League. It did neither. It only proved that the British had temporarily taken leave of their senses. They did not even remember that the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement was confined to the Frontier and that its leaders were not even allowed to step into the tribal areas.

The members of the Assembly were elected from the Zilas of the Frontier Province. The tribals did not have any vote. The British were deliberately getting the issues mixed up. They were aware that the Khudai Khidmatgar was a popular movement. They had to take help from political agents, underling retainers, Maliks, Mullahs and Pirs to incite the tribals against the existing Government using the name of Islam. Their ultimate aim was to use the tribal unrest to somehow seize the power from the Khudai Khidmatgars and present it to the Muslim League. In this manner the partition proposal could be rationalized.

Another political circus was held in the Frontier. The Muslim League was asked to convene an assembly. Truck loads of people were collected from all over the provinces. Mountbatten was invited and informed that this angry crowd was about to attack the cantonment and the Government. Neither the police, nor the army could control this violent mob. Only if Mountbatten asked them, would they disperse. Governor Caroe wanted to prove to Mountbatten that only the Muslim League could have arranged such a massive gathering. He hoped that Mountbatten would be convinced that since the Muslim League had collected such enormous crowds at the Cunningham Park in Peshawar, it was proof of the fact that the Pakhtoons had joined the Muslim League, leaving for ever their loyalties to the Khudai Khidmatgars.

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Dominion Status and Commonwealth

The Muslim League was firm on its demand and Jinnah was not prepared to accept any thing short of Pakistan. This was the result of the expeditious efforts of the British. The policy of Lord Linlithgow, and Mr Amery, the Secretary of State for India, was that the greater the divide between the Hindus and the Muslims, the brighter the chances for the British to become the arbitrators and administer their own problem-solving recipes. The British insistence on including the Muslim League in the Interim Government had convinced many people that the British were favouring the League and had taken a final decision on Partition. With the passage of time, communal hatred was growing as was evident by widespread communal riots.

When the Muslim League joined the Interim Government, one of its Ministers got the Finance portfolio. At that time there were two capable and competent Muslim officers in the Ministry of Finance, Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Choudhury Mohammad Ali. Knowing that business and industry were in the hands of non-Muslims, Liaquat Ali Khan, while preparing his first budget, imposed such heavy taxes that these capitalists and industrialists staggered beneath their adverse impact. The first priority of the Congress had always been to provide relief to the poor. Therefore, they found it difficult to object to this budget. The capitalists and the industrialists were forced to seek other solutions. This was a dead-end situation; therefore, they came to the unfortunate conclusion that it was better to concede the demand of the Muslim

League for Pakistan. They also advocated that if the Muslim League was prepared for the partition of Bengal, Calcutta should be allotted to India, as also the mining areas of coal and iron ore, and the League might be given the waterlogged lands prone to floods in East Pakistan. They wondered why the Congress objected to this scheme of division? They said that India should have no objection to this scheme provided the Muslim League agreed to the division of Punjab. Thus, as a result of pressing public opinion, India was driven to accepting the creation of Pakistan.

Time had come for final decision making. The principle of partition had been accepted. The British strategy was to keep both these countries as Dominions within the British Commonwealth. Pakistan had no objection to this proposal. Mr Jinnah had given the bait to Mountbatten when he found he was trying to convince him about the advantages of Pakistan. In the course of this discussion Mr Jinnah had hinted that Pakistan would join the British Commonwealth as a Dominion. Mountbatten ridiculed this idea saying that Jinnah was surprised when he found Mountbatten indifferent to this proposition. He said that when the occasion arose, he would place Jinnah's proposal before the British Government. Jinnah had thought that he was placing Britain under a great obligation.

The British were more interested in winning over India to the proposed arrangement in which, as a Dominion, it would be a member of the British Commonwealth. A difficulty arose, however, when the Constituent Assembly met in a joint session. It decided that India may become a Republic but not a Dominion. The Government of India, being a successor authority, should maintain its continuity of association with the British. There was one other aspect of the problem. Since Pakistan was separating itself from India and was as such covered by the term "secession", its continued association with the Commonwealth was all the more necessary. Another difficulty before India was the existence of over 600 Princely States. Since these States had entered into treaties with the British Crown, their future status was uncertain unless the new Government was recognized as the successor to the British Government: India's decision to join the Commonwealth solved this

problem. The only remaining obstacle was that the structure of the Commonwealth would have to be altered so that a Republic could also become a member.

The British were now satisfied that their communal policies had reached a logical conclusion. Having used up all their tricks of divide and rule, they played their final trump by presenting the patriots with the parting gift of partition! To celebrate their departure they lit the communal spark before closing the door behind them. The atmosphere thus created resulted in mass killings, and a bloody carnage with a disastrous impact on future generations.

PROCLAMATION OF THE PLAN OF 3 JUNE

The seeds of dissension sown by the British had borne fruit. Communalism, like galloping cancer, spread to every vital organ of the nation. Jinnah prescribed surgery as the only solution. India, a land where Hindus and Muslims had lived for centuries in harmony, amity and peace, and where the Muslims had ruled for centuries without any disturbance, was going to be balkanized through the machiavellian designs of the British. The partition of India was a partition of the Muslims.

On 2 June, Mountbatten invited three representatives for discussions, one each from the Congress and the Muslim League, and one from the Sikh community. Nehru had indicated to Mountbatten that he and Sardar Patel would like to attend this Conference on behalf of the Congress. However, since Acharya Kripalani had recently become party president, his presence was also necessary. When Jinnah heard this, he insisted on the inclusion of a third member in the Muslim League delegation. The delegation now consisted of himself, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar. Nishtar's was an extraordinary case. When his name was proposed by the Muslim League for appointment as a Minister in the Interim Government, the Congress Party had raised an objection. They said that he could not be allowed to represent the Frontier because in the State Assembly elections of 1946, he had lost in his home constituency of Peshawar. One, who could not represent his constituency in the Provincial Assembly, could

hardly claim to represent the whole province. Eventually a settlement was made with the Congress on the basis that the Viceroy should consult the leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. If he objected, then Nishtar would have to be dropped. Badshah Khan was consulted. His verdict was that whatever the circumstances, the fact was that Nishtar was a Pakhtoon, and, for that reason, he would not object to the proposal of the Muslim League. It was only then Nishtar was appointed a Minister in the Central Cabinet.

The Viceroy discussed the details of the British Government's proposal with this group of top representatives of the two leading political parties: *(a)* division of Bengal; *(b)* division of Punjab; *(c)* referendum in one district of Assam; and *(d)* referendum in the North West Frontier Province with a clear option to join Pakistan or India. For the partition of Bengal and Punjab, a Boundary Commission would be appointed. Its decision would be final, irrevocable and binding on all concerned parties. It was also announced that while June 1948 was the deadline for the transfer of power, attempts would be made that such transfer might be effected earlier.

When Mountbatten expounded this plan, he announced that he did not expect an immediate reaction from the two parties. They were allowed to consult in their respective Working Committees, before conveying their decisions. Jinnah stated that the Working Committee of the Muslim League was not competent to take such an important decision; therefore it would be necessary to convene a session of the All India Muslim League. The Congress Party had already warned Lord Mountbatten about Jinnah's strategy to dither in his decisions, and wait until he saw the Congress' hand before showing his own. The representatives of the Congress Party suggested that Mountbatten should not fall into this trap like his predecessor who used to inform Jinnah of all the discussions and decisions of the Congress Party. They suggested that he should fix a deadline by which both the parties should convey their decisions. Jinnah promised that he would communicate the decision of his party that very evening.

Mountbatten wrote that at midnight Jinnah approached him

saying that he was the only constitutional head of the Muslim League and the authority to take a final decision in an important matter like this, rested with the Muslim League Council. Mountbatten argued that this time the Congress Party was not prepared to give their decision earlier and, once again, allow the League to have an advantage over them. They insisted that final decisions would be communicated simultaneously. Jinnah was most uncomfortable with this proposition. Eventually Mountbatten had to tell him, "Mr Jinnah, I do not intend to let you wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement. Since you will not accept it for the Muslim League, I will speak for them myself." The Viceroy did not stop here and added that the following morning he would announce to all the leaders that Jinnah had given him an assurance with which he was satisfied, and on no account would he allow Jinnah to contradict him. He wrote, "After this announcement when I look to you, Mr Jinnah, you would nod signifying that whatever I am saying is correct." Mountbatten added that at the meeting held the following morning Jinnah, dutifully, nodded his head.

From the above it is clear that on their own neither the Muslim League nor Jinnah accepted the decision of partition, better known as the "Plan of 3rd June." But this proposal and counter-proposal were made on behalf of the Muslim League by the Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, on the basis that he was given the authority to represent and decide on behalf the Muslim League. Whether this authority was given by the Muslim League or he had grabbed this initiative from them remains an untold story. But the facts are in the documents which have been written by these leaders in their own hands, and are available in the archives today.

REFERENDUM

The people of the Frontier opposed the referendum. Their stand was clear. If its purpose was to obtain public opinion, it had already been ascertained a year ago during the elections to the Legislative Assembly. The Khudai Khidmatgars had defeated all the provincial parties including the Muslim League. After just a year what was the need to confirm the public opinion through a referendum?

In accordance with the decision taken in the Provincial Conference of the Khudai Khidmatgars, the leaders of the Congress Party had decided to oppose referendum in NWFP. During this period Mountbatten went to Simla where he invited Jawaharlal Nehru to meet him. When he returned he announced that Jawaharlal Nehru had agreed to hold a referendum in the Frontier. Jawaharlal Nehru explained later that he had a detailed discussion on this issue with the Prime Minister of the province, Dr Khan Saheb, and together they agreed to hold the referendum.

The first objection of the Khudai Khidmatgars to the referendum was that when both the political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, had agreed on partition [ratified by the Central Working Committee of the Congress] it was binding on them in view of their representation in the Congress through Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. What was the need of holding a referendum when they had accepted the plan of partition with NWFP being a part of Pakistan? It was an exercise in futility, the result of which would be confrontation between anti and pro-Pakistan elements at a time when the situation was highly explosive.

But the Muslim League and the British had their vested interests in this referendum. The first objective of the Muslim League was to create an impression that Pakistan was established on the demand and insistence of the people of NWFP. In this process they wanted to prove that Khudai Khidmatgars had all along opposed the establishment of an Islamic State, with the result that referendum was the only recourse.

The NWFP was treated differently from the other provinces. When the partition plan was presented before the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and Punjab they ratified it. Similarly the matter was referred to the Sind Assembly. The question arises why was it not placed before the Legislative Assembly of the NWFP? There was an excellent reason for this. If the Khudai Khidmatgars decided in favour of Pakistan, the decision would have to be credited to them. This was unacceptable to the Muslim League and to the British.

The Muslim League knew that the Khudai Khidmatgars would refuse to participate in the referendum, and it would go in favour

of Pakistan. Therefore, their second objective was to make an issue of the referendum result by saying that the people of NWFP had no faith in the Khudai Khidmatgars. This may become a turning point in the politics of NWFP, and a revolutionary change would occur in its political scenario. The Muslim League would then demand a vote of no confidence in the light of the referendum. Then there would be no alternative for the Government but to accept the verdict of the people and submit its resignation. If the Government did not resign, it may be possible for the Governor General to dismiss it. The Government of NWFP would be taken away from Khudai Khidmatgars and be presented in a platter to the Muslim League.

The Khudai Khidmatgars realised that the British were bent on holding a referendum. They disagreed with the idea but felt that if the British authorities wanted to perform the ritual, the people of the province who were not willing to opt either for India or Pakistan, should be free to establish a free State of their own. The referendum should be held not only on the issue of the partition of the country but also on the issue of an independent Pakhtoonistan.

This demand was rejected out of hand by Mountbatten. Consequently, the Khudai Khidmatgars announced that since the decision on the partition had already been taken, and it had become a non-issue, they would boycott the referendum. This is a classical example of the hypocrisy of the British and the iniquity of the leaders of Pakistan. For example, when the question of the partition of West Bengal arose, the Prime Minister of Bengal, a Muslim Leaguer, H.S. Suhrawardy, proposed that Bengal should remain united and become independent. Jinnah immediately accepted this proposal. But when the same kind of demand was made by Khudai Khidmatgars, they were condemned as enemies of Islam and traitors to Pakistan. It is interesting to recall that in united Bengal, the proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims was fifty-four per cent and forty-six per cent respectively. It was probable that if the non-Muslims won over some Muslims MLAs, they could easily tip the balance and wipe out the possibility of a Muslim League Government. In the Frontier there was no scope for such desertion, or combination because non-Muslims could never form

a Government in a province of ninety-three per cent Muslim population. The Government of a united and independent Bengal would always have been dependent on the support of the non-Muslims; while in the Frontier this problem too was non-existent. The Khudai Khidmatgars were a monkey-wrench in the British plan to hang Islam like a millstone around the neck of Soviet Russia. They realised that this international plan of theirs could not be implemented unless all the patriotic and anti-imperialistic forces were routed.

At that time the leaders of Khudai Khidmatgars believed that the Muslim League would not create any disturbances once Pakistan was established. Had they known otherwise, nobody could have prevented them from continuing to oppose them. As a matter of fact, I had personally shown them this path of confrontation. The Khudai Khidmatgars wanted Pakhtoonistan and the British would not concede them this right of self-determination. Therefore, the only way out of this predicament would have been to pass a resolution in the Legislative Assembly establishing Pakhtoonistan. They would have been assured of the support of the Constituent Assembly of India which was controlled by the Congress Party. If the people of NWFP had used the referendum to announce their accession to India, instead of refraining from voting, they would certainly have got complete independence and also a promise of protection from the Congress Government. We should have explained to our people that if they wanted Pakhtoonistan, they should cast their vote in favour of accession to India. When I look back in retrospect, I feel that we were fooled by what then seemed like human consideration and Islamic fervour of the leaders of the Muslim League.

In those days a friend, who was a member of the Muslim League, told me, "Don't you agree that we have got you in our grip? You are now stranded here, have no means of communication with India, as Punjab lies in between, cannot take a stand in the referendum that you want to accede to India." Agreeing with his analysis, I said:

> It is the policy of your Muslim League and your masters, the British, to partition a well-knit country and balkanize a

sub-continent. We are constructive while you are destructive. Have you forgotten what distance separates the Eastern and the Western parts of Pakistan? If you can form a Federation with two parts of a country at a distance of 1500 miles from each other, why is it difficult for the Frontier to join India with a distance of not more than 300 miles? Besides, you speak of the territory lying between the Eastern and the Western parts of your country as a non-Muslim enemy territory whereas there would be Muslim and Punjabi brethren on the border of my country. But all this could have been possible only if we too had followed your unprincipled policies.

Ultimately, the British got their heart's desire! Preparations were made for the referendum. Sir Olaf Caroe was removed and the referendum was conducted under the supervision of Sir Robb Lockhart. Although Khudai Khidmatgars had announced a boycott of the referendum, the Muslim League mobilised all their resources, and leaders from every corner of India were brought in to foment hatred. Even students from the Aligarh Muslim University were sent in large numbers to different parts of the Province. The amount of rigging on the election day was phenomenal. Bogus votes were cast including some in the names of our leaders! Two interesting incidents occurred. One was narrated to me by Iskander Mirza who, in turn was told by the then Deputy Commissioner of Hazara District. While inspecting different polling stations, he went to one in Gilyat. When he asked how the polling was going on, the staff proudly said that this being a hilly tract although the total number of votes was 200, 210 votes had been cast! He shouted at them and said that if some one raised an objection there would be no answer to the charge of booth capturing. Another incident was related to me during the 1970 elections when the National Awami Party had formed the Government. A lady MLA told me that she had cast fifty-one votes in the referendum! I was struck at this chicanery. You must have had one vote and that too of your husband. What about these fifty votes?" I asked:

Did you cast these votes on behalf of "other" husbands, and, in

that event, did you not consider it necessary to renew your 'Nikah". You must have stood before the Polling Officers and stated that you are the lawful wife of so and so. Being a properly wedded wife what was the status of these 50 men in your life? An interesting development could have been that one of those 50 men could have legitimately claimed you as his wife, because you had made a statement to that effect to the polling officer.

However, as a result of the combined efforts of Government officials, the Muslim League, and the British, the result of the referendum was as follows:

Total number of votes:	5,72,799
Votes polled	2,92,118
In favour of Pakistan	2,89,244 (50.5%)
In favour of India	2,874

Despite this bungling and booth-capturing, fifty percent people voted in favour of Pakistan. It must be remembered that in those days there was no adult suffrage. Consequently, there were only six lakh voters out of a total population of thirty-five lakhs. In addition, the referendum was held only in six districts of the province, and six Agency Areas adjacent to the Frontier were excluded along with the tribal areas. Also, Swat, Dir, Chitral and Amb States were left out. The population of the entire Frontier Province was seventy to eighty lakhs. Three lakhs out of them cast their votes. The normal practice is that whenever the right of self-determination is exercised under the aegis of an international organisation, the verdict is predicted upon two-third of the total votes being cast. Hence, if the Khudai Khidmatgars objected to this methodology of the referendum, their objection was tenable on legal and moral grounds.

Since the Khudai Khidmatgars considered the referendum to be unnecessary, they did not want to waste their time over this issue. All they wanted to do was: fight the old enemy. Finally the light became visible at the end of a long and arduous tunnel. The British were finally compelled to wind up their show. The valiant sacrifices

made by Khudai Khidmatgars had ushered in the day of deliverance. The earnest desire for independence, dormant for years, was fulfilled. They directed all their efforts to clean the existing atmosphere which was charged with tension and hatred. The common enemy had been vanquished and now they were left with their own kith and kin. It was, therefore, incumbent upon all the people of the country to work together, and enjoy the fruits of freedom. A new life was in the offing for the poor and deprived Pakhtoons.

As expected, soon after the announcement of the result of the referendum, the Muslim League raised a hue and cry that the referendum was a vote of no-confidence in the present provincial Government. It was, therefore, appropriate for the provincial Government to offer to resign.

The Muslim League knew that the referendum had nothing to do with the future of the present Government. The referendum was held to ascertain whether the people wanted to remain with India or Pakistan. In this exercise of option the provincial Government had played no part. Confidence or no-confidence was a matter for the Legislative Assembly to decide. The leaders of the Muslim League had raised this agitation for an altogether different reason. Under the existing constitution it was within the Governor General's authority to dismiss a provincial Government. According to the new constitution, however, which the British had promised to proclaim on the eve of independence, this authority was to be vested in the State Government. The strategy of the leaders of the Muslim League was to pressurize the provincial Government to resign, and, if they did not do so, they would, then, urge the Governor General to dismiss them. Therefore, Jinnah had discussions with Mountbatten and requested him to dismiss the present provincial Government of NWFP. But Mountbatten took a contrary stand. He stated that the referendum had nothing to do with this issue and hinted that this was now upto the Muslim League to resolve. They could do whatever they considered proper.

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Appointment of Two Governors-General

A different scenario existed in Delhi. Some developments, which were contrary to British expectations, had taken place. Two of them related to India and one to Pakistan. In India the Indian National Congress had assumed power. It had the same revolutionary leadership which had fought for independence for many years. These men and women passed through a political inferno before reaching their goal. Relations between the Congress and the British were strained. The British policy towards India was biased and hostile, particularly when Congress had declared that they would accept nothing short of complete independence. Several movements had been launched, which the British crushed with an iron hand; bombing was used to rout the Quit India Movement. All this resulted in hatred, bitterness and animosity. The British knew that the Indian leaders and their followers had gone through an ordeal by fire. Departing from the scene of an Armageddon they could hardly accept a cordial farewell.

When the Constituent Assembly of India decided upon a Republic instead of a Dominion, it became clear to the British that their game was over. When India agreed to join the British Commonwealth as a Republic, and accepted membership of the Commonwealth with the Queen of England as the Head they were pleasantly shocked. The British statesmen in India as well as in England were amazed that the leaders of the Congress had exhibited such political acumen and sagacity, and given precedence to the interests of the country over their own personal interests.

What was more surprising for the British was that the leaders of the Congress had decided that during the interregnum and under the new constitution, they would elect Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General of India. The British were astounded, as also were statesmen of other countries to see that in these difficult circumstances and at such a critical juncture when India was about to decide her policies and plans for future, she had entrusted the reins of power to an Englishman. The country did not lack trusted and popular leaders who were capable of occupying this highly responsible position. This was an unprecedented act of wisdom and foresight on the part of a political party which had shown that its leaders had no personal enmity against the British. It had also proved beyond doubt that its leaders were not motivated by their own interest but by the interest of the country and nation. Campbell Johnson wrote that in accordance with Mr Jinnah's suggestion Lord Mountbatten was to be appointed the Governor-General of both the Dominions. But Jinnah, characteristically, had a last minute change of heart. He kept stalling on the decision, saying that he wanted to consult his colleagues. Campbell Johnson wrote that his colleagues suggested to Jinnah that in view of the fact that the country had to face many problems such as demarcation of provinces, division of assets, army, railway, etc., it was in the interest of Pakistan that during the interregnum, Mountbatten should continue as the Governor-General. According to Johnson, Jinnah sat over this advice for a week, before announcing his decision. "He has at long last come clean, and Jinnah's verdict goes in favour of Jinnah". In this connection Mountbatten wrote that when he learnt of Jinnah's decision, he tried to explain to him the difficulties and disadvantages for a new country which were inherent in his decision. Jinnah said, "He realised all the disadvantages of giving up the common Governor-Generalship, but he was unable to accept any position other than the Governor-General of Pakistan on the 15th of August...." Mountbatten tried to explain that the Governor-General was only a constitutional postiion; the real power would rest with the Prime Minister. In case Jinnah was interested in authority and power, he should become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. To this Jinnah's answer was, "In any position it is I who

will give the orders and others will act on them." Mountbatten wrote, "I asked him, 'Do you realise what this will cost?' He said sadly, 'It may cost me several crores of rupees in assets.' To which I replied somewhat acidly, 'It may cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan'. " Mountbatten was greatly perturbed about the future of Pakistan.

Jinnah's decision to become Governor-General in the prevailing circumstances was disappointing especially for the British. The matter of distribution of assets and liabilities which was the number one priority of the Governor-General should have been entrusted to an impartial arbitrator, even an Englishman. This would have gone 100 per cent in the interest of Pakistan. The British could not conceal their disappointment and indignation, which was reflected in their bitter criticism of him. Mountbatten's position was unenviable. He had assured the British Government that Jinnah would opt for a common Governor-General; he honestly believed he would! Jinnah's decision, therefore, seemed a personal insult to him.

I believe that when Jinnah was presented with the proposal of a common Governor-General, he was convinced that the Congress leaders of India would never agree to having an Englishman as the first Governor-General of a free India. Jinnah probably thought that by accepting a common Governor-General he would oblige Mountbatten and the British Government. He was confident that India would reject the proposal; he would, then, lay the blame at India's doorstep, and withdraw his acceptance, saying that he had done so because India had not agreed. The world leaders found the Congress policies broad-minded and futuristic compared with the insular vision of the Muslim League. Here was an organisation which had fought British imperialism, their leaders and volunteers were jailed, exiled, and even hanged for the cause. As a consequence, it was natural that they should have harboured hatred and hostility. Yet despite their long struggle for freedom, the Congress leaders displayed extraordinary courage, level-headed approach and broad outlook. The country was their number one priority, overtaking hatred against their implacable enemies, the British. Thus they showed an extraordinary greatness of mind, character and principles. This is why a newly independent India occupied a

place of honour in the comity of nations. This also made a positive impression on Britain. An atmosphere of consolidation and progress was created.

Compared with the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League had always lagged behind. It had not fought for freedom, was not pitted against the British, and did not launch any movement against them. It was now common knowledge that but for the British, Pakistan would never have come into existence. The British united the Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League, and propped up Jinnah so that he could stand up and fight against the Congress. Jinnah's decision not to opt for a common Governor-General was, therefore, all the more shocking and irresponsible. Even if he did not consider the interests of Pakistan, he should have shown some courtesy to his benefactors, the British, in appreciation of their long cooperation and support. Immediately, a comparison was made between the Congress' dignified and firm policies, and the Muslim League's policies of weak vacillation. The British were sorry for what they had done for Jinnah, and his party; even though their policies were not intended for the benefit of the Muslim League but for the furtherance of their imperialist and colonial interests. The relations between the two were less than cordial.

Another interesting aspect of this matter is presented in the book *Freedom At Midnight,* [by Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins]. For the first time it was revealed that Jinnah had been suffering from TB. The authors have further proved that the doctors and specialists had told him that he would not live for not more than two or three years. Therefore, given his short life expectancy, Jinnah was not prepared to give away the office of the Governor-General to Mountbatten. By temperament, too, Jinnah could not be content with anything except the highest office in the land. How could he, therefore, tolerate that he should occupy a position lower than that of Mountbatten?

While the leaders were busy conspiring against each other in their stately mansions in Delhi, the whole country was scorching in communal heat. The Hindus and Sikhs were relatively richer; they had properties, businesses, bungalows and factories. They were looted and killed, less in NWFP and more in Punjab; efforts were

made to chase away the survivors so that they could leave their houses and wealth behind. These migrants, in retaliation, started the same bloody game of murder and plunder in East Punjab and Delhi. A vicious circle began to gyrate on both sides of the border. People became crazy with killing, plunder, loot, arson, and abduction of women. According to one estimate, about 30,000 to 40,000 women were abducted from Punjab alone. This was Britain's parting kick at a country which they had exploited for 200 years. These were the people who had starved their children to feed the British; they had sacrificed their youth to protect the Crown and Empire; they had fought against the enemies of Britain in every corner of the world; they even went to the extent of offering to attack the sacred *Kaaba* for their infidel masters!

Oppressed and helpless, the Indians lost all sense of proportion. They treated the British as their friends and their own Hindu and Muslim brothers as their enemies. In this regard the attitude of the Muslim League was unpardonable. It is understandable that the leaders of the Muslim League wanted the Hindus and Sikhs to leave their new country, so that they could be all in all in Punjab. One can also understand the human failing that they wanted to expropriate the evacuated properties. But why did they loot and set fire to about one hundred and twenty houses and bungalows of the Hindus and Sikhs in Murree? The properties left behind by the Hindus and Sikhs were the properties of people of Pakistan. Were they so blinded by communal hatred that they set fire to the properties of Pakistan? It is heart-rending that communal hatred flared up to an extent that people slit the throats of their neighbours and friends. Against the background of this carnage, leaders were seeking power, seats of authority, portfolios, and public offices. The top guns were forming provincial Governments; while others were taking possession of the abandoned properties of the migrants. Whosoever started this political bloody game, with whatever purpose and objective, its deplorable result was that the street thugs and small-time criminals came into the open and had a field day. They killed innocent children, set houses on fire; raped girls and women. The oppressed migrants were leaving their country in abject misery. It seems that some people had arrogated

to themselves the responsibility for partition even before the partition of Punjab was officially announced. We read in history books how kings used to flee their countries and take refuge in other kingdoms. Now we were witnessing their subjects fleeing and seeking refuge in other countries. How bitter tasted the fruit of freedom! It had been officially announced that the country would be partitioned, become free and Pakistan would be established. Why was it necessary, then, to indulge in this madness, to sever old and abiding fraternal relationships, and to foster hatred instead of amity in this sub-continent?

That year, following my usual pattern, I had gone to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was in jail because of his differences with the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Congress was trying to arrange for his release so that he could be present at this crucial and important juncture in the history of the country. In Kashmir, we found thousands of Hindus and Sikhs from district Hazara, who had taken refuge from the communal riots. At that time Gandhiji had also come to Kashmir so that he could use his good offices with the Maharaja to get Sheikh Abdullah released. I used to visit Gandhiji almost every day. I was shocked when I found that Gandhiji did not seem to have his usual sense of humour, his lighter mood of gossip, and his liveliness which was so characteristic of him. One day, I took the courage to tell him that I had been watching him for a few days and it seemed to me that his inner light had been extinguished, why was he not jubilant over the departure of the British? "It is a rare occurrece in history," I said, "that one witnesses the fruit of one's lifetime struggle. Under your guidance forty crore helpless and oppressed people were brought out of the darkness of slavery to the light of freedom. Is it not a moment of joy? Is it not the time to inspire them to achieve higher goals? You had once said that you would live upto the age of one hundred and twenty-five! How wonderful for free India, that she would reap a long range benefit from your experience and guidance."

Gandhiji had an endearing trait of character: that he talked to people of different temperaments at their mental level. When I had spoken, I found Gandhiji in a very sombre mood. He said, "So far it was my desire to live upto the age of one hundred and twenty-five

years, but now I have no such desire. The objective before me was not just to attain freedom, but also to remove all the social ills in the society which had festered during the 200 years of the British rule. They have practically divested us of our traditions of tolerance and harmony, and, instead, fomented hatred and discord through their communal policies. I had thought that we could change the entire system and people of this country and would live together like brothers, in love, harmony, and peace, so that coming generations may be blessed with all of that, which, thanks to the British, we have been deprived of. Therefore, in addition to the freedom of my country, the primary objective of my life was maintenance of cordial relations between the Hindus and the Muslims. Since I could not attain my objective, this freedom has become tainted. Today, when I see Hindus and Muslims separated, with a more or less permanent gulf, I feel politically and spiritually defeated. I have no desire to live any longer."

Then glancing towards me he said, "How could I consider it a day of freedom and joy when I had to say goodbye to your father, Badshah Khan, at the Delhi Railway Station. He was my comrade, friend, companion, and fellow freedom fighter, and now that we have attained independence, we are parted. Perhaps we may never see each other. Now you see what joy this independence has brought for me?" Gandhiji paused and then continued; "If you look around at India today, you will see that all the empty spaces and bazaars of Srinagar are crowded with Hindu and Sikh refugees, from NWFP. Similarly, in Bengal, Bihar and Delhi, Muslims are suffering the trauma of partition. The Punjab situation is, by far, the worst. Caravans of Muslim refugees are going towards Pakistan, and, similarly, unending streams of Hindu and Sikh refugees are coming to India. They are being massacred enroute. Men have turned brutes. Barbarism is rampant; every group of refugees is faced with well-organised attacks. Bloodshed has become a daily occurrence; people are being killed irrespective of their age or sex. Is this the freedom that we wanted to attain?"

Then Gandhiji asked a poignant question. "When I cannot remove this mutual hatred and ill-will between Hindus and Muslims, and cannot create feelings of love, peace, and harmony in the

name of God and religion, you tell me whether there is any point in my living any more? I would prefer death to this kind of life."

These were incontrovertible facts which only a seer could have perceived, one who was above all vested interests. Assuming that partition was inevitable, we should have conducted it like sensible, prudent, and responsible men. This type of occurrence is not unprecedented in world history. There are some countries which were initially united but subsequently partitioned; for example, Sweden and Norway. At one time they constituted a single country; subsequently they decided to split themselves into two countries. Having taken this decision, they peacefully determined their respective boundaries, minus looting, arson or bloodshed. Today they live next door to each other like mature and good neighbours. In India, we became crazy with hatred; if a Hindu was killed in Peshawar, his relatives migrated to Delhi and killed innocent Muslims in revenge; and so the wheel kept on spinning until the land was strewn with freshly mutilated bodies. Similarly, if someone usurped the property of a Sikh in Pakistan, and forced him to flee the country, the Sikh went to India and took possession of the property of some rich Muslim. One spark, and the entire forest is burnt down. So it continued for several months. Let it be remembered that this blood was shed in the name of religion, in

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Partition of Provinces

I wish to remove one misunderstanding which has persisted for a long time. The leaders of the Muslim League aver that the partition of the provinces was the policy of the British. This is downright false. As mentioned above, when these leaders took into account theproportion of Muslims and non-Muslims in these two provinces, they realized that they would have difficulty in forming the Government in Bengal and Punjab. Statistics revealed that the Cabinet Mission's proposals showed that in Group 'C' namely, Bengal and Assam, there were 36 per cent Muslims and 34 per cent non-Muslims. In Punjab there were 12 non-Muslims for every 16 Muslims. Of the non-Muslims, 8 were Hindus and 4 were Sikhs. Therefore in forming a government in these two provinces, the League would have a wafer-thin majority of 2 to 3 members only. I have made a reference to this situation earlier in the book. When these difficulties were brought to the notice of Jinnah, he suggested that certain areas predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims would have to be excluded from Pakistan. These have been detailed in documents which have since been made public by the British Government.

Another testimony in support of the Muslim League's effort to win absolute majority in Punjab is found in the diary of Wavell. "Agha Khan came and talked of the necessity of Pakistan and the impossibility of Hindus and Muslims agreeing; he said Jinnah was willing to concede Amritsar-Ambala etc. in the North-West, and the Hindu districts of Bengal and Assam." [Wavell, Feb. 1946].

According to Baldev Singh, "Jinnah did not want a settlement." He had held discussions with him in London, but had got nowhere, and Jinnah offered no assurance to the Sikhs even if they supported Pakistan. This shows that the Muslim League was not interested in having a united Punjab. They decided that no matter how small the area of Pakistan might become, it must be one over which the Muslim League could have absolute and undisputed power. They tried to get the non-Muslims to migrate from all the provinces of Pakistan. They were not at all worried about the retaliatory repercussions of this mass exodus, upon the Muslims in India. They were offered as sacrificial lambs at the altar of the Muslim League politics, and left at the mercy of the non-Muslims in an atmosphere of communal frenzy, hatred and enmity.

With regard to the "truncated Pakistan" I want to mention another important event. The Khan of Kalat in Pakistan was in litigation with the British authorities over Quetta and certain disputed areas in its vicinity. Jinnah was his lawyer. When the partition of India was announced, the Khan raised the issue with the Government of India that Kalat should be accorded the same status as Nepal because it was not part of India. In proof of his claim he cited the treaties which his ancestors had made with the British rulers. In his book entitled *A Short History of the Nation of Biloch and its Laws,* the Khan of Kalat wrote that a meeting was held in which one party consisted of himself, and his legal adviser Sultan Ahmed Khan, and the other included Jinnah, Governor-General designate of Pakistan, and the Prime Minister designate, Liaquat Ali Khan. Lord Mountbatten was also present. After detailed discussions the following decisions were made:

a. On relinquishment of power by the British on 15 August, the State of Kalat will revert to the status which existed in 1838 when a treaty was made between the then Khan of Kalat and the British Agent.

b. In case no agreement was reached between the Khan of Kalat and the Government of Pakistan with regard to accession, then it would be within the competence of the State of Kalat to accede to Afghanistan.

This agreement bears the signatures of Khan of Kalat, Mount-

batten and Jinnah. This pattern of events initiated by the Muslim League was replete with contradictory decisions. At Suhrawardy's insistence, they passed a resolution for the complete independence of a United Bengal, then they proceeded to divide Bengal and Punjab and included in it one district of Assam which amalgamated with Pakistan. They encouraged the Khan of Kalat to let his state accede to Afghanistan. Their objective is clearly stated by Liaquat Ali Khan; that they were content even if the desert of Sind alone were to be given to them.

We in the Frontier used to laugh at the antics of the Muslim League. It was often said that this was not partition of India but partition of Muslims! The League was prepared to desert crores of Muslims of India, without bothering to look back at their miserable plight. When their leaders and officials migrated to Pakistan, these Muslim Indians were left behind, totally helpless. The Muslim League leaders used to claim that the Hindus who would opt to stay back in Pakistan would be treated like hostages. If the Hindus in India committed excesses upon the Muslims then the Pakistani Muslims would use the Pakistani Hindus as political leverage. This was expected to maintain the balance. Having banished the Hindus from Pakistan, the question arose; What would happen to the helpless Muslims in India? How would they exert pressure and on whom? The one irrefutable truth was that no one was the least bit bothered about the Muslims who would be left behind in India. They were too busy plundering homes, properties, bungalows, shops, factories and business houses of Hindus and Sikhs. Muslim Leaguers were openly looting and expropriating the properties of the non-Muslims although they had no legitimate claim to them. The actual claimants were the Muslim refugees who had lost every thing in India when they migrated to Pakistan and whose properties had to be left behind. These properties should have accrued to the Government of Pakistan, so that they could have been utilised for public benefit. In public interest, it was the duty of the Government of the day, to adopt the position that in case of partition of a country, the legitimate claimants were those brave patriots who struggled for freedom against the oppressive rulers; who suffered imprisonment; in particular those families who have lost all their

possessions and whose children have been deprived of proper upbringing and education. The youth who sacrificed their present for ushering in a better future for their countrymen, should have been the legitimate heirs of freedom. Accolades should have gone to the young and brave women who stood alongside their husbands in the struggle for freedom and those mothers who sacrificed their children for the country. The country should have paid a debt of gratitude to these martyrs, and valiant freedom fighters. But the existing situation was altogether different. The British had won, and the nation lost! The British were annoyed with the Khudai Khidmatgars, because, with the sole exception of the Ulemas of Deoband, only they had revolted against the British. Now they were reaping the punishment for rebellion against their colonizers. Power was, once again, bestowed upon the very same title-holders, Nawabs, Khan Bahadurs and Jagirdars, who had always been supportive of the British, so that they could implement their policies to the letter. These Jagirdars, Knights, and Nawabs wanted the entire nation to become dependent on them, so that they could appropriate all the wealth of the nation. The Khudai Khidmatgars had the self-confidence, self-reliance, and the urge to demand rights for the poor and oppressed people of their homeland. But this did not serve the interests of the British, nor that of their sycophants, the Knights, Nawabs and Jagirdars.

17

Muslim League and Princely States

One-fifth of the Indian territory was under princely rule. The inhabitants of these states comprised two-fifth of the total population; out of forty crores they totalled sixteen crores. There were approximately six hundred states of varying sizes. The Congress and the Muslim League were at loggerheads on the future of these states. The Congress policy was that the people of every state should decide their own destiny. The Muslim League's stand was that this right should be exclusively vested with the ruler. His subjects should simply follow him to whichever side he chooses.

The map of India was broken into fragments of various sizes, each of which comprised a Princely State. Across the country one saw various examples of governance by Nawabs and Maharajas. Some states were equal in size to small countries of Europe. One such example, the Nizam's Kingdom of Hyderabad, with a population of two crores, was approximately the size of Italy. The League had in mind Princely States such as Hyderabad Deccan, Bhopal and Rampur where the rulers were Muslims and the majority of inhabitants non-Muslims. Kathiawar's states such as Junagarh and Manawadar were in a similar predicament. Although these states were at a distance from the Pakistan border the distance was not as vast as the distance between Karachi and Dacca. On the basis of this argument presented by the Muslim League, the accession of these states to Pakistan was feasible. No one could take an exception to their logic that the ruler should decide the fate and future alliance of his state. The League did not consider it

necessary to consult the people of the states. Never having approached the British for the rights of the people of India, they could not be expected to concede the rights of the people living in an Indian State under a Muslim ruler. They were, in fact, anxious to impress upon the British that the Muslims of India did not want them to leave. The Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell, wrote that the British should stay on in India for a while; at least the Muslims did not want to see them go. "He [Liaquat Ali Khan] said that in any event we [British] should have to stop for many years yet, and that the Muslims were not at all anxious that we should go." [Wavell, p. 207].

The majority of the Muslim League leaders was indifferent to the fate of the Indian Muslims. Ironically, however, the decision for accession of the Indian States was being made on the basis of Islam. The leaders were indifferent to what would happen to Kashmir [where the Maharaja was a Hindu while the majority of the population was Muslim] in case the right of the ruler deciding about accession was conceded. How would they rationalize their double standards—one for the accession of Hyderabad, Bhopal, and Rampur and the other for the accession of Kashmir?

Kashmir presented another difficulty for India. Its boundaries did not coincide with India's boundaries. Fortunately, this problem was resolved by the Muslim League when it agreed to the partition of Punjab. When the report of the Boundary Commission was received and the District of Gurdaspur was included in India, it extended Indian boundaries up to Kashmir. Since both the political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, had accepted that the verdict of the Boundary Commission would be final and binding on both, the Muslim League did not have the right to object to the District of Gurdaspur becoming a part of India. If the Hindu Maharaja of this state wanted to accede to India, the Muslim League had no moral or legal right to question this decision. They had already declared that the accession of the Indian states would be decided by the rulers. In this manner the Muslim League presented Kashmir to India on a golden platter. Thanks to her leaders, Pakistan lost to India another territory with a Muslim majority.

18

Communal Politics and Ideology of Muslim League

The Muslim League considered itself to be the custodian of the rights of the Muslims. It offered Pakistan as a panacea for the removal of all grievances, difficulties and problems of the Muslims. Not only was it to be a Muslim country, but also an Islamic State. It is important to make a distinction between these two concepts. There are many countries in which Muslims are the majority; an Islamic country is one where Islamic polity and system of Government is established. If we look at Muslim countries we find that almost every country has a different system of Government: some have monarchy others have military rule, some have dictatorship and some have a parliamentary government with a plural party system. The Muslim League declared that it wanted to establish Pakistan so that an Islamic judiciary and Islamic society could be created. It would become a model for the entire world of Islam, so that other countries may emulate its example and establish Islamic Governments.

In support of its demand for carving out another country, its main argument was that India consisted of two nations. For the first time, the world heard the theory that nations were constituted on the basis of religion. According to the Muslim League, the Hindus and the Muslims constituted two different nations, since their religious faiths were different; therefore, India should be partitioned on the basis of different religions, a Hindu State and

a Muslim State. This fundamental principle was articulated by Mr Jinnah in 1940, while explaining the resolution of Pakistan. "The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different civilizations; which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.... To yoke together such two nations under a single State, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that be so built up for the Government of such a State."

So far the concept of a nation had been associated with a country, irrespective of whether this country was inhabited by followers of different religions. Take the example of Britain. People of different faiths and communities live there and yet they are all known as British. Similarly, those who live in America are called Americans, no matter what beliefs they profess. This is true of Russia, France, Germany, Italy, etc. Dr Sir Mohammad Iqbal [who is said to be one of the authors of Pakistan] has explained this doctrine in one of his poems:

MAZHAB NAHIN SIKHATA APAS MEN BAIR RAKHNA;
HINDI HEN HAM WATAN HAI HINDOSTAN HAMARA!
Religion does not teach mutual discord.
Strung on a single strand, we are one
We are Indians.

The two-nation theory, based on religion, propounded by the Muslim League had only one parallel in the world. It was on the basis of this very principle that the Jews persuaded the British Government to carve a separate State of Israel out of Palestine.

Let us examine what strategy the Muslim League adopted to make its ideology acceptable and what conditions it created to safeguard the rights of the Muslims, and usher in a glorious future for them. The first question that needs to be examined is what are the fundamental causes for the present misfortunes of the Muslims? The Muslim League believed that the Hindus were their enemy number one, and although, in all honesty, they knew that there real enemy were the British. The hatred of the Muslims should have been directed towards them rather than the Hindus. The British wanted to destroy Muslim rule not only in India, but

in every part of the world. Whenever an opportunity arose, the British did not hesitate to batter the Muslims. History is replete with British atrocities which have left a permanent scar on the Muslims. Starting with the Crusades when the Christians fought against Sultan Salahuddin Ayubi, till the present when the British fragmented the Ottoman Empire, they have inflicted lethal blows on the Muslims. In India, they did not single out the Hindus for persecution, they systematically and mercilessly exploited and destroyed both Muslims and Hindus. In their exploitation game they made no distinction between Hindus and Muslims.

Therefore, it was a new phenomenon in Political Science that a party had emerged in India which considered the Hindus rather than the British as their enemies. They did not stop to think that the Hindus too were oppressed by the British. The British, on their part, made every effort to appear as the imperial benefactors to whom the people of India should pay lifelong homage. Their success can be measured by the fact that if a Muslim soldier was ordered to shoot even at the sacred *Kaaba* he would not hesitate to do so. Another extraordinary development was that due to this hatred created by the League, the Muslims considered all enemies of the British as their enemies. The League was opposed to the brave soldiers of Islam, those action-oriented Ulemas of Deoband, who, following the spirit of Islam, were waging an ideological *Jehad* against the British. They also condemned as *Kafirs* and traitors, those nationalist Muslims who were fighting against the British with patriotic fervour and in the overall interest of the country. I believe that this was the cardinal sin committed by the Muslim League leaders in pursuing their communal policies. They did not identify their real enemy. Their diagnosis of the malady that afflicted the Muslims, was far off the mark. The real beneficiaries of this diagnostic blunder were the British.

In support of their two-nation theory, the leaders of the Muslim League stated that it was first propounded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who founded the Aligarh Muslim University as a modern alternative to the Islamic Academy of Learning at Deoband. A little historical research, however, reveals a different picture. Whatever speeches of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan I have heard are categorically

against the two-nation theory. For instance, in his speech at Gurdaspur on 27 January 1884, reproduced on page 339 of the collection compiled by Makhdoomzada Hasan Mahmood, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan said, "We [i.e. Hindus and Mohammadans] should try to become one heart and soul and act in union." He proceeds further and marshalling some historical and logical arguments, says:

> In old historical books and traditions you will have read and heard, and see even now, that all the people inhabiting one country are designated by the term one nation. The different tribes of Afghanistan are termed as one nation and so the miscellaneous hordes peopling Iran, distinguished by the term Persians, though abounding in variety of thought and religion, are still known as members of one nation. Remember that the words Hindu and Mohammadan are meant for religious distinction; otherwise, all who reside in this country...in this particular respect belong to the same nation.

In another speech delivered at Lahore in 1884, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan explicated the two-nation theory in detail, "These are the different grounds upon which I call both these races which inhabit India by one word, i.e. Hindu, meaning that they are inhabitants of Hindustan," he said.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan went to the extent of calling all Indians Hindus, and gave a clear verdict that in this respect, whoever inhabited Hindustan, should be called Hindu irrespective of his faith or creed.

This was precisely the approach of Sir Mohammad Iqbal. He said, "We are all Indians, we are all Hindis and our homeland is Hindustan." He finds an Islamic justification for this saying that religion does not teach hatred. It is axiomatic that the tenets of the religion are immutable. The Muslims believe that after Prophet no one has any authority to make the slightest change in the basic tenets of Islam. The question, therefore, arises how can religious tenets vary with changing political ideology? Even Sir Mohammad Iqbal like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had gone to the extent of saying

in one of his Persian verses:

DANA-I-SABAHA BA ZUNNAR KASHIDAN AMOZ!
GAR NIGAHE TU DO BEEN AST NA DEEDAN AMOZ!

This verse illustrates the underlying unity and brotherhood between Hindus and Muslims. The poet suggests that the beads of the *tasbih* of a Muslim should be threaded by the sacred thread of the Hindus. He goes on to say that, if you make a distinction between the two, if unity appears duality to you due to your defective eye-sight, alas! you have become blind.

Various resolutions passed from time to time by the Muslim League and the innumerable speeches of Mr Jinnah prove that they believed that if India was partitioned and Pakistan established, all the difficulties and problems of the Muslms would be resolved. It is a fact that the demand for Pakistan was strongest in those provinces where the Muslims were in minority. This is proved beyond doubt by the results of the 1937 elections to the Provincial Assemblies. Ironically, the Muslim League did not emerge as the sole representative of the Muslims in the four Muslim dominated provinces; not a single member of the Muslim League was elected to the Provincial Assembly of Sind and NWFP, and only one out of 84 Muslim members in the Legislative Assembly of Punjab was a League member. In the above provinces, Muslims had formed governments; Sir Sikander Hayat Khan was the undisputed leader of Punjab, Maulvi Fazlul Haq of Bengal, Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh Somru of Sind and Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum of NWFP. In these provinces, therefore, the question of safeguarding the rights of the Muslims did not arise. This question was valid only in the provinces where non-Muslims were in majority. It is a fact that the Muslim League was popular in these provinces and their leaders were the all India leaders of the League in Parliament and in Provincial Assemblies.

How far was the Muslim League successful in removing the difficulties and problems of the Muslims in non-Muslim provinces? It is important to remember that by that time the Muslim League had been successful in implementing its policies. After

having achieved this extraordinary measure of success, namely Pakistan, the question is how far were the Muslims of these minority-Muslim provinces helped by the League's remedy for the Hindu-Muslim problem? The Muslims already had full authority in the provinces which were to comprise Pakistan. They had already been vested with the necessary political authority which was sought to be achieved through the establishment of Pakistan. The only difference was that these provinces were not grouped together under the name "Pakistan". The real problem was that of the Muslims living in Bombay, Madras, Delhi, UP, Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa. While the Bombay Muslims faced problems, West Pakistan was established to cover Lahore and Peshawar; similarly, the Muslims of Bihar and Orissa were in great distress, but East Pakistan was established in East Bengal.

It, therefore, follows that not only the Muslims of India who had to live in their respective provinces after partition, but also the Muslims of Pakistan should ask the leaders of the Muslim League how their panacea for the prosperity, happiness, and freedom of the five crore of Muslims living in India has proved to be effective?

With the proclamation of Pakistan, communal riots erupted all over. The two communities turned each others camps into slaughter-houses. The refugees, having lost everything, migrated from one country to another. No area was safe; hatred and enmity between the Hindus and Sikhs on one side, and the Muslims on the other had grown to an extent that basic human values were lost. In this atmosphere of communal madness, the poor, helpless and oppressed Muslims had no choice but to live with those very Hindus and Sikhs who had been affected by riots. The mental, spiritual, and psychological state of these Muslims was at its lowest. To top it all, those leaders, who claimed themselves to be the sole representatives of the Muslims, had safely migrated to Pakistan leaving behind their Muslim followers to wallow in the mire of bloodshed. All the Muslims who were holding civil or military jobs, to whom the common people could look up to for assistance, had also opted for Pakistan. Which Muslim League leader felt any pang of conscience at the state of helplessness and misery of the Muslims he had left behind? They, who had

nourished the Muslim League with their blood, sweat and tears, collected funds and donations, organised demonstrations and rallies, raised slogans, and had gone to the extent of hating their neighbours, were discarded on the dust heap of history. What happened to all those leaders who had left these Muslims behind at the mercy of the very same Hindus and Sikhs whom they had taught them to hate? These are the questions which should be put to the leaders of the Muslim League.

Apart from Government officials and employees, even small Muslim traders, businessmen and merchants migrated to Pakistan. This dealt a death-blow to the economy of the Muslims in India and, subsequently, they were denied all avenues of economic progress. They were trapped like dumb animals. They had been silenced on religious, political and economic matters; the entire environment was hostile to them. Although lakhs of people migrated to Pakistan, nearly five crore Muslims were left in the bondage of the Hindus. To lead a decent and honourable life under these circumstances was not only difficult but nearly impossible. One by one, all their leaders had migrated to the promised land; I can think of only one leader, Nawab Ismail Khan, who refused to go to Pakistan saying that he was not prepared to leave his Muslim brothers in these conditions, and that he would live and die in this very land, along with them. All other leaders migrated with their families to Pakistan in great comfort and safety leaving behind their political comrades and followers to face the ordeal.

The Muslim refugees, having lost everything, and having been mentally and physically wounded, reached Pakistan in a state of utter misery and distress. They thought they would be safe in Pakistan. It is a well known fact how the rich and influential Muslim refugees in Pakistan took possession of the properties, bungalows, houses and factories of the non-Muslims. The poor riot-affected refugees were left out in the cold to be fed upon the leavings from a rich man's board!

As a legacy of the Muslim League, a political problem thus became a religious one, and a political battle became a communal battle. If it was purely political, the problem would have been resolved with partition. The Muslim League demanded Pakistan,

the Congress demanded freedom of India and both were successful. The British departed, and with it ended the period of suppression and bondage. The religio-political pot-pourri was the cup of poison administered by the Muslim League to the Indian Muslims left behind. The communal Hindus, worked up to a state of religious frenzy, were bound to believe that if the country had been partitioned on the basis of religion and if crores of Muslims were left behind, the Hindu-Muslim problem was unresolved. Therefore, the fire of religious madness and communal hatred could not be quenched. The condition of those Muslims left behind was further aggravated by the fact that first they were at the mercy of the Hindu majority but now they were also subjected to their anger and hatred. The conclusion is inescapable. The Muslim League had failed to find a solution to the problems of the Muslims living in the provinces where they were in minority. They also failed miserably in their diagnosis of the Muslim malaise, and, therefore, the remedy proved to be ineffective; instead of improving their condition, the Muslim League policies reduced them to penury, deprivation and humiliation.

19

Communal Riots and Congress

As a result of the politics of the Muslim League, the whole country was caught up in a communal frenzy. There were, however, certain forces amongst Muslims and non-Muslims, determined to stifle the hatred which had driven people berserk. Once a man loses his human impulse, he stoops to bestiality. Preaching harmony and amity was the only way of restoring sanity. Not doing so would have been a contradiction of every principle of ethics.

Amongst the Muslims an organized effort was made by the Khudai Khidmatgars. Reacting to this the Muslim League intensified its campaign to overthrow them. For the first time, in this part of the country, disruptive forces raised their ugly head in the person of Major Khursheed Anwar. It was clear to one and all that it were the anti-national elements and goondas who had been paid to start plunder and arson, with an unlimited licence to kill. They forcibly took possession of the houses, business premises, and factories of the non-Muslims. Their terrorising tactics were expected to prove the negligence of Government Officials in protecting the non-Muslims. To stop this, the Government asked the Khudai Khidmatgars to come forward as volunteers and protect the life and property of the non-Muslims. Accordingly, we mobilised about six thousand Khudai Khidmatgars in Peshawar. The volunteers of the Muslim League and some hired thugs used to taunt the Khudai Khidmatgars, saying that they were trying to protect the Hindus. They narrated blood-curdling tales of the communal riots in Bihar, and of the excesses committed by the Sikhs upon the Muslims.

Despite this provocation, the Khudai Khidmatgars succeeded in their noble task of saving the life, property and honour of the non-Muslims.

The British authorities wanted to show the world that the rift between the Hindus and the Muslims was so deep and abiding that there was no question of their living together like members of a single united family! They secretly helped in driving away the non-Muslims from this area, as this was in the interest of the Muslim League. Another sinister scheme was to drive out the Hindu and Sikh members of the Legislative Assembly. Accordingly, all the non-Muslim members collected in Bala Hisar Fort in Peshawar and from there they were shipped out to other parts of the sub-continent that later became India.

In other parts of the country the Congress leaders, particularly, Gandhiji, were working hard to stop the communal riots. Gandhiji staked his own life and observed a fast-unto-death in order to stop the killing of Muslims in Calcutta. The impact of his fast was such that Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, even the Police was moved to tears. On the day when thousands of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs embraced each other in the Maidan at Calcutta, Gandhiji broke his fast. But communal riots in those days were like a wild fire, if extinguished at one place they would erupt at another; whether in Calcutta, or Delhi, or East Bengal, or Bihar.

Going back a few months one recalls that it was Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who, as the Prime Minister of Bengal, had led a procession of Muslims to commemorate 'Direct Action' day in Calcutta. This had unleashed a fire-spitting dragon which devoured thousands of innocent people to satisfy its communal appetite. This very gentleman, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, now walked alongside Gandhiji, through the length and breadth of the country, preaching peace and communal harmony. What a bunch of chameleons were these staunch Muslim Leaguers!

20

Repudiation of the Two-Nation Theory by Muslim League

When the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission's proposals and agreed to a federal structure for India, with the Central Government based on a grouping of States, they had, in effect, abandoned their demand for Pakistan. Since the creation of Pakistan was based on the two-nation theory, the logical conclusion was that along with their demand for Pakistan they had also given up this theory. It is difficult to understand that the leaders of the Muslim League who had chosen religion as their main political instrument and sought justification for their every move in the Islamic point of view, should keep altering its basic tenets. Islam does not allow any amendments in its basic principles. Muslims regard Hazrat Mohammad as the last of the Prophets. They believe that he has left a complete, perfect and immutable system for regulating the life of the individual and the community. When the Muslim League decided to create Pakistan they gave the state the fundamental principle of Islam, *La Ilaha Illal lah* [there is no other god but The God]. Then, how was it that the same leaders of the Muslims now decided that they would abandon the demand for Pakistan thereby renouncing the cardinal ideology of Islam? Having established an indissoluble link between Pakistan and Islam it seemed these very leaders became disillusioned with its basic tenets. Religion does not permit tinkering with its fundamental principles; a movement launched today, called off tomorrrow,

all in the name of Islam is repugnant to the devout followers of the religion.

This is a fundamental problem which is faced by every organisation or party which exploits religion in order to further its political objectives. There are, no doubt, other organisations which carry on religious movements for pure religious objectives. For instance, in India there were the Ulemas from Dar-ur-Uloom of Deoband. They considered it their religious duty to launch a movement or *Jehad* against the British infidels. They confined their actions strictly within the parameters of religion. But political parties, particularly the Muslim League which was exploiting religion for politics, encountered the difficulties mentioned above, because the path of religion is straight and narrow, while politics is a winding road! This is an admonition of those who mix religion with politics. As a result of deviation from its political credo, the Muslim League had to abandon its demand for Pakistan. Since this demand was based on the fundamental tenets of Islam, it follows, they renounced not only their political but also their religious ideology.

If we look at the political history of the Muslim League, we find that the leaders acted in accordance with their own wishes or convenience. When Mr Jinnah came to the North-West Frontier Province, he met a number of religious leaders and *Pirs*. He wrote to the *Pir Sahib* of Manki Shareef, Amin-ul-Hasanat that Pakistan would be an Islamic State in which Islamic laws ordained by *Shariat* would be followed. Iskander Mirza's evidence is contrary to Jinnah's statement. He wrote:

> Before we all left Delhi, I said to the Quaid-i-Azam one day, "Sir, we are all agreed to go to Pakistan; but what kind of polity are you going to have? Are you going to have an Islamic State?" "Nonsense," he replied, "I am going to have a modern State."

As a matter of fact the Muslim League had modelled Pakistan along the lines of paradise as enunciated by the Mullahs! You got whatever you desired, streams of milk and honey flowed, and countless *Houries and Ghilmans** were close at hand for service

*Beautiful girls and handsome boys

and entertainment. The fruit you desired would appear, whether it be grapes, pomegranates, apples or almonds. Growing, watering and manuring them would not be an ordeal. And if *Shariat* law was vouchsafed to Pir Sahib of Manki Shareef, that promise, too, would become illusory!

We have seen that when Muslim League was allowed to join the Interim Government, they included as Minister one Joginder Nath Mandal who was a Hindu and a Harijan. It was unusual that a totally Theocratic State which had arrogated to itself the responsibility of safeguarding the interests of the Muslims, could entrust them to a Hindu Minister.

Three days before the official declaration of the establishment of Pakistan, namely, on 11 August 1947, Jinnah's detailed speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, enunciated the policy of the Government:

> If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you no matter what community he belongs to, no matter what his colour, caste or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this State, with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.* I cannot emphasise it too much; we should begin to work in that spirit, and, in course of time, all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. You may be forced to go to your temples, mosques or any other place of worship; you may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State....

It is important to remember that this speech was not made by the Quaid-i-Azam at a press conference nor in any reception given in his honour; but it was the official proclamation of the policy of the

* G.Allana, Historical Documents, pp. 545-6

new State, made in its Constituent Assembly, in the presence of the members who were expected to draw the constitution for the Islamic State of Pakistan and to define the fundamental rights of her people. The question arises from what position was Jinnah making these statements? He was the undisputed leader of Pakistan; the father of the nation, the elected President of the Muslim League Party which claimed to represent the Muslims of the entire subcontinent. What is important, he was also the Governor-General of Pakistan, and, finally, the elected President of the Constituent Assembly. There was no responsible organ of the Government or the ruling party which Jinnah did not represent. He was reading from a prepared text. This was probably the first written speech that an experienced barrister and parliamentarian like Jinnah had delivered; he knew that it was a very important and historic speech because it enunciated the policy of the new State.

Several new aspects of Jinnah's philosophy are reflected in this speech. First of all Jinnah uses the word 'community' for the Hindus and the Muslims instead of 'nations'; he calls them majority community and minority community, but he does not stop at that. He further explains that this implied the Hindu community and the Muslim community. I believe that this is the cardinal point of the speech; the rest of it is elucidation and explanation.

Another important point is that while describing the Muslims, he mentions Pakhtoons and Punjabis along with the Shias and Sunnis. Similarly, while on the subject of Hindus, he mentions Bengalis and Madrasis along with Brahmins, Shudras and Kshatriyas. Subconsciously, therefore, he makes no distinction between their religious and regional identity. In this manner he demolishes his entire fundamental thesis that a separate area should be ear-marked for the followers of a particular faith. His mental process also cuts across the distinction of caste, creed and ethnicity.

Towards the end of his speech he sums up his policy:

> .... Now I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each

individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

The fundamental difference between the ideology of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Congress on the one hand, and that of Jinnah and the Muslim League on the other was that the former believed that religion was a matter for the individual and that the people of India were equal in the eyes of the law. Having established Pakistan on the basis of the contrary ideology that the Hindus and Muslims were two different nations, the same Jinnah announces with a great sense of responsibility before the members of the Constituent Assembly that Hindus and Muslims are *not two nations* but they are *two communities* and in the State polity and policies there should be no discrimination between them.

The question arises that if this was Jinnah's declared ideology, what was the need to plunge the sub-continent into bloodshed and riots, and for what purpose were so many lives lost? Why were lakhs of families ruined, why was communal frenzy and hatred created, and why was permanent animosity betweeen the two communities fanned to an extent that thousands were mercilessly butchered? It will be a long time before people forget these events. Words, in the form of political speeches, will never prove unguents for those wounds.

This only proves Lord Mountbatten's allegation that the Muslim League never bothered to give a second thought to the consequences of their demand for the division of the country or their proposal for the creation of Pakistan. If attention were to be drawn to the devastation they had caused, they would have turned stone deaf. But when the Government of Pakistan was entrusted to the League, and they were saddled with the problems of nationalism, polity and statehood, they found inherent contradictions in their politics. It now became clear to them that if a State were founded on the basis of religious faith, then the non-Muslim population of a Muslim country would be compelled to migrate to a non-Muslim State and vice versa.

Jinnah faced a serious problem of reconciling his politics with the religious ideology. He reached the conclusion that since there were a large number of non-Muslims, in the newly carved country

called Pakistan, they too would be known as Pakistanis. They too would consider themselves to be members of the nation and that the word Pakistan should not become synonymous with Muslim. He realised the inadequacy of his previous political philosophy. When Hindus and Muslims became inhabitants of a new country called Pakistan, they ceased to be separate and became one nation known as Pakistan. On the basis of their religious faith and for purposes of distinction they could be described as different communities. It is ironical that Pakistan was created in a region where these two communities had lived together for centuries. The only change that occurred was that a part of this country was given a different name. According to the Muslim League, differences between the Hindus and the Muslims ceased to exist in this new country. In the context of this two-nation theory, it is necessary to dispel one more myth. The Muslim League continued to give the impression that this was their own ideology. A Government, State, or Nation, has no ideology of its own; ideology does not pertain to any landmass. It relates to a group of individuals, an organisation, or a party. It continues to be propagated by this group of individuals, parties, or organisation so long as they are in power. For instance, as a land mass, Russia has no ideology of its own. To begin with, it was the Czar's monarchy, but when the Czar was overthrown the political power passed on to the Communist Party. Thus the Communist ideology was introduced. What happened in India? Here the British held sway over crores of people. When they left, and the country was partitioned, Pakistan had no ideology of its own. Its ideology was the ideology of the Muslim League. So long as the Muslim League continued to be in power their ideology prevailed. When another party with a different ideology came to power, the Muslim League walked out with its ideology and the ideology of Pakistan was that of the new ruling party.

It is a paradox that Jinnah did not wait for another political party to come to power and, on his own, rejected the two-nation ideology and accepted secularism. It was, therefore, a fair game for people to ask the leaders of the Muslim League to define their ideology after Jinnah had made some surprising comments in his speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He had suggested to the

people that they should change their past and that the policies of the new country should be governed by the principles which had been enunciated in this speech. Whoever accepted Jinnah as his leader and trusted his political acumen, intelligence, and wisdom, must have concluded with him that the two-nation theory of the Muslim League was not his ideology nor that of Pakistan. His concept, on the contrary, was secularism. If one thinks carefully, it becomes apparent that as a result of the policies of the British rulers India was partitioned on the basis of communalism, and, with the departure of the British, communal politics was rejected. This sequence of events has a moral which is reflected in the following Persian couplet:

HARCHE DANA KUNAD, KUNAD NADAN;
LAKE BAD AZ KHARABIYE BISYAR!
What a wise man does in time,
A fool does late,
After creating a lot of damage!

The Muslim League gave the communal policies of the British religious twist by suggesting that voting would be on communal lines. Hindus would vote for Hindus and Muslims for Muslims. The Congress Party was in favour of a joint electorate. Later, when Jinnah made it clear that in Pakistan there would be no discrimination on the basis of faith, caste, creed or community, how could the Muslim League advocate and adhere to the principle of separate electorate? In the light of the new policy proclaimed by Jinnah, the Muslim League had to accept the principle of joint electorate.

21

14 August 1947

The days of freedom were drawing closer. In the country thousands of communal fires were continuing to smoulder. It looked as though every one was intent upon cutting the other's throat. Young boys and girls and children, who had led sheltered lives and had never stepped outside their carpeted drawing rooms and bed-rooms, were brutally murdered. All human values were eroded. It was most ironical that these conditions coincided with the country winning its fight for freedom. While houses were set on fire, and streams of blood flowed in towns and cities, parades were held, bugles were sounded, salutes given. Celebrations were held in every part of the country. In the city of Karachi unending streams of refugees were escaping from their burning homes, while the murderers' bullets were riddling human bodies. Families, who had never stirred out of their homes, were walking barefoot on the roads and open spaces. In the same city 14 August was being celebrated as the day of emancipation, partition and creation of Pakistan.

Lord Mountbatten and Lady Edwina came to Karachi to proclaim the end of the British Empire by giving the oath of office to the new Governor-General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Neither Mr Jinnah nor Liaquat Ali Khan, who was appointed as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, went to the airport to welcome the Mountbattens. Instead, Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, Governor of Sind, received them on behalf of the Government of Pakistan. The leaders of the Muslim League had a peculiar mentality. They often

overlooked minor matters of protocol and decorum. They had the impression that showing disrespect for others will earn them respect. Jinnah created another issue by insisting that he should be provided a higher chair than Mountbatten in view of the fact that he was the Governor-General of Pakistan and President of the Constituent Assembly. But the British diplomatically turned this request down hinting that Jinnah would assume the office of the Governor-General only when the Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, delivered the oath of office. Until such time that all powers inherent in the office were transferred to him, Jinnah had no official position. It was also made clear to him that even if he became Governor-General, his office would be lesser in importance than that of the Viceroy.

As soon as the question of prestige and protocol was settled, another problem arose. It was rumoured that the Sikhs of Punjab were infuriated and had planned to assassinate Jinnah by throwing a bomb at him when he went to the Assembly House. When Mountbatten arrived, he was asked what he wished to do in the light of the above information, regarding the ceremonial procession? Mountbatten said that the decision was not his to make; it was upto Jinnah and the party. When he realised that Jinnah had left this decision to him, Mountbatten said:

> If any one has planned that he would explode Jinnah by a bomb, it is probable that when I go with him in the carriage, there may be no such attack on him because by doing so they would be killing the Governor-General of India along with the Governor-General of Pakistan; that is why, I have no objection to the procession being taken out.

After this assurance arrangements were made for the ceremonial procession. After the function when Jinnah and Mountbatten reached the Government House safe and sound, Jinnah said, "Thank God, I have got you back alive." To this Mountbatten replied, "Thank God, I have got you back alive!"

These were the gory circumstances in which we attained independence. After transferring the power, the British departed. The Union Jack was furled after two hundred years. It was replaced by the flag of Pakistan.

22

Formation of Government of Pakistan

When the Central Government of Pakistan was formed, Jinnah became Governor-General, Liaquat Ali Khan Prime Minister, and almost all the old Muslim League leaders became Ministers; such as Chundrigar, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar and the same Harijan leader Joginder Nath Mandal. The latter was given the portfolio of Law. The Muslim League had promised that Pakistan would be governed in accordance with Islamic and Quranic laws. How anamolous that in this Islamic State the Ministry of Islamic Law was entrusted to a Harijan! This was a slap on the face of the Ulemas, Mullahs and Pirs. It was particularly difficult for the Pir of Manki Shareef to swallow this insult. He still believed in the statement of Jinnah that the *Shariat* Law and the Islamic system of Government would be established in Pakistan. Now that the office of the Chief *Qazi* in Pakistan was given to a non-Muslim the Pir was speechless with shock! The Muslim League offered no satisfactory explanation for this decision.

Let us look at one other aspect of this matter, which has been discussed in detail in previous chapters. The British had planned to construct an ideological citadel of Islam in the territory stretching from Turkey to China as a buffer against the surge of Communist ideology so that this would act as a ring around Soviet Russia. In order to achieve this objective, it mattered little to the British if India was partitioned, Muslims divided or there was bloodshed among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The British were neither foes of the Hindus nor friends of the Muslims. They

set up Pakistan not as a gesture of friendship towards the Muslims, but under the compulsion of their international policies.

Earlier, I had discussed the genesis of Viceroy Wavell's Breakdown Plan. According to this, the British could not continue to rule over the whole of India; therefore they should liberate the Hindu-dominated provinces and move all their civil and military officers, together with their families, to the Muslim-dominated provinces. Pakistan would consist of these provinces which would also serve as the British foothold in this part of the world. The Labour Government did not agree with Wavell's plan. His was a soldier's mind, not necessarily endowed with wisdom or vision. The British politicians did not have the slightest doubt that the days of military domination were over. Strong arm tactics had to give way to political solutions. The concept of Pakistan was evolved after considerable thought.

The British knew that as a consequence of the partition both countries would be weakened. Although India's sovereignty was guaranteed, its international border defence was weak. India was losing the North Western Frontier Province, which had natural barriers in the shape of mountains, from Khyber pass to Bolan pass, and similarly upto Sinkiang, on the border of China. A similar situation existed on the Eastern front. There were also serious difficulties of defence in Assam because the roads, airfields, railway lines, and, what is more important, navigation routes through rivers, would remain in East Pakistan. Three strategically important ports, Chalna, Khulna and Chittagong were also in Pakistan and thus the undisputed control over the Bay of Bengal was also lost to India. Apart from these frontiers and natural arrangements for defence, India was also deprived of one of her best trained regiments for which the British slang was PM's i.e. Punjabi Musalmans. These excellent soldiers had played a very useful role in the expansion of the British Empire. There was hardly any country in the British Empire where these Punjabi Musalmans had not shed their blood for expanding the colonial and imperialist designs of the British.

India was also facing several economic difficulties. Factories were on the Indian side of the border, while raw materials were on

the Pakistani side. At some places the factories fell on one side, while the market was on the other side of the border. The British had successfully reduced India to a position of such economic weakness that they were satisfied that she would never be able to extricate herself from these difficulties and would continue to be dependent on the Western powers.

The problems of Pakistan were more intricate than those of India. The main problem was created by her geography; her two parts were separated by one thousand miles through Indian territory where the effects of the communal riots persisted. People had not forgotten the bloodshed, but Pakistan was wholly dependent on India for communication between its Eastern and Western Sectors. It is difficult to gauge the seriousness of its economic difficulties. West Pakistan was a land of deserts and mountains while East Pakistan was inundated by floods. It would take centuries to resettle areas, set up factories, and achieve a reasonable degree of economic progress. During this period of reconstruction, Pakistan would have to depend on the charity of the affluent West.

The most dangerous consequence of partition was the growing hatred and enmity between the two countries. This was a natural consequence of the communal riots. Under these circumstances an atmosphere of cooperation and amity was impossible. In fact, the two countries became sworn enemies of one another. Where this kind of attitude of confrontation exists, it is inevitable that the arms race would become their number one priority. They became more concerned about building up their defences instead of thinking of removing poverty. As a result, both the countries were compelled to take assistance from the West.

The British were satisfied that on no account would Pakistan ever sever relations with them. But they had no such illusions about India. They knew that the Congress had always opposed them and made great sacrifices in the freedom struggle. Since the same Congress Party was elected to form the Government there was no hope of friendship with India. The Indian leaders had a broad vision; they had a feel for international relations, and were fully acquainted with the hidden iron fist of British imperialism. The British would never have dared to use them for

furthering their imperialist policies.

Pakistan was a different story. The Muslim League had taken no part in the country's freedom. They never launched any movement or struggled for freedom. So engrossed were they in opposing the Congress Party that they sought British help in fulfilling their objective. The British were aware that in the whole of Pakistan there was only one organisation which had participated in the struggle against British imperialism, the Khudai Khidmatgars of the North West Frontier Province. The British and the Khudai Khidmatgars were naturally not kindly disposed towards each other. On these two scores, the Muslim League and the British were on common ground; therefore, whoever opposed the British, was also opposed to the Muslim League. Consequently, a Muslim League Government was expected to fall in line with the British, and would allow the British to use it in taking revenge on behalf of the allies. The British viewed Pakistan as a totally new country, which would take a while to stand on its own. For years to come the Government of Pakistan would have to look up to the British for assistance.

Another reason for British complacency about Pakistan was that her rulers were not locally born, but had migrated from India. They were immigrants who did not have their roots in the new country. Their authority was derived from the Muslim League. Based on empirical evidence the British realised that the Muslim League could not acquire political power even in Muslim Punjab. It is axiomatic that if a political party is not properly organised and disciplined, the political power slips out of its hands and passes on to the bureaucracy. The Government of Pakistan did precisely what the British had expected them to do. Almost all key positions were given to the British. When the names of the new Governors of the Provinces were announced, with the exception of Sind all the provinces had British Governors: (1) Sir Frederick Bourne, East Bengal; (2) Sir Francis Mudie, Punjab; (3) Sir George Cunningham, NWFP; and (4) An Englishman as Agent in Baluchistan.

Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah was the only Pakistani, who was appointed the Governor of Sind. This appointment was made because the capital of Sind was Karachi which also happened to

be the capital of Pakistan. The Government House of Sind was occupied by Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan. Therefore another residence had to be arranged for the Governor of Sind!

The British were appointed the Chiefs of the Pakistan Army, Air Force and Navy: (1) General Sir Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief, Army; (2) Air Vice-Marshal Perry Keane, Chief of Air Force; and (3) Rear Admiral Jefford, Chief of Naval Staff.

There were five British Secretaries in the Central Government of Pakistan. In addition, Defence and other Central Ministries were placed under British officers. In his autobiography, Iskander Mirza profusely praised these British officers, saying how hard they worked for the consolidation of Pakistan. In particular, he admired one General Ross Mackay, who was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing the Pakistan Army. Iskandar Mirza has also mentioned two other British officers through whose intervention Skardu was included in the accession of Gilgit to the Northern Region of Pakistan. According to him these two officers were great supporters of Pakistan. They manipulated a rebellion of the Scouts to facilitate the accession of Gilgit and Skadru to Pakistan. "In the most northern sector things went well, we were able to take over Gilgit Agency and Skadru. Here a rising of the Gilgit scouts was organised by the two British officers with the scouts who were pro-Pakistan."

The situation in the North West Frontier Province deserves special mention, because, as viewed from the British angle, this was the most sensitive area. It was here that for one hundred years the British had fought against the tribals. The main difficulty for the British was that it was this Muslim-dominated Province which had all along opposed the domestic policies of the Muslim League and the international policies of the British. In the last two elections to the State Legislative Assembly, the Khudai Khidmatgars had secured a two-third majority. Therefore, it was necessary, both for the Government of Pakistan and the British, that they should first deal with this province and the Khudai Khidmatgars. It was said about Jinnah that whenever the subject of NWFP and the Khudai Khidmatgars was brought before him, he always said that none but the British could subdue the Pathans. The decisions taken with

regard to NWFP should be viewed in this perspective. In this province a large number of British officers stilll hung around; it was difficult to say that the British had departed and we had attained independence. The Governor of the province was British. British officers were in key positions such as Chief Secretary, Secretaries to the State Government, Police Chief, and even Secretaries of Public Works Department and Department of Electricity.

In addition to NWFP, Pakistan was also concerned about the tribal areas. The British had made all their resources available to the Government to ensure that these areas were consolidated, brought under control and the loyalty of the tribals was, somehow, assured. They had one hundred years of experience with the tribal insurgency to qualify them for their role as advisers to the Pakistan Government. The next step was the accession of these tribal areas to Pakistan. For this, too, the presence of the British was necessary, so that the tribals could be assured of continuity by virtue of the fact that the British would be co-signatories in the new Instrument of Accession. The British had convinced Pakistan that they alone could accomplish the task of impressing upon the tribesmen that the Government of Pakistan was the real successor to the British authority. Therefore, all the treaties and agreements which had so far been signed between the British authorities and the tribals would now be ratified on behalf of the Government of Pakistan by an English Governor. They also offered to convince the tribesmen that the Government of Pakistan was solidly backed by the British, as a guarantee for their sovereignty and stability.

Regarding the international position of this Province, there was the question of Afghanistan. The British Government had consistently acted upon the principle that since the Government of Pakistan was the successor to the British, all those agreements and treaties which the Government of India had made from time to time with the Government of Afghanistan would, ipso facto, become binding on the Government of Pakistan. The British Government had made it clear to the Government of Afghanistan that since Pakistan was a member of the British Commonwealth, the treaties made between the Governments of Afghanistan and Britain were still valid. The Durrand Line which was the accepted

international boundary between Afghanistan and the British Empire would continue to be the valid border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, because it was, in fact, the boundary of the British Commonwealth. Continuing this line of argument, the British explained to Afghanistan that since Pakistan was a member of the British Commonwealth, it was incumbent on the Government of Great Britain to guarantee its sovereignty, defence and stability. This must have surprised the Government of Afghanistan in view of its historical relationship with Britain.

There was a time when Germany had attacked Russia and pushed the Russian forces almost upto Moscow. When the British saw that Germany had conquered the whole of Europe and was moving in on Russia, they were faced with the happy prospect that it would no longer present the potential danger which they had been warding off all these years through constant changes in policy. In the meantime Japan started conquering one British colony after another in the Far East, including Burma. When they bombed Calcutta, the British were alarmed! At that time they proposed that the Government of Afghanistan should demand from them the return of the territories which were ceded to NWFP and Baluchistan under the treaty of 1893. Subsequently, the situation changed. When Germany lost the war along with Japan, and they were no longer a serious threat to the British Empire, the British policy turned round one hundred and eighty degrees! Russia's victory would have meant the continuation of the threat of communism. Hence, the pressing need for securing the sanctity of the Durrand Line and protection of the international boundary. On the face of it, the British showed concern for the sovereignty and consolidation of Pakistan, but all this was being done so that Afghanistan could be reduced to the status of a buffer state, and the British could pursue their old anti-Russia policy utilizing the Government of Pakistan.

With regard to the successor authority I am reminded of another important development. When a political party under the banner of the Muslim League emerged in NWFP, some of their leaders, while espousing the case of Islam, transgressed the limits of human consideration, to say nothing of political decorum. Since

these leaders had no case against the Khudai Khidmatgars, they started the propaganda that since the Congress was a body of Hindus, the Khudai Khidmatgars, who were in favour of the Congress during the freedom struggle, were agents of Hindus. The effort was to tarnish their record of national and patriotic services, and to negate their sacrifices. Sir George Cunningham's absurd allegation was touted around that since the Hindus were not the *Ahl-e-Kitaab,* the Khudai Khidmatgars' support of the Congress was tantamount to cooperating with infidels or *Kafirs.* Some Muslim League leaders went a step further, and, in their speeches, called them enemies and made obscene statements transgressing all bounds of decency. This campaign of vituperation and vilification against Khudai Khidmatgars reached a crescendo when, in addition to calling them the agents of the Hindus, they were called descendants of the Hindus. But then these very Muslim League leaders did not lose a moment in occupying the evacuated Hindu properties. How could they rationalize this when, in fact, according to their own claim, the descendants of the Hindus were alive and well. At that time I told them:

> It is curious logic that when we participated in the struggle for freedom with the Congress against the British rule, the gutless Muslim League leaders used to taunt us by calling us the children of the Hindus. Now when the Hindus have left behind properties worth crores of rupees, those very leaders are the first to arrive, take possession of them, and assert their right on them.

I added that according to both the civil and religious laws, children were entitled to the properties of their fathers. Therefore, who was the legal heir to the properties left behind by the Hindus? The Khudai Khidmatgars, or the leaders of the Muslim League? Naturally, whoever had the authority of the Hindu migrant would be entitled to his property and would be considered the legal heir. It was strange that when it was time to struggle against the British, the Khudai Khidmatgars were branded as children of the Hindus; but when the question of claim to their properties was raised, the original charge was forgotten, and, instead, the Muslim leaders

made the soul-stirring declaration that they were the real claimants of Hindu properties.

On the question of successor authority, there was no justification for the Muslim League to claim that they had inherited power after the departure of the British. Had they launched any movement to claim this heritage? Did they struggle, sacrifice, or fight for it? When the Congress Party claimed to be the successor of the British in India, their claim was valid. Their sacrifices have become legends and passed into history. Thousands of men and women were killed, hundreds of thousands of workers went to prison. In comparison, what has been the role of the present rulers of Pakistan? All along they supported the British rule. In any confrontation that occurred between the British and the Congress, they always cooperated with the British. They made no sacrifices for freedom. They opposed all anti-British agitations. Their pro-British attitude was displayed not only in opposing the Congress, but also in opposing all such Muslim organisations which were anti-British. They opposed the Ulemas of Deoband. They were not prepared to recognize the Muslims who participated in the National Movement. All along they tried to convince the British that the Muslim League was the sole representative of the Muslims in India. Since the Muslim League had played no part in gaining freedom for their part of the country, now called Pakistan, but were all along cooperating with their masters, the British, it is, therefore, natural to conclude that their claim to being the successor authority was purely hereditary, and not based on any sacrifice or struggle. They would have to admit that the only basis for their claim rests on the premise that they are real 'children' of the British. I do not wish to debate this issue further. Later, it will be seen what happened to the Muslim League after the establishment of Pakistan. A historical review will be made of all the subsequent events in the light of secret documents and historical facts. It would also be discussed how, after the Second World War, the British colonial power ended and how, under compulsion of circumstances, the British entrusted all their imperialist policies to the USA. I will also discuss in detail how in keeping with their old tradition the Muslim League continued to use its good

offices to further the imperialist and capitalist designs of their new masters, the Americans, and how the leaders of Pakistan, using the sacred name of Islam, tried to take the Muslim countries to America, with their begging bowls.

It is a matter of some satisfaction that just as the British have kept some of their most secret documents in their libraries for posterity, similarly, there are secret documents in America to which I have fortunately got access. There is a great amount of material in these documents for a historian and for a patriotic Pakistani. By the Grace of Allah in my next book I will throw light on all these matters.

Appendix

POSITION OF SEATS FOR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1937

Province	Muslim League	Other Muslim Reserved Seats	Congress
Madras	11	17	159
Bombay	20	9	88
Bengal	40	77	50
United Provinces	27	37	134
Punjab	1	83	18
Bihar	Nil	39	98
Central Provinces	Nil	14	71
Assam	9	25	35
N.W. Frontier Provinces	Nil	*36	19
Orissa	Nil	4	36
Sind	Nil	36	7
Total	108	377	715

Source: *ENLIST INDIA FOR FREEDOM* by Edward Thompson, Victor Gollancs Ltd, London 1940 p. 24

* 36 include 12 minority members.

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پڑهندڙ نسُل . پ ن

The Reading Generation

1960 جي ڏهاڪي ۾ عبدالله حسين " اُداس نسلين" نالي ڪتاب لکيو. 70 واري ڏهاڪي ۾ وري ماڻڪ "لُڙهندڙ نسُل" نالي ڪتاب لکي پنهنجي دور جي عڪاسي ڪرڻ جي ڪوشش ڪئي. امداد حُسينيءَ وري 70 واري ڏهاڪي ۾ لکيو:

انڌي ماءُ جڻيندي آهي اونڌا سونڌا ٻارَ
ايندڙ نسل سَمورو هوندو گونگا ٻوڑا ٻارَ

هر دور جي نوجوانن کي اُداس، لُڙهندڙ، ڪَڙهندڙ، ڪُڙهندڙ، ٻَرندڙ، چُرندڙ، ڪِرَندڙ، اوسيئڙو ڪَندڙ، ياڙي، ڪاڦُو، ياجوڪَڙُ، ڪاوڙيل ۽ وِڙهندڙ نسلن سان منسوب ڪري سَڳهجي ٿو، پَر اسان اِنهن سيني وِچان "**پڑهندڙ**" نسل جا ڳولائو آهيون. ڪتابن کي ڪاڳر تان کڻي ڪمپيوٽر جي دنيا ۾ آڻڻ، ٻين لفظن ۾ برقي ڪتاب يعنيe-books ناهي ورهائڻ جي وسيلي پڑهندڙ نسل کي وَڌڻ، ويجهَڻ ۽ هِڪَ ٻِئي کي ڳولي سَهڪاريِ تحريڪ جي رستي تي آڻڻ جي آسَ رکون ٿا.

پڑهندڙ نَسل (پَـنَ) کا بہ تنظيمَ ناهي. اُنَ جو کو بہ صدر، عُهديدار يا پايو وِجهندڙ نہ آهي. جيڪڏهن کو بہ شخص اهڙي دعويٰ ڪري ٿو تہ پَڪَ ڄاڻو تہ اُهو ڪُوڙو آهي. نہ ئي وري پَـنَ جي نالي ڪي پئسا گڏ ڪيا ويندا. جيڪڏهن کو اهڙي ڪوشش ڪري ٿو تہ پَڪَ ڄاڻو تہ اُهو بِہ ڪُوڙو آهي.

جَهڙيءَ طَرَح وطن جا پَـنَ ساوا، گاڙهاڻ، نيرا، پيلا يا ناسي هوندا آهن اَهڙيءَ طرح پڑهندڙ نَسُل وارا پَـنَ بہ مختَلِف آهن ۽ هوندا. اُهي ساڳئي ئي وقت اُداس ۽ پڙهندڙ، بَرندڙ ۽ پڙهندڙ، سُست ۽ پڙهندڙ يا وِڙهندڙ ۽ پڙهندڙ بہ ٿي سگهن ٿا. بين لفظن ۾ پَـنَ کا خُصوصي ۽ تالي لڳل ڪِلَب Exclusive Club نہ آهي.

ڪوشش اها هوندي تہ پَـنَ جا سڀ ڪَم ڪار سَهڪاري ۽ رَضاڪار بنيادن تي ٿين، پر ممڪن آهي تہ ڪي ڪم اُجرتي بنيادن تي بہ ٿِين. اهڙي حالت ۾ پَـنَ پاڻ هِڪَٻِئي جي مدد ڪَـرڻ جي اُصولَ هيٺ ڏي وَٺُ ڪندا ۽ غيرتجارتي non-commercial رهندا. پَـنَـن پاران ڪتابن کي ڊِجيٽائيز digitize ڪرڻ جي عَملَ مان کو بہ مالي فائدو يا نفعو حاصل ڪرڻ جي ڪوشش نہ ڪئي ويندي.

ڪتابن کي ڊِجيٽائيز ڪرڻ کان پو ٻيو اهم مرحلو وِرهائڻ distribution جو ٿيندو. اِهو ڪم ڪرڻ وارن مان جيڪڏهن کو پيسا ڪمائي سگهي ٿو تہ پلي ڪمائي، رُڳو پَـنَـن سان اُن جو کو بہ لاڳاپو نہ هوندو.

پڑهندڙ نَسُل . پ ڙ ن The Reading Generation

پَنَن کي ڪُليل اکرن ۾ صلاح ڏجي ٿي ته هو وَسَ پٽاندڙ وڌِ کان وَڌِ ڪتاب خريد ڪَري ڪتابن جي ليکَڪَن، ڇپائيندڙن ۽ ڇاپيندڙن کي هِمٿائِن. پر ساڳئي وقت عِلم حاصل ڪرڻ ۽ ڄاڻ کي ڦهلائڻ جي ڪوشش دوران ڪَنهن به رُڪاوٽ کي نه مڃن.

شيخ اَياز علمَ، ڄاڻ، سمجهَ ۽ ڏاهپَ کي گيتَ، بيتَ، سِٽ، پُڪارَ سان تَشبيهه ڏيندي انهن سيني کي بَمن، گولين ۽ بارودَ جي مدِ مقابل بيهاريو آهي. اياز چوي ٿو ته:

گيتَ بہ جِٽ گوريلا آهن، جي ويريءَ تي وار ڪَرن ٿا.

... ...

جئن جئن جاڙ وڌي ٿي جَڳَ ۾، هو ٻوليءَ جي آڙ چُپن ٿا؛

ريتيءَ تي راتاها ڪن ٿا، موتي مَنجهِ پهاڙ چُپن ٿا؛

... ...

ڪالهَ هُيا جي سُرخ گُلن جيئن، اڄ ڪلهه نيلا پيلا آهن؛

گيتَ بہ جِٽ گوريلا آهن.....

... ...

هي بيتُ اَتي، هي بَم- گولو،

جيڪي به ڪٽين، جيڪي به ڪٽين!

مون لاءِ ٻنهي ۾ فَرَقُ نہ آ، هي بيتُ به بَمَ جو ساٿي آ،

جنهن رِڻَ ۾ رات ڪَيا راڙا، تنهن هَڏَ ۽ چَمَ جو ساٿي آ ـ

اِن حسابَ سان اڄاڻائي کي پاڻَ تي اِهو سوچي مَڙهڻ ته "هاڻي ويڙهه ۽ عمل جو دور آهي، اُن ڪري پڙهڻ تي وقت نہ وجايو" ناداني‌ءَ جي نشاني آهي.

پَڻ جو پڙهڻ عام ڪِتابي ڪيڙن وانگر رُڳو نِصابي ڪتابن تائين محدود نہ هوندو. رڳو نصابي ڪتابن ۾ پاڻ کي قيد ڪري ڇڏڻ سان سماج ۽ سماجي حالتن تان نظر کڄي ويندي ۽ نتيجي طور سماجي ۽ حڪومتي پاليسيون policies اڻڄاڻن ۽ نادانن جي هٿن ۾ رهنديون. پَڻ نِصابي ڪتابن سان گڏوگڏ ادبي، تاريخي، سياسي، سماجي، اقتصادي، سائنسي ۽ ٻين ڪتابن کي پڙهي سماجي حالتن کي بهتر بنائڻ جي ڪوشش ڪندا.

پَڙهندڙ نَسُل جا پَنَ سيني کي **چو، چالاءِ ۽ ڪينئن** جهڙن سوالن کي هر بَيانَ تي لاڳو ڪرڻ جي ڪوشَ ڏين تا ۽ انهن تي ويچار ڪرڻ سان گڏ جوابَ ڳولڻ کي نہ رڳو پنهنجو حق، پر فرض ۽ اٽٽر گهرج unavoidable necessity سمجهندي ڪتابن کي پاڻ پڙهڻ ۽ وڌ ڪان وڌ ماڻهن تائين پهچائڻ جي ڪوشش جديد ترين طريقن وسيلي ڪرڻ جو ويچار رکن تا.

توهان بہ پڙهڻَ، پڙهائڻ ۽ ڦهلائڻ جي اِن سهڪاري تحريڪ ۾ شامل ٿي سگهو ٿا، بَس پنهنجي اوسي پاسي ۾ ڏِسو، هر قسم جا ڳاڙها توڙي نيرا، ساوا توڙي پيلا پن ضرور نظر اچي ويندا.

وڻ وڻ کي مون ياڪي پائي چيو تہ "منهنجا ياءُ
پهتو منهنجي من ۾ تنهنجي پَنَ پَنَ جو پڙلاءُ".
- ايار (ڪلهي پاتم ڪينرو)

پڙهندڙ نَسُل - پ ن The Reading Generation

FACTS ARE FACTS

The untold story of India's Partition

WALI KHAN

